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ABSTRACT
This report presents the results of a preliminary failure modes and effects 
analysis (FMEA) of a small tritium-breeding test blanket module design for the 
International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor. The FMEA was quantified 
with “generic” component failure rate data, and the failure events are binned into 
postulated initiating event families and frequency categories for safety 
assessment. An appendix to this report contains repair time data to support an 
occupational radiation exposure assessment for test blanket module maintenance.
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2Preliminary Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
of the US DCLL Test Blanket Module 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This report presents the results of a preliminary failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) 
of a small tritium-breeding test blanket module. The FMEA was quantified with “generic” 
component failure rate data, and the failure events are binned into postulated initiating event 
families and frequency categories for safety assessment.  The FMEA pages are given in 
appendices to this report, and another appendix contains representative repair time data to support 
a TBM occupational radiation exposure assessment. 
The United States is a participant in the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor 
(ITER) construction project. This tokamak experiment will have two operational phases: an initial 
physics phase where the machine will use hydrogen and then deuterium fuel while exploring the 
physics of large plasmas, and a high power phase where it will burn deuterium-tritium fuel for 
long pulses of § 400 seconds and produce more power than it consumes. One of the technology 
issues for fusion reactors that follow ITER is production of tritium fuel to meet its own fuel 
demands, which could be up to several kilograms per year. To investigate tritium production, 
ITER has a design provision to allow testing of test blanket modules (TBMs). These modules are 
only a small (1.8 m tall by 0.6 m wide) portion of the § 700 m2 ITER first wall and are intended 
to test the most promising ideas for tritium breeding from fusion neutron bombardment.  
The U.S. has developed two conceptual TBM designs: a helium-cooled TBM (Ying 2006) 
and a dual coolant lithium lead (DCLL) and helium TBM (Wong 2006). The DCLL TBM is an 
interesting candidate option because the dual coolant allows some flexibility in TBM availability. 
If the lithium-lead (Pb-17Li) coolant fails (loss of flow, flow blockage, loss of coolant, loss of 
heat sink, etc.), the TBM can continue to operate as a small, helium-cooled (non-breeding) first 
wall module.  
Part of the TBM design process is to evaluate the reliability and safety of the candidate 
designs. The ITER International Team is preparing inputs to a regulatory safety assessment for 
licensing ITER, the Rapport Preliminarie du Surete (RPrS). The RPrS is to the French Autorite de 
Surete Nucleaire (ASN) regulators in their licensing process what a preliminary safety analysis 
report is to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The RPrS will include the TBMs as part of 
the ITER design. One of the preparations for TBM inclusion in the RPrS is a FMEA. The FMEA 
is a fundamental type of reliability, and also risk analysis, tool that is used to identify failures of 
individual system components in a systematic, thorough manner, quantify the failures, and 
identify possible corrective actions. The FMEA can be used to determine the most hazardous 
failures of system components (which can be used in risk assessment) and the reliability of a 
system. Because the TBM designs from the ITER participants are not finalized, the design 
information for the RPrS is preliminary.  
This report presents three FMEAs that were performed on the three main parts of the U.S. 
DCLL TBM: the Pb-17Li cooling loop, the helium cooling loop, and the TBM module box. 
These three FMEAs are based on design information from the 2005 U.S. DCLL TBM design 
description document (DDD) that was compiled by General Atomics in San Diego, California 
(Wong 2005). 
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42. PRELIMINARY FMEA ON U.S. DCLL TBM PB-17LI FLOW 
LOOP
The FMEA for the TBM Pb-17Li flow loop has investigated potential accident-initiating 
events. Such events are referred to as postulated initiating events (PIEs) in the ITER safety 
approach, and are component or human failures that place the facility in an off-normal condition. 
If redundant systems, backup systems, and/or safety systems function correctly, the facility 
returns to a stable shutdown condition. If there are additional failures, the accident event could 
result in small radiological releases to the environment.  
2.1 Pb-17Li Flow Loop Description 
This description was taken from Wong (2005). The U.S. DCLL TBM is designed to fit in a 
half-port in the ITER blanket/first wall. The TBM module dimensions are 186.4 cm high by 64.5 
cm wide by 30.5 cm deep. Helium coolant is used with the Pb-17Li breeder-coolant in the TBM 
module, giving the dual coolant concept. The helium removes 54% of the heat from the module 
via a helium gas heat transfer flow loop and transfers the heat to the Tokamak Cooling Water 
System (TCWS). The helium loop has tritium extraction, purification, and heat exchange to the 
TCWS. The Pb-17Li lithium-lead eutectic coolant flow loop also has tritium extraction, coolant 
purification, and heat exchange to the TCWS. A schematic diagram of the Pb-17Li flow loop is 
given in Figure 2-1. The Pb-17Li total flow loop volume is § 0.4 m3, the flow rate through the 
TBM piping is § 2 m/s and 0.4 MPa (maximum pressure is 2 MPa), and the operating 
temperatures are 340°C minimum and 470°C maximum (with a design provision to operate at a 
high temperature plateau of 650°C for demonstrating a Brayton thermodynamic cycle and 
enhancing tritium removal). A 20-kW centrifugal pump drives the Pb-17Li flow through the 
single-pass flow loop. Piping and components are to be constructed of reduced activation ferritic 
steel (RAFS) and have 10–15 cm of thermal insulation. As seen in Figure 2-1, the major 
components of the Pb-17Li flow loop are the pump, cold trap, drain tank, thermal mixing tank, 
TBM coolant channels, a vacuum permeator for tritium removal, and a Pb-17Li-to-helium heat 
exchanger. The TBM module helium coolant, which operates at 8 MPa as opposed to the Pb-17Li 
that operates at a maximum of 2 MPa, can breach into the Pb-17Li within the TBM module 
without loss of module integrity (Wong 2005). Any other helium breaches into the Pb-17Li, such 
as the 8 MPa helium at the heat exchanger, are expected to transmit pressure throughout the 
highly fluid Pb-17Li (Feuerstein 1988) flow loop quickly, and the gas is expected to deposit itself 
in the headspace of the centrifugal pump casing or its expansion tank, or the pressure increase 
could actuate the rupture disk to the drain tank. If the rupture disk opens, the system will 
depressurize into the drain tank. The heat exchanger helium enters the tubes at 200°C and exits at 
360°C and 8 MPa.  
The Pb-17Li centrifugal pump is a modest size unit (20 kW or § 25 horsepower), probably 
a vertically aligned motor to an overhung shaft with either a magnetic bearing or at least a design 
provision of no mechanical bearing immersed in the liquid metal. The liquid metal will not touch 
the pump shaft seal; a cover gas (perhaps helium or argon) will be used to provide a cushion to 
the shaft seal and pressurize the Pb-17Li. The flow from the pump is § 72 kg/s. At 340°C, the 
density of Pb-17Li is about 9420 kg/m3, so the flow rate is 7.6Eí03 m3/s (7.6 L/s). An expansion 
tank is mounted in tandem with the pump casing. The expansion tank serves two purposes: 
smooth pressure pulsations and supply extra liquid to compensate for liquid level (keep the 
impeller immersed). In the pump casing expansion tank, the helium cover gas also provides an 
opportunity to draw off radioactive gases from the Pb-17Li and route them to cleanup via the 
pressure control system. From the pump exit, the flow passes a cold trap, which is expected to be 
5a tank with baffles and wire screens to promote precipitation of impurities and any oxides that 
might form in the Pb-17Li. The cold trap lowers the Pb-17Li temperature to approach the freezing 
point of § 240°C but not freeze the alloy. The cooler temperature allows some impurities and 
oxides to condense out of the liquid alloy. The cold trap can be cooled by forced air, nitrogen, or 
helium gas; no  
Figure 2-1. The Pb-17Li flow loop of the U.S. DCLL TBM. 
special coolants or design provisions are needed for this type of cold trap. Only a percentage of 
the liquid metal flow routes to the cold trap; other designs have used 5% flow diversion to the 
cold trap (Spencer 2000). From there, the flow proceeds toward the TBM module. Some flow will 
always divert into the mixing tank, which is included in the design as a provision to allow high 
temperature (650°C) operation. From the mixing tank, the flow enters a concentric pipe (inner 
pipe is the outlet flow, the outer pipe annulus is the inlet flow) that connects to the back of the 
TBM, cools the walls and breeds some tritium, then flows back out to the flow loop. The outlet 
flow proceeds to a tritium extraction unit, a vacuum permeator. The permeator is designed similar 
to a heat exchanger. The high temperature Pb-17Li flow enters tubes that allow tritium 
permeation through the tube walls, and the vacuum pumping equipment connected to the shell 
draws the gas away for processing. From the permeator, the hot Pb-17Li (470 up to 650°C) enters 
a heat exchanger. Helium at 8 MPa in the tubes enters at 200°C and leaves 360°C, and the Pb-
17Li leaves at 340°C. From the heat exchanger, the Pb-17Li returns to the centrifugal pump. A 
drain tank is also part of the flow loop. The 0.5-m3 drain tank is electrically heated by external 
resistance heaters to keep the Pb-17Li above its freezing point of § 240°C. External heaters were 
chosen to enhance reliability and maintainability over that of immersion heaters that would be 
exposed to the liquid metal. The tank is filled with helium gas at 0.1 MPa to prevent moisture or 
6air intrusion while not in use. A relief valve and a rupture disk will allow flow into the drain tank 
in the event that overpressure is experienced in the flow loop. The rupture disk is located after the 
heat exchanger so the Pb-17Li temperature should be relatively constant in that portion of the 
flow loop. The rupture disk has a rated burst pressure of 3.5 MPa. Rupture disk burst pressures 
decrease as the temperatures that the disk is exposed to increase, so keeping a uniform 
temperature enables proper rupture disk performance. A pressure relief valve on the drain tank 
lifts at 4 MPa (Wong 2005).  
2.2 TBM Operation 
ITER plans to conduct 3,000 plasma pulses in a year. The dwell time between pulses is 
§ 2,000 s. A typical pulse scenario is 100 s ramp up, 400 s pulse flat top, and 100 s ramp down to 
the dwell time. Thus, one pulse requires 43.3 min. ITER is also stated to have a 25% duty factor. 
GSSR volume IV, “Normal Operation,” page 36, states that the planned ITER operation is a 35-
day operating campaign with 10-hour pulse days, and 20–22 pulses performed per day (ITER-
Joint Central Team [JCT] 2001). Each campaign will give § 750 pulses, with four campaigns per 
year (35 days of operation and 45 days of post-operation shutdown) and the last 3 months of the 
year being reserved for a long maintenance shutdown. Considering an electricity cost of 
$0.15/kW-h, and a 20 kW pump motor, the cost of keeping the pump operating for 14 idle hours 
per operating day is about $42. There are 140 operating days per year, giving a total cost of $5.9k 
in additional pump electricity if the pump is started once per campaign. Pump heat can be used to 
help keep the Pb-17Li liquid in the system. Turning the pump off daily will mean 35 days u
4 campaigns = 140 operational start demands per year at a failure rate of 5Eí03/demand, or an 
annual failure probability of 0.7 for a specialty pump costing an estimated $20k to purchase 
(assume $1 or 2k for a typical motor replacement and $2k for a replacement pump shaft). ITER 
will have ample downtime to allow pump repairs, the occupational radiation exposure should be 
somewhat low for this component so far from the ITER vacuum vessel, and the Pb-17Li system is 
designed with the drain tank to facilitate repairs. The failure rates predict a pump fault requiring 
maintenance and perhaps spare parts in 1.5 year at the 140/year “on-off” frequency. The 
economics of the situation show that it would probably be less cost to start/stop the pump and 
then repair the pump every other year. However, if the pump is specified to throttle back by using 
a variable speed drive that consumed less kW-h, then the pump could operate at perhaps 10% of 
its typical flow rate and would maintain heat in the flow loop during the 14-hour lulls in 
operations during each campaign day. The liquid metal flow would not be very fast, so corrosion 
would be minimized.  
Smith (1993) discussed that most liquid sodium reactor systems either had pony motors on 
the pumps to maintain a 10% flow or used a small electromagnetic pump to flow when the main 
centrifugal pumps were shut down. The advantage to pump operation is less start-stop wear, 
which would mean less repair work to perform, less personnel radiation exposure, possibly less 
Pb-17Li exposure to air during repairs, and less time required to prepare the Pb-17Li loop before 
each day of pulse operations. Therefore, as a first estimate for operational start/stop demands on 
the TBM equipment, the pump will operate at reduced capacity for the 14 idle hours between 
pulse days and there will be four operational start demands per year (not counting any 
maintenance-related test, or system operability test, starts). The TBM flow loop will start up and 
operate for the 35-day entire pulse campaign, then shut down for any maintenance or other 
servicing. It is expected that during the 45-day maintenance outages between campaigns it would 
be most cost effective to drain the Pb-17Li to the drain tank and shut down the rest of the system. 
Therefore, the operating hours for the TBM Pb-17Li flow loop will be 35 days u 24 hr/day u
4 campaigns/yr = 3,360 hr/yr. This value is used with the hourly failure rates to give frequency 
7category estimates. The drain tank would operate for 8,760 hr/yr í 3,360 hr = 5,400 hr/yr in 
storage mode. Therefore, to summarize, the assumed operating scenario is that the TBM is system 
is prepared and operability tested, and upon successful test completion, it is started for campaign 
operations. ITER then runs its 35-day campaign and shuts down for a 45-day maintenance period. 
After a short cooldown, the TBM Pb-17Li is drained to the insulated drain tank. For the long 
shutdowns of 45 or 90 days, it is probably more economical to allow the Pb-17Li to freeze than it 
is to keep it heated above 240°C until it is needed again. Maintaining the Pb-17Li above freezing 
would be costly. Allowing the alloy to freeze also poses concerns, however—reliquefying the Pb-
17Li must be performed carefully to avoid undue pipe stresses. Typically, heating from the 
helium and from the walls will allow the alloy to expand within the drain tank without 
overstressing the tank walls. When needed, heated helium gas will pressurize the Pb-17Li and 
force it to flow back into the TBM pipework in preparation for another operating campaign. An 
estimate of § 1 shift advance preparation is assumed to heat the 0.5 m3 of Pb-17Li, drive it from 
the drain tank back into the system piping, evolve the helium out of the alloy, test the 
instrumentation and the mechanical equipment, and prepare for TBM operation. 
2.3 Current Design Information on Pb-alloy Fission Reactors 
Dostal (2004) and Hejzlar (2004) stated that for a Pb-alloy coolant in a fission reactor 
using HT-9 reduced activation steel, an oxide film forms on the structural material walls and this 
film protects the structural material from corrosion. If the Pb-alloy flow velocity is too high, the 
protective oxide layer could be stripped, allowing additional wall corrosion. The authors admitted 
that current knowledge of the Pb-steel corrosion mechanism was not sufficient to confidently 
establish a coolant velocity limit, but they chose a maximum velocity of 2 m/s Pb-alloy flow as a 
conservative approach to protect the oxide film. Ballinger and Lim (2004) stated that at high 
speeds of greater than § 4 m/s corrosion is a significant issue in Pb-Bi and Pb. Ballinger and Lim 
also stated that current operating systems have a practical upper temperature limit of 450°C, 
operation in the 450–550°C range requires careful oxygen control in the loop, and operation in 
the 550–650°C range is possible in principle for iron-based materials (but may not be possible 
without materials research and development). Wong (2005) cited that the maximum flow velocity 
in the Pb-17Li flow loop would be 2 m/s, which agrees with the fission choice.  
Hejlzar (2004) discussed that even in a completely Pb-cooled fission reactor, there would 
be some polonium generation. Stable Pb-208, which comprises about 50% of the natural Pb 
coolant, would capture a neutron and then beta decay to Bi-209 with a half-life of 3.25 hours. 
Neutron capture by Bi-209 becomes Bi-210, which beta decays to Po-210 with a half-life of 5 
days. The Po-210 is a modestly long-lived alpha emitter (half-life 138 days) that decays to stable 
Pb-206. Buongiorno (2004) stated that for a typical fission reactor neutron flux, the Po-210 
concentration could reside between 1 to 10 Ci/kg of lead-bismuth eutectic coolant, and that the 
polonium melting point is 250°C, making it liquid at Pb-17Li temperatures and too close to the 
Pb-17Li freezing temperature of 240°C to easily plate out in a cold trap. Investigations of the Po-
210 have shown that the metal forms lead polonide in the Pb-17Li and that very little (1E+06 
times less than calculated by assuming an ideal solution of Pb-17Li eutectic with impurity 
polonium metal) polonium evaporates to the cover gas in liquid metal systems (Feuerstein 1992). 
Wong (2005) stated that the Po-210 production would be very low in the DCLL TBM. 
Demkowicz stated that the current thinking in Pb-Bi coolant system design was to provide 
a small, sacrificial ingot or set of spheres of PbO, which would be enclosed in and directly 
8exposed to the coolant in the fission reactor flow loopa; for example, housed in a piping stub. 
Small amounts of oxygen from the PbO would diffuse throughout the system piping due to oxide 
concentration gradients. This oxygen would form the oxide film that protects the structural 
materials. When oxygen concentrations equilibrated and the film was intact, the sacrificial PbO 
would not be depleted any further. The PbO would remain available to diffuse more oxygen to 
correct any small changes to the oxygen concentration or slowly repair any damage to the oxide 
film. At the same time, the overall oxygen concentration within the liquid metal should be kept 
below 10 ppm (Spencer 2000) to protect the flow loop structural materials.  
Foletti (2006) described some issues with Pb-Bi liquid metal. One issue is freezing the 
alloy in a tank. Lead-bismuth eutectic (LBE) has a property of expansion upon freezing; the alloy 
re-crystallizes as it cools lower than the freezing temperature. Recrystallization enriches the 
bismuth phase, and bismuth expands on freezing while lead shrinks. An LBE pool that is 
undergoing freezing will place stresses on the chamber walls as it expands (Foletti 2006; 
Glasbrenner 2005); the depth of the pool increases the stresses on the chamber walls. For LBE 
cylindrical storage tanks, it is preferable to have the storage tank axis aligned horizontally rather 
than vertically and to fill the tank to less than half capacity. If a tank must be oriented vertically, 
the tank should be designed so that the minimum ratio of tank diameter to the maximum LBE 
height in the tank is 0.5 or less (Foletti 2006). Agostini (2004) stated that LBE requires height 
reduction of the frozen volume, allowance for “crush volumes” (artificial voids can be created in 
LBE; these implode during solidification and reduce wall stresses), limit of internal parts and 
instrumentation that would be stressed by inadvertent solidification, and that vessels be kept at 
90–120°C above the alloy melting point. Since Pb-17Li is a very small weight percent of lithium 
(0.7% by weight of lithium), while LBE is 55.2% by weight of bismuth, the LBE effects and 
design parameters are not directly applicable to Pb-17Li. Pb-17Li merely expands 3.5% by 
volume on melting, lithium also expands on melting (by 1.5%) (Malang and Mattas 1995). 
However, the tank orientation and other practices described above to reduce wall stresses are 
good design practices.  
Foletti (2006) also had some other pertinent operating experiences. The LBE lead 
corrosion flow loop experiment used K-type thermocouples, electromagnetic and vortex flow 
meters and pressure transducers. The pressure transducers with small, smooth surface diaphragm 
surfaces (5 mm diameter) suffered from oxide buildup on the diaphragm surfaces and stopped 
operating. The pressure transducers with wider, corrugated diaphragms (95 mm dia.) continued to 
operate. The 12.7-mm diameter electromagnetic flow meters suffered from oxide buildup and 
read lower and lower values until they erroneously reported zero flow. The 25.4-mm diameter 
flow meter continued to operate through 5,000 hours, but it was partly attributed to being in a 
location that did not experience much oxide buildup. The electromagnetic pump experienced 
deposition of oxides that reduced its efficiency. That pump was replaced with two vertical-axis, 
submerged impeller pumps. One of these two pumps used a Chesterton oil-cooled pump shaft 
seal. This pump worked very well, although periodic checking of the oil was recommended to 
avoid oil contamination of the LBE. The other pump motor was directly connected to the pump 
casing and it did not perform as well as the oil-cooled shaft seal pump. Oxygen sensors using 
yttria-zirconia doped ceramic elements were used to sense the oxygen concentration in the LBE. 
The oxygen concentration had to be kept between that of the scavenger Mg metal and PbO. This 
sensor was effective. Oxygen concentration is a balance between corrosion control of the steel by 
forming and maintaining an oxide layer and avoiding the contamination of slag (solid PbO 
particle) formation in the flow loop (Courouau 2002). The large scale venturi flow meter was 
effective at 40–350 kg/s flow rates (uncertainty ± 3%). The measurement was not reliable below 
                                                     
a. Private communication with P. Demkowicz, Idaho National Laboratory, Setpember 28, 2006.  
940 kg/s due to the loss of sensitivity with this type of instrument. The meter performed well in 
LBE. Porous mechanical filters were used to remove macroscopic slag from the LBE. The 
mechanical filters did not plug up in 6,000 hours of operation. A hot trap with a fiberglass filter 
was effective at trapping small slag. Oxygen was removed from the LBE by adding a 
stoichiometric amount of Mg and by bubbling an Ar/H2 gas mixture through the alloy (Foletti 
2006). These experiences demonstrate that oxide accumulation should be given attention because 
it can foul instruments. 
There are two safety concerns regarding spills of Pb-17Li from the flow loop into the port. 
One concern is that the hot leg Pb-17Li could be at 470–650°C, and such a high temperature 
molten metal could threaten equipment in the room, particularly the metal bellows that connects 
the port frame to the bioshield wall. Overheating and breaching the bellows would result in a loss 
of cryostat vacuum event. While not a particularly important accident from the public safety 
perspective, loss of cryostat vacuum that draws metal into the cryostat is a very important 
accident from the investment protection perspective. The ITER tokamak would benefit from 
being shut down as quickly as possible and dumping the magnet energy to dump resistors. In-
rushing air from the port would freeze onto the magnet cases that are held at 4 K, warming the 
magnet cases and creating an air plus metal impurity ingress issue that would require months to 
clean up. Freezing moisture from the air could expand and place extra stress on the magnet cases, 
which could overstress the magnet insulation and lead to insulation failure. Insulation failure 
would probably require magnet coil replacement. Given the small amount of liquid metal (0.4 
m3), protection in the form of a catch pan, a dike, or protective sleeves that create a barrier 
between the port and the bellows convolutions should be used to preclude a bellows breach event. 
If sleeves are chosen, they should be removable to allow periodic bellows visual inspections. The 
second safety concern is loss of control of radioactive materials. The DDD (Wong 2005) stated 
that there could be some activated mercury (an impurity in the Pb-17Li) and some small amount 
of tritium in the spilled coolant. Po-210 is expected to remain as lead polonide in the coolant 
during a spill. The coolant on the floor (at 470 to 650°C if spilled from the hot leg, or 340°C if 
spilled from the cold leg) can have some mild, yet exothermic chemical reactions in air 
(Hubberstey and Sample 1992). Pb-17Li will react with oxygen and oxygen-containing species in 
air (CO, CO2, H2O) to form lithium oxide (Li2O). Jeppson (1989) showed in kg-scale tests that 
the lithium oxide forms a crust on the molten metal and the crust blocks air from reaching fresh 
molten metal. As the reaction is slowed and halted due to this oxide cover, the metal has time to 
cool, reducing its chemical reactivity. Most liquid metal systems use drip pans or catch pans 
under the piping, and the pan should be insulated so that the concrete floor is not overheated. 
Floor concrete overheating (above § 200°C, see Naus, 2006) can cause a reversal of the hydration 
reaction that formed the concrete and drive water vapor and CO2 back out of the calcium 
compound. After pressure equilibration in a spill event, air will enter the Pb-17Li piping. Air 
poses a chemical contamination concern for the Pb-17Li. Air intrusion will require extensive 
cleaning before operation of the Pb-17Li system is possible again. 
2.4 Related Operating Experiences Supporting the FMEA 
The literature was searched for any applicable liquid metal operating experiences with Pb-
17Li or similar coolants. The most applicable experiences located were those of the TRITEX Pb-
17Li flow loop. Otherwise, liquid metals are not widely used outside of the nuclear industry. One 
nuclear conference proceedings did contain several articles of interest as discussed below. Also, 
Cadwallader (1999) compiled operating experiences for fission coolants other than water; these 
experiences were used to recognize faults that could occur with a liquid metal coolant. These 
findings are described below. 
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TRITEX operating experiences are very relevant to the DCLL TBM. While the TRITEX 
Pb-17Li flow loop was not under neutron irradiation, it did operate at 250 to 550°C, so its 
operating temperatures are within the range of the DCLL. The main piping was 15 mm diameter 
and the flow rate was 0.1 to 2.5 L/min., or 1 to 25 cm/s flow velocities. The wetted surface area 
was 1.2 to 1.5 m2. Argon was used as a cover gas at 1 bar pressure, which is less than the DCLL. 
It is possible that the higher pressure of the DCLL may be conducive to keeping the alloy more 
pure by protecting against air inleakage. At high temperatures, in the 500°C range, the Pb-17Li 
was found to be very fluid (i.e., low viscosity); it would easily flow out of small cracks or leaks 
(Feuerstein 1988). Between 1988 and 1996, TRITEX ran for 13,000 hours (Feuerstein 1999). The 
small loop, small number of components, and low operating time are insufficient to give good 
component failure rate data statistics, but the operating experiences are indicative of the types of 
events, equipment failure modes, and problems that could occur with a Pb-17Li flow loop. In the 
initial operating campaign, the staff determined that the electrical trace heating (3 kW) and the 
thermal insulation were insufficient; there was heat leakage. (Note: heat leakage into cryogenic 
systems and heat leakage out of high-temperature systems has always plagued designers.) A 
second thermal box was constructed around loop piping runs to prevent heat leakage. Some small 
leaks of Pb-17Li encountered with the apparatus exhibited a characteristic of solidifying in the 
thermal insulation and self-sealing the leak location. The self-sealing may have been more easily 
accomplished because of the low pressure in the system. The electromagnetic pump used on the 
loop had a titanium zirconium molybdenum (TZM) alloy outlet pipe, which was not compatible 
with the Pb-17Li. It cracked in the first operating period, spilling § 15 kg of alloy (15% of the 
TRITEX piping inventory). A TZM level indicator in the drain tank also failed and leaked air into 
the drain tank, where it reacted with the Pb-17Li, oxidizing the alloy and depleting the alloy of 
lithium. About 3.5 kg of oxides was created and the remaining alloy contained less than 5 atom 
percent Li. The alloy in the drain tank had to be replaced. The system valves used metal bellows 
as a secondary seal around the valve stem. Some Pb-17Li got to the bellows and had to be 
cleaned out. The staff were stated to have been amazed that the electromagnetic (EM) pump 
electrical components, which had to be used to heat the alloy as well as move alloy, survived for 
the operating life of the flow loop, 13,000 hr (Feuerstein 1999). The EM pump magnets could 
reach 400°C in normal operation. The TRITEX piping was ferritic steel, and some oxides and 
corrosion products were evident in the flow, as seen through the quartz viewing window installed 
in the flow loop. The staff could see oxide particles, which usually went into crusts that were 
visible through the window, and corrosion product particles in the mirror-like surface of the Pb-
17Li that was reminiscent of liquid mercury. Despite the careful procedures to keep the alloy 
pure, which included vacuum degassing, argon cover gas, and cleaning the pipework, oxides and 
corrosion products formed in the un-irradiated loop. The staff noted some issues with valves 
leaking past their seats—the oxides and corrosion products apparently built up on the valve seats 
and prevented complete valve closure. One major power outage at the laboratory, due to fault in 
their electrical distribution equipment, allowed the Pb-17Li to freeze in the entire loop (Feuerstein 
1999). This total freeze required careful reheating to not overstress the piping. The original 
TRITEX design flow rate of 5 L/min. was not obtainable due to the liquid metal level differences 
created in the components at high flow rates, and the high temperatures developed in the EM 
pump when trying to attain high flow rates. 
When the TRITEX flow loop piping was drained, a film remained on the pipe surfaces, 87 
± 61 mg/cm2, which accounted as 1% of the 100-kg piping inventory. Even though the drain was 
performed at 477°C, the film remained (Feuerstein 1999). This behavior is not uncommon with 
other liquid metals besides Pb-17Li.  
Some TRITEX equipment and design practices deserve mention here. Two EM flow 
meters were used and two mass flow meters were also provided. This redundancy in instruments 
11
presents costs—purchase cost and maintenance costs—but it can be a virtue in a flow loop. 
Redundancy increases the operational reliability and reduces concerns that repairs will result in 
air ingress contamination. Two cold traps using wire mesh and external air cooling (using fins on 
the casing) were used. The alloy flow velocity in the cold traps was 13 times less than the main 
piping flow velocity. The cold traps served as deposition regions for impurities (such as Bi) and 
corrosion products (such as Fe, Cr), reaching a low temperature of about 280°C. Two magnetic 
traps operating at 650 Gauss were also used: one was simply permanent magnets placed outside 
sections of the main pipe, another was a small flow chamber placed in the piping; the lid was 
removable for cleaning adhered particles. The magnetic traps primarily captured iron oxide 
corrosion products. The laboratory used a non-water fire suppression system because if high-
temperature liquid metal spilled, applying water from a fire sprinkler system could lead to a steam 
pressure explosion. A steel catch pan was used below the experiment. The catch pan was sized to 
accommodate ten times more liquid metal than the loop held. The loop held about 100 kg of Pb-
17Li and the drain tank reserve was an additional 20 kg. Considering a potential spill in the ITER 
port, catch pans and protection of the bellows are needed. A fire suppression gas might be the 
most favorable firefighting agent to use—powder or dry chemical suppressant would require 
extensive cleanup, water is contraindicated due to its chemical reactivity with Pb-17Li, and water 
turning to steam could create other concerns in the port such as electrical short circuits. A gas that 
would not overpressurize the port, perhaps heptafluoropropane (called HFC-227), argonite 
(argon-nitrogen mixture), or other fire suppression gases, could be used. Inergen (nitrogen-argon-
carbon dioxide) is not recommended as a fire suppressant because Pb-17Li reacts exothermically 
and vigorously with carbon dioxide (Jeppson and Muhlestein 1985). 
The TRITEX drain tank was insulated and was continually heated to 350°C to avoid 
thermal shock problems if the alloy had to be dumped to the drain tank on short notice 
(Feuerstein 1999). This should be a consideration for DCLL TBM designers. 
Drobyshev (1969) described some operational problems with liquid metal forced-
circulation flow loops. Drobyshev stated that for personnel protection, all high-temperature 
portions of liquid metal systems should be placed in inert-gas chambers. This reduces chemical 
reactions and inert gas zones form personnel exclusion zones. Catch pans should always be used 
to collect leaks, especially leaks from defects in construction materials—microcracks, 
micropores, bad weld joints, etc. Drain lines must be heated to a higher temperature than the 
freezing point of the alloy. An interlock should be used such that when metal alloy leakage is 
sensed, the drain valves should automatically be opened and the electrical heat tracing should be 
de-powered. Nichrome heaters wound onto piping have short circuited to the pipe, so voltage was 
reduced to § 48 volts to preclude short circuiting.  
The former Soviet Union used Pb and Pb-Bi cooled fission reactors in land tests and for 
naval propulsion plants. There were several operating experiences of relevance to the use of Pb-
17Li in the U.S. TBM. Gromov (1999) discussed the accidents that had occurred with heavy Pb-
Bi liquid metal coolants. The first event described occurred in a submarine propulsion reactor, the 
“Project 645,” in 1968. In this event, investigators believed that air had been admitted to the 
primary coolant piping during pipe repairs. The air had reacted with the Pb-Bi to form large 
amounts of lead oxide that plugged the piping. Also, oil from the shaft seals for the coolant 
pumps had leaked into the Pb-Bi, where the high temperatures pyrolyzed the oil into other 
hydrocarbons. These impurities coated the heat transfer surfaces, greatly retarding heat transfer 
from the reactor core, and plugged piping. The naval personnel did not understand what was 
occurring with the fission reactor so they tried to compensate for power decreases by withdrawing 
control rods. The core overheated and fuel cladding failed. Fuel and fission products circulated in 
the primary coolant system.  
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The lessons that have been learned are 
x Use an inert gas blanket when performing maintenance on piping 
x Use sensors to detect oxygen in the coolant 
x Use gas-tight electric drivers or water seals on pump shafts 
x Use a lead oxide recovery system in the coolant purification system 
x Use coolant quality control to prevent oxide film formation on heat transfer surfaces 
A brief examination of the heats of formation of Pb and Li oxides (Chemical Rubber 
Company 1979) shows: 
x PbO í52
x Pb2O í51
x Pb2O4 í175
x Pb(N3) 2 +104 
x Li2O í142.4
x Li2O2 í151
x Li3N í47
All values are in kcal/gram-mole for 25°C. Negative signs indicate exothermic reactions. 
Feuerstein (1988) discussed that air intrusion into the Pb-17Li caused Li2O to form and 
deplete the alloy of lithium. The heats of formation listed above show that Pb will oxidize at a 
low rate, lower than lithium. Feuerstein stated that for air ingress to the loop at 550°C, 0.3% of 
the total liquid metal inventory would be oxidized within 1 hour, and the oxides would contain 
25% of the total lithium inventory. The Slavic experience shows that Pb2O and PbO buildup will 
attenuate heat transfer to a large extent. Therefore, the DCLL TBM should avoid trapping air in 
the Pb-17Li pipework. An oxygen sensor in the liquid metal, as suggested in the Project 645 
lessons learned, would be a prudent measure to ensure that no air has intruded into the system. 
The experience shows that air intrusion will form metal oxides and these oxides can precipitate 
out of the liquid. A cold trap is included in the DCLL TBM design to remove such impurities. 
The second event Gromov (1999) discussed occurred with the “Project 705” submarine in 
1971. One of the steam generators (Pb-Bi to water heat exchanger) had a slight leak in an access 
cover on the steam side due to a gasket flaw, and there was additional steam leakage due to some 
faulty welds. The compartment housing the steam generator thus tended to be high humidity and 
there was condensation on the compartment’s cool surfaces. The condensed water droplets 
included chlorides that were present for water chemistry control. The chlorides caused corrosion 
on the austenitic stainless steel primary circuit and ancillary pipelines. This event has little 
significance to the TBM; the only water in the TBM design is used to cool the TBM module 
mounting frame. The TBM frame cooling water may use different methods of chemistry control. 
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If that water were to leak, it could conceivably leak from piping into the port where the Pb-17Li 
loop is housed. The Pb-17Li piping will have insulation on the exterior and, given that the 
Pb-17Li piping is held at 340°C and higher, the insulation will be warm. Any water intruding into 
the piping thermal insulation is expected to evaporate and deposit its residue chemicals in the 
insulation, not directly on the piping.  
The third event that Gromov (1999) discussed occurred with the “Project 705K” submarine 
in 1982. This event was a confluence of errors. On this reactor, the primary Pb-Bi coolant pump 
had an adjusting manometer that was only to be used during plant shutdowns (speculation is that 
this manometer was used to verify proper fill of the pump tank, then it was supposed to be valved 
out before plant startup). The manometer was rated for 4 kg/cm2 pressure, which was an adequate 
rating for shutdown conditions. The fission reactor underwent startup; the manometer had not 
been valved out as procedures specified. A steam generator tube fault occurred after reactor 
startup due to water chemistry control problems. The inlet water was supposed to be stripped of 
free oxygen by an electron-ion-exchanger filter that was charged with copper. Some copper 
escaped from the filter into the water and caused electro-chemical corrosion of the steam 
generator tubing. The steam generator tubing was not made of the specified high nickel, 
corrosion-resistant steel alloy; a fabrication error had allowed the tubing to be constructed of 
common stainless steel that was more susceptible to copper corrosion. Water, at higher pressure 
than the Pb-Bi, penetrated into the Pb-Bi coolant and some collected in the pump tank. The pump 
tank pressure increased to 6 kg/cm2, and the manometer failed. Pb-Bi and steam leaked from the 
pump tank into the reactor compartment. The crew in the compartment was exposed to 
radioactive contamination in air, especially Po-210. Fortunately, no one received high exposures; 
the highest was 10% of the annual maximum permissible exposure. Gromov did not give the 
operating temperature of the Pb-Bi coolant, and it is unfortunate that the Po-210 issue is not better 
explained in Gromov’s article. Experiments show that polonium should remain as lead polonide, 
or at least as a liquid metal in mixture within the Pb-Bi eutectic, but Gromov stated that Po-210 
gave a dose. As an alpha particle emitter, Po-210 poses a radiological threat when inhaled or 
ingested, but not from external radiation. In this event, the steam generator was constructed of 
incorrect materials and the copper oxygen radical collector had failed, contaminating the 
secondary coolant system and attacking the steam generator tubes.  
Other pertinent design criteria and operating experiences were given by Bagdassarov 
(1999). He stated that for a lead-cooled reactor, the reactor core Pb coolant inlet temperature of 
420°C was too close to the freezing point of lead (327°C). Reasons were not stated for this design 
advice, but presumably the liquid metal is such a good conductor of heat that it can transfer 
enough heat to quickly reduce its temperature to, or near, its freezing point. Bagdassarov stated 
that the required minimum difference of the low coolant temperature in the system (i.e., the heat 
exchanger outlet or the core inlet temperature) and the freezing point of the liquid metal should be 
at least a ¨T of 150°C. It is noted that the U.S. TBM using Pb-17Li has a melting temperature of 
§ 240°C and the minimum operating temperature is 340°C; perhaps using a ¨T of only 100°C is 
adequate for Pb-17Li. The TBM has the helium gas coolant that is easily warmed and can keep 
the Pb-17Li temperature high and more constant around 340°C. Bagdassarov further stated that 
liquid lead corrosion increases when the Pb temperature elevates above 540°C, so a smaller the 
temperature rise across the heat input section of the flow loop is better to keep structural material 
corrosion at low levels. This temperature limit would require a higher flow rate than other 
coolants, which means high pumping power. Compared with liquid sodium coolant, liquid lead 
requires a significantly higher operating pressure, has higher corrosion activity with structural 
materials, requires a more complicated system for coolant purification, has much different 
buoyancy characteristics than alkali metals, and presents a more demanding task to maintain in 
liquid phase. Fortunately, these issues can be dealt with in design. One of the more intriguing 
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issues, the high buoyancy, is not an issue for the TBM because it is a once-through “single pass” 
flow loop—there are no components that could “float up” in the Pb flow. 
2.4.1 Sodium Liquid Metal Experiences 
Instruments and their penetrations have been the source of some notable failures 
(Cadwallader 1999). During June 1985, a faulty weld on a thermocouple allowed several cubic 
centimeters of secondary sodium coolant to escape from the intermediate cooling loop of the 
Super Phenix reactor in France. In December 1995, a thermocouple fatigue failure allowed § 730 
kg of sodium to leak from the Monju fast reactor in Japan. While these designs vary a great deal 
from the TBM, the TBM will also use the typical temperature, pressure, and level instruments, 
and possibly flow instruments, oxygen monitors, and other instrumentation. King (1985) stated 
that for Experimental Breeder Reactor (EBR)-II, the original ten flow meters on the primary flow 
circuit had no provision for repair or replacement. From 1964 to 1985, seven of the ten units had 
failed, so alternative means had to be devised to determine primary flow. EBR-II began to have 
concerns about obtaining spare parts for crucial components. In 1985, a spare pump impeller and 
shaft were delivered to the site, although it is doubted that the staff ever replaced a primary pump 
shaft.
The Dounreay fast reactor also reported on a failure of the sodium level instrument within 
a pump casing. The instrument failed due to cross flow on the instrument thimble. The thimble 
fractured, probably due to imperfect construction (Walford 1978). In another event, “thermal 
striping” created by a stream of hot sodium (that is, a stripe) onto the walls of a heat exchanger 
caused concern about potential thermal stress damage to welds; therefore, when the minimum 
three heat exchangers were in operation, the plant core temperature was limited to lower values to 
reduce the thermal stress effects on the welds. To keep station efficiency high, this limitation 
made it very important to keep the maximum six heat exchangers on line.  
Dounreay used centrifugal pumps for both primary and secondary coolant. These pumps 
experienced some trips and unscheduled shutdowns, six trips in 5 years. The trips generally arose 
from the pump oil systems and other auxiliary systems (Walford 1978). Dounreay pipework had 
sections that were jacketed for leak detection. The leak detectors were ceramic units with a metal 
electrode and gave rise to a number of spurious leakage alarms due to faulty detectors. Faulty 
detectors were bypassed; there was enough redundancy in the detection system to allow that 
procedure. There were two small leaks in 5 years: one leak was traced to a construction flaw and 
the other small leak was not described. Walford also mentioned a few small leaks at flanges and 
actuator shaft seals that were addressed by “gas pressure padding” until more permanent repairs 
could be performed during a scheduled shutdown. Argon gas was used for padding. If gas 
pressure padding can be applied to the TBM, it should be noted that while the cost of some 
increased argon usage is minor compared to that of an unscheduled plant shutdown, any escaping 
argon could entrain some tritium gas from the Pb-17Li. A fission reactor would also have some 
tritium (created by fission) migrating into the coolant, so presumably the need for gas pressure 
padding was infrequent and the gas leak rate was small.  
As noted with EBR-II (Koch 1988), many liquid metal piping systems have used some 
provision for accommodating thermal expansion, either a Z-shape or a C-shape in the pipe run 
that will allow pipe elongation and flex as the piping heats up to operating temperature. The TBM 
Pb-17Li piping can operate from 470 up to 650°C, so some design provision will be needed to 
handle ferritic steel pipe expansion. Some sketches of the TBM show an “S” in the main piping 
that will relieve the stress of thermal expansion. 
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A phenomena reported in the literature is liquid metal flowing into piping thermal 
insulation and the insulation spreading or “wicking” the liquid so that the liquid is exposed to 
more air within the insulation (McIntosh 1994). The Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (IEEE) (IEEE 1987) gives some suggested maximum service temperatures for piping 
thermal insulation; only calcium silicate and mineral wool have temperatures of 677°C, which is 
just above the peak TBM fluid temperature of 650°C. Other well-known insulation choices, such 
as fiberglass, are only rated for 232°C. Leaking Pb-17Li to the thermal insulation on the piping 
may mean dispersion of the liquid metal so that it mixes with copious air and can react easily in 
air. In such cases, the leak size could be important. Most leaks out of the piping are small; the 
fluid expends energy traversing the leak path to escape into the room air. The system flows at 77 
kg/s. Analyzing water leak flow rate data from power plant piping (Eide 1991), which are the best 
data available, shows that the average leak of water is 3% for boiling water reactors (BWRs) to 
5% for pressurized water reactors (PWRs) of the nominal volumetric pipe flow rate, with the 
median values being 0.3% and 0.75%, respectively. Most of the piping was less than 76 cm 
(3 inch) diameter, assumed to carry up to 45 kg/s (738 gal/min.) of water. The PWRs provided 
many data points versus only a few from BWRs, so the PWR data are considered to be the most 
representative data. These are the best data available for estimating leak rates from pipe breaches 
based on the nominal system flow rate. Using 0.75% for a small leak and 5% for a typical leak 
gives 0.6 kg/s for a small leak of Pb-17Li and 3.85 kg/s for a typical leak. Recalling the TRITEX 
experience, very small leaks tended to cool and freeze in the insulation, plugging the leak 
location. The larger leak in TRITEX when the EM pump outlet nozzle cracked was § 15% of the 
loop inventory; which was a large leak. Such leaks are anticipated to continue until operators act 
to isolate the leaks by using valves, reducing system pressure, or draining the Pb-17Li to the drain 
tank. These kg-size leaks should present enough mass intruding into the piping insulation that the 
insulation will quickly breach and pour the liquid metal to the equatorial port floor (unless other 
design provisions have been taken, such as a guard pipe, floor liners, catch pans, etc.). Thus, the 
leak events are expected to result in traditional spills that form pools on the floor. Large leaks or 
ruptures of water piping are defined to be greater than 50 gal/min. (Eide 1991) or 3 kg/s of water 
flow, based on operating experiences. For Pb-17Li, the 50 gal/min. definition of a rupture flow 
rate converts to 30 kg/s.  
It is noted that Pb is a hazardous substance. When high-temperature liquid is spilled, there 
will be vapor above the pool surface. The pressure of saturated vapor in mm of Hg above the pool 
surface is found by this equation (Chemical Rubber Company 1979): 
Log10 Pressure = [í(0.05223)(188,500)/T + 7.827] (2-1)
where T is in Kelvin.
The results are given in Table 2-1. 
Table 2-1. Pb vapor above a liquid Pb pool. 
Pb Pool Temperature 
(C)
Pb Vapor pressure 
(mm Hg) 
Pb Vapor density 
(#/m3)
Pb concentration 
(mg/m3)
340 5.84Eí09 2E+14 6.8Eí05
470 3.77Eí06 1E+17 0.034 
650 1.45Eí03 2E+19 6.88 
The vapor density was read from a graph (Advanced Power Extraction [APEX] 1999). 
Converting from number of particles in the air over the pool to mg of Pb was straightforward 
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using the molecular weight. Feuerstein (1991) stated that the majority of the particles would be 
Pb rather than Li because the Li forms compounds with the liquid Pb rather than becoming 
airborne. Pb is monotomic; its molecular weight is 207.2 g/mole. The threshold limit value (TLV) 
for 40 hr/wk occupational exposure to Pb is 0.05 mg/m3 (American Conference of Industrial 
Hygienists [ACGIH] 2007). Given the results, a spill at 340°C, the cold leg temperature, would 
not pose an occupational chemical exposure threat near the port area. A spill at 470°C results in a 
vapor concentration close to the TLV and would require ventilation control as a precaution to 
reduce personnel exposure as much as possible. A spill at 650°C would result in a concentration 
more than 100 times above the occupational exposure limit. The immediately dangerous to life or 
health (IDLH) concentration for Pb is 100 mg/m3, so there is no immediate health threat from the 
6.88 mg/m3 that results from a 650°C spill. A possible approach could be to ventilate and filter 
the air until the room temperature decreases and the spill pool cools. In a chemical reactivity test 
of 200 kg of Pb-17Li at 600°C with 0.054 m3 of room-temperature basalt concrete, the alloy 
temperature reduced to 410°C in 15 minutes after pouring the pool onto the concrete because of 
heat transfer into the bare concrete (Jeppson and Muhlestein 1985).  
2.5 FMEA Failure Rate Data 
The component failure rate data used in the FMEA came from several sources. The ITER 
Project does not have an approved component failure rate database, so data sources most 
applicable to the TBM components were used. No component failure rate data compilations or 
reports were found in the literature for Pb, Pb-Bi, or other heavy metal coolants, so the data 
values from alkali metal cooled fission reactors were used. While Pb-17Li and Na are dissimilar, 
the sodium-cooled fission reactors do have the applicability of low-pressure and high-temperature 
operation, the same issues of “wetting” the walls of the flow loop, and molten metal pumping 
similarities (even though Pb-17Li metal is much denser and has different chemical reactivity 
concerns). Data from a sodium reactor data compilation report (Eide 1990), the Experimental 
Breeder Reactor-II probabilistic risk assessment (Argonne National Laboratory 1991), and a few 
other sources were used in the FMEA. Some data from the Centralized Reliability Data 
Organization (CREDO) for liquid sodium cooled fission reactors is in the EBR-II risk assessment 
and a few other values were found in the literature. Work by Boisseau (1982) on failure rates 
from Euroean Union sodium reactor operating experiences sometimes compared fairly (with 10u
of the failure rate used) and usually compared well (within 3u of the failure rate used) with U.S. 
data. Buende’s data (Buende 1991) was used for weld failure rates even though welding of RAFS 
may not be as straightforward as welding ordinary carbon steel or stainless steels. These data are 
considered to be the most representative data available at this time to apply to TBM RAFS 
components. 
2.6 TBM Preliminary FMEA Results 
The TBM Pb-17Li flow loop FMEA covered the liquid metal flow loop in normal, pulse 
operation. The TBM module itself was treated as a flow channel in this analysis. If needed, future 
work can expand the FMEA to cover other Pb-17Li operating modes and also treat the helium 
coolant portion of the DCLL TBM design.  
The preliminary FMEA on the Pb-17Li flow loop is given in Appendix A. The main results 
were not surprising for this single-pass flow loop that cools a small section of the ITER 
blanket/first wall. Table 2-2 summarizes the PIEs from the FMEA results. 
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From the ITER TBM conference call held on 30 September 2006, the PIE format is four 
characters: 
x Character 1 is alphabetic, the type of event, for example L=loss, F=flow, H=heat 
x Character 2 is alphabetic, the system under consideration, here B=TBM, M=liquid metal, 
F=first wall 
x Character 3 is alphabetic, the location of the event, here B=blanket as in TBM breeder 
module box, V=vessel, P=port cell, M=module flow loop, O=outside, and I=inside 
x Character 4 is numeric, the accident severity, 1=most severe event, 2=leak, 3=small leak. 
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Table 2-2. Pb-17Li Loop FMEA Results for postulated initiating events 
PIE Family FMEA Faults and Annual Frequency Frequency Summation 
LMP2
Small Pb-17Li 
LOCA to
Port Cell 
Valve leaks, 3.3Eí02
Pump leak, 1Eí02;
Piping leaks, 6Eí03
Expansion tank leaks, 3.4Eí03
Cold trap leak, 1.7Eí03
Mixing tank leak, 3.4Eí04 
Concentric pipe trans. leaks, 1.7Eí04
Temperature instrument leaks, 1Eí04
Concentric pipe run leaks, 6Eí05
Pressure instrument leaks, 1Eí05
Level instrument leaks, 3.4Eí06
5.6Eí02/year for small leaks 
from the Pb-17Li system. 
Category II 
LMP1
Pb-17Li LOCA 
to Port Cell 
Valve ruptures, 7.7Eí03
Cold trap rupture, 1.7Eí03 
Pump rupture, 1Eí03
Expansion tank ruptures, 3.4Eí04
Piping ruptures, 6Eí05
Mixing tank rupture, 1.7Eí05
Concentric pipe trans. rupture, 1.7Eí06 
Concentric pipe run rupture, 6Eí06
Pressure instrument rupture, 3Eí07
Level instrument rupture, 2Eí07
Temperature instrument rupture, 1Eí07 
1.1Eí02/year for large leaks 
or ruptures from the Pb-17Li 
system.  
Category II 
VMM2
Small Pb-17Li 
LOCA
to VV 
TBM module box leak, 1Eí02 1Eí02/year for TBM module 
leaks to the vacuum vessel. 
Category II 
VMM1
Pb-17Li LOCA 
To VV 
TBM module box failure, 1Eí03 1Eí03/year for TBM module 
large leaks to the vacuum 
vessel.
Category III 
LBB2
Small He LOCA 
in TBM 
Helium leak into Pb-17Li, lose helium 
cooling to TBM box, 1Eí02 
1Eí02/year for helium leaks 
into the Pb-17Li.  
Category II 
LBB1
He LOCA in 
TBM
Helium rupture to Pb-17Li, lose helium 
cooling to TBM box, 1Eí03 
1Eí03/year for large helium 
TBM coolant leaks into the 
Pb-17Li.
Category III 
LMM2
Small He LOCA 
in TBM HX 
Pb-17Li-to-He heat exchanger tube 
leakage, 3.3Eí03
3.3Eí03/year for secondary 
helium leaks into Pb-17Li. 
Category III 
LMM1
He LOCA in 
TBM HX 
Pb-17Li-to-He heat exchanger tube rupture, 
3.3Eí03
3.3Eí03/year for secondary 
helium rupture into Pb-17Li. 
Category III 
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Some more detailed PIE definitions (Pinna 2006a; Pinna 2006b) are given below: 
x FB1—Loss of He flow in a TBM cooling circuit due to pump seizure 
x FB2—Partial He flow blockage in a TBM cooling circuit due to filter clogging 
x HB1—Loss of heat sink in TBM He cooling circuit 
x LBB1—Loss of TBM He cooling circuit inside breeder blanket box, weld rupture 
x LBB2—Loss of TBM He cooling circuit inside breeder blanket box, weld leak 
x LBO1—Loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) outside vacuum vessel (VV) due to large He 
pipe rupture in TCWS room 
x LBO2—LOCA outside VV due to small He pipe rupture in TCWS room 
x LBO3—LOCA outside VV due to tube rupture in TBM-He cooling system hx 
x LBP1—LOCA outside VV due to rupture of TBM He cooling circuit in port cell 
x LBP2—LOCA outside VV due to small rupture of TBM He cooling circuit in port cell 
x LBV1—LOCA inside VV due to He rupture of TBM-first wall into VV 
x LBV2—LOCA inside VV due to He leak of TBM-first wall into VV 
x LFP2—LOCA outside VV due to small rupture of He cooling circuit in port cell 
x LFV2—Small first wall/blanket in-vessel LOCA, break size a few cm2
x LMP2—Pb-17Li LOCA into port cell due to small break in cooling circuit 
x LVP2—Small rupture of VV He cooling circuit in port cell 
x LVV2—Small rupture of the inner VV shell, break size a few cm2
x VMM1—Loss of vacuum in VV due to large Pb-17Li ingress from TBM break 
x VMM2—Loss of vacuum in VV due to small Pb-17Li ingress from TBM break 
x VVA2—Small ingress of air into the VV from TBM  
x N/S—Not safety relevant. 
Of these PIEs, only the events involving Pb-17Li are considered in this FMEA. Future 
work will address the helium cooling system, the secondary heat removal system (i.e., the 
intermediate helium coolant loop that rejects heat to the TCWS), and the blanket box itself. 
Therefore, only LMP2, VMM1, VMM2, LBB1, LBB2, and LBO3 are represented in this Pb-17Li 
FMEA; the initiator LMP1 is added to cover component ruptures of the liquid metal system. Loss 
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of Pb-17Li flow is not a safety issue. The alloy has a very high boiling point, over 1300°C, and 
can withstand large amounts of heat without failure.  
2.7 Notes from Similar FMEA Studies 
Pinna (2006a) discussed an event where a water cooling line to the ITER first wall/blanket 
leaks or ruptures in the port cell and exposes the helium cooled pebble bed (HCPB) TBM cooling 
systems to a steam/water spray/humid air environment. The cooling systems to the ITER first 
wall and divertor are rated at: 125°C, 3 MPa, 140 m3 water per cooling loop (ITER-JCT 2001). 
Given an in-port LOCA, there are concerns about steam damage in the port cell. The liquid metal 
coolant piping design calls for electrical heat tracing to prevent coolant solidification and thermal 
insulation over the heat tracing to protect against heat loss—liquid metals transfer heat rather 
easily so there must be a fairly thick insulation layer to help retain heat and keep the liquid metal 
at operating temperature. The insulation will probably be several cm thick, assuming a § 40°C 
outside surface temperature for personnel protection. The steam will likely condense on the 
insulation and will not transfer much heat away from the Pb-17Li piping. Steam intrusion to the 
electrical equipment, the pump and valve motors, heater circuits, and instrumentation is likely to 
be more consequential. However, if the Pb-17Li loop pump experiences a short circuit or other 
fault due to steam engulfment, the loop flow stagnates. Stagnant Pb-17Li can withstand intense 
heating (boiling point § 1,700°C) and does not pressurize very much, so there is no threat of 
radiological or hazardous material escape from the loop during 400 s ITER pulses (Wong 2005) 
unless there is another failure causing loss of loop integrity.
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3. PRELIMINARY FMEA ON U.S. DCLL TBM HELIUM COOLANT 
LOOP
This FMEA on the TBM helium coolant loop investigated potential accident-initiating 
events with the TBM helium coolant loops, both the primary coolant to the TBM module box and 
the secondary helium coolant to the Pb-17Li loop. The helium coolant to the TBM module box is 
the primary cooling loop for the TBM, removing 54% of the total TBM energy at maximum 
operating levels. The FMEA results provide insights to the possible accident-initiating events that 
could occur with the TBM. 
3.1 TBM Helium Coolant System Description 
As noted in Section 2, helium coolant is used in separate channels from the Pb-17Li 
breeder-coolant that also cools the TBM module, giving the dual coolant concept. The helium 
coolant typically removes 54% of the heat from the module via a helium gas heat transfer flow 
loop and transfers the heat to the TCWS. If the Pb-17Li flow or coolant is lost, the helium can 
remove enough heat that the TBM can continue to operate without risk of overheat damage, but 
the reverse is not true—losing helium cooling requires TBM shut down for safety (and ITER 
shutdown as well). The helium loop has tritium extraction, purification, and heat exchange to the 
TCWS. The helium loop schematic diagram is given in Figure 3-1. The helium flow loop volume 
is about § 2.3 m3, the flow rate through the TBM piping is about § 2 m/s and 8 MPa, and the 
operating temperatures are 380°C minimum and 460°C maximum. A gas circulator drives the 
helium through the single-pass flow loop. Piping and components are to be constructed of RAFS 
and have 10–15 cm of thermal insulation to reduce heat radiation to the test port area.  
The main components of the TBM first wall helium cooling loop are a heat exchanger, 
electrical heater, control valves, and pipework. The electrical heater is turned off during normal 
operations; it is used to raise the helium to the minimum design temperature. The helium 
purification system (HPS) is small diameter piping with control valves to control flow. The HPS 
takes a small fraction of the helium coolant as a bypass flow. The helium purification system 
removes tritium that might diffuse into the helium coolant. There are no filters in the bypass line 
(e.g., no dust filters like those used in graphite-moderated Magnox and advanced gas-cooled 
fission reactors) because there are no recognized sources of dust or other contaminants in the 
TBM flow loop. It is also noted that the Pb-17Li coolant operates at a maximum of 2 MPa, so if a 
breach between the helium at 8 MPa and the Pb-17Li occurred within the TBM module then 
helium would pressurize the liquid metal. The module box is built to withstand such a breach 
without loss of module integrity (Wong 2005).  Any 8 MPa helium breaching into the 2 MPa Pb-
17Li will transmit pressure throughout the high temperature (highly fluid) Pb-17Li flow loop 
quickly, and the noble gas is expected to deposit itself in the headspace of the centrifugal pump 
casing or its expansion tank. The pressure increase in the Pb-17Li loop could actuate the Pb-17Li 
rupture disk to the drain tank. If the rupture disk opens, the system will depressurize into the drain 
tank. It is not clear how the helium system would respond to such a breach—the helium will 
initially depressurize into the drained Pb-17Li piping, but there is makeup helium available from 
the pressure control system. With the Pb-17Li drained, the Pb-17Li flow loop would de-energize 
and present a stagnant branch to the helium flow loop. In theory, the helium pressure control 
system could re-establish helium pressure and continue to cool the TBM module; however, the 
effects of the transient on the gas circulator (e.g., low pressure/overspeed trip?) and on the TBM 
box temperature transient during undercooling may require a shutdown. Otherwise, the helium 
pressure control system is used when evacuating the helium flow loop in preparation for long 
outages, for supplying makeup helium, and for system overpressure protection. 
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Figure 3-1. The helium flow loop of the U.S. DCLL TBM. 
Note that nine helium storage, four helium dump, and one buffer tank(s) are not shown. 
The helium coolant flows at 1.76 kg/s. The helium circulator, located on the cold leg of the 
flow loop, is encapsulated and uses a vertical shaft. The shaft bearings will either be gas 
lubricated or magnetic; this has not been decided thus far in the design. The design temperature of 
the circulator is 440°C, with a higher maximum temperature to be determined. The circulator is 
rated for 8 MPa plus a 10% margin for overpressure control. The circulator can deliver a total 
mass flow rate of 1.82 kg/s at a head of 0.65 MPa at rated (TBD) rpm speed, with 380°C at the 
nozzle outlet. The circulator speed and maximum allowable speed is to be determined. Circulator 
safety trips also need to be determined. The input power to the circulator drive motor is 295 kW 
(assuming a combined motor and circulator efficiency of 0.68). The circulator and motor 
dimensions are expected to be 1.54 m in diameter by 1.76 m in height. The gas circulator is 
expected to give heating power of 80 kW to the helium gas flowing through the unit.  
The electrical heater in the helium flow loop is used to bakeout the TBM first wall at 
375°C and to increase the temperature of the helium in the loop after complete cooldowns to 
room temperature. The heater has an electrical power of 170 kW. That heat source and circulator 
heating will raise the helium temperature at a rate of 200°C/hour if uniform heating is assumed. 
The electrical heater is electrical resistance elements in tubes; the helium flows over the exterior 
of the set of tubes. The heating rod tubes occupy 18% of the heater unit, so the pressure drop in 
the heater is low, only § 500 Pa.  
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The main pipework is 114.3 mm diameter with a wall thickness of 6 mm. The helium flow 
velocity is between 37.6 and 41.1 m/s. The pipework length has been estimated to be 100 m for 
the hot leg and 95 m for the cold leg (Table 2.2.2-6 in the DDD gives 180 m [Wong 2005], but 
the larger values will be used for conservatism in this preliminary FMEA), with two U-bends for 
thermal expansion control. There are 44 elbows in the pipework, but these are not evident in 
Figure 3-1. The bypass line to the heater is about 4 m in length and is the same 114.3 mm 
diameter as the main pipe. The compressed helium volume is § 2.3 m3 with a mass of 16.52 kg.  
Valves were minimized in the design to preclude friction pressure drop and to avoid 
inadvertent valve closure, which would mean a loss of flow. One valve is placed before the heat 
exchanger and one on the bypass to the electrical heater. These valves are position-controlled. 
The primary helium system has one heat exchanger, one circulator, one electric heater, nine 
helium storage tanks, four helium dump tanks, and one buffer tank. Despite this knowledge of the 
equipment available, the HPS and the pressure control system are not designed in detail at this 
time and are not treated in detail in this preliminary FMEA.  
The secondary helium coolant flow loop is called the liquid-breeder-to-helium heat 
transport loop (LB). The LB removes heat from the Pb-17Li coolant in a heat exchanger and 
transfers the heat to the TCWS. The LB traverses about 70 m from the TBM to the TCWS vault. 
The LB helium enters the heat exchanger at 8 MPa and 180°C and exits at 8 MPa and 300°C. 
That helium travels about 70 m to a water heat exchanger. The water enters at 35°C and exits at 
70°C and less than 1 MPa. Because the water heat exchanger is housed in a different room and 
the helium pressure is much higher than the water pressure, there is no foreseen way to introduce 
large quantities of water to the helium or liquid metal loops. It is possible that a heat exchanger 
breach could allow helium to accept some traces of moisture in exchange through a breach 
location.
3.2 TBM Operation 
At the end of the operating day and during outages, the helium cooling system will operate 
at reduced circulator speed to remove decay heat from the TBM module box. If the level of decay 
heat is low enough, natural circulation will remove the heat and save circulator operating costs. If 
the helium loop requires repairs, it is cooled and the helium is evacuated; the piping is then 
opened to air. Startup after repair requires drawing a vacuum to 100 Pa over 24 hours, then 
flooding with helium pressurized to 4.5 MPa at 25°C and heating with the electric heater and the 
gas circulator turning at partial speed continues until the gas reaches 380°C within a few hours. A 
bakeout session is then conducted at the 380°C temperature with the gas cleanup system 
operating to remove atmospheric gases and the circulator running up to rated speed. With the 
temperature at 380°C and the pressure at 8±0.3 MPa, the subsystem is ready for operation.  
As a first estimate for operational start/stop demands on the helium flow loop equipment, it 
is noted that the circulator will operate at reduced speed in a decay heat removal mode for the 14 
idle hours on pulse days and it will also continue operating into each ITER maintenance 
shutdown until the decay heat decreases low enough that forced cooling is not needed. Therefore, 
there will be four operational start demands per year (not counting any maintenance-related test, 
or system operability test, starts) for the gas circulator. The TBM helium loop will start up and 
operate for the 35-day entire pulse campaign, then shut down for any maintenance or other 
servicing. It is expected that § one week into a maintenance outage that the decay heat has 
reduced enough to no longer require active or natural circulation cooling by the helium loop. 
Therefore 35 days u 24 hr/day u 4 campaigns/yr + 7 days cooling/outage u 24 hr/day u
4 campaign outages/yr) = 4,032 hr/yr. This value is used with the hourly failure rates to give 
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frequency category estimates. For the LB secondary helium cooling loop, the liquid metal does 
not need to be cooled between pulse days; the assumed mode of operation is to turn the liquid 
metal pump at reduced speed and slowly circulate the Pb-17Li to keep it in liquid state. 
Therefore, the LB secondary helium circulator will be turned off each pulse day, so four 
campaigns per year, 35 days per campaign gives 140 operational starts and stops per year. 
As stated previously, the pressure control subsystem is not well defined at this time. There 
is flow in this system, and the helium flow is cleaned of tritium and particulate. However, the 
system details are yet to be determined. The pressure control system will not be treated in detail 
in this preliminary FMEA.  
The thermal insulation on the pipe and tank walls is not specified or described well, but the 
peak insulation surface temperature is given as 68°C (Wong 2005, Table 2.2.2-8). This value 
suggests that the port room will be an exclusion area for industrial safety reasons as well as 
radiological reasons because the upper bound surface temperature that humans can accommodate 
is § 40°C without protective equipment (e.g., gloves) (Bernard 1993) and 68°C heat in a 30°C 
room indicates very short stay times from a personnel heat stress perspective (Bongarra 1985). 
3.3 Design Information of Interest 
It is noted that Section 841.126 of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) 
gas transmission and distribution piping code B31.8 states that gas velocity should not exceed 
100 ft/s (30.5 m/s) at peak conditions and that lower velocity values are recommended for natural 
gas transmission and distribution (ASME 2003). High gas velocities in piping increase turbulence 
and pressure drop and high velocity contributes to excessive sound pressure levels (aerodynamic 
noise), which can cause internal pipe wall erosion. Section 841.125 states that upstream dry gas 
filters should be considered by designers for rotary or turbine flow meters. Particulates and pipe 
dust can contaminate meter lube oil and other internal meter components. Section 841.127 states 
that conical reducers downstream of the pressure regulator or control valve will allow more 
graded expansion of gas to larger piping and reduce turbulence and pressure drop during gas 
expansion. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), Standard 54, National Fuel Gas 
Code, states that fuel gases shall have at least schedule 40 piping and shall be welded joints if the 
system is operating at pressure above 5 psig (NFPA 2006). 
Several sources were reviewed to determine if any electrical grounding or bonding were 
needed for the helium gas system, particularly for reducing any chance of corrosion in the piping 
due to impurity gases being present in the system. Non-cryogenic gas piping system design does 
not address bonding or grounding. NFPA 54 states that gas system piping likely to become 
energized shall be grounded, but this system is not viewed as a metal pipe system that is likely to 
become electrically energized.  
Another point to note is that the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, 29CFR1910.103, 
discusses gas system design. Gas system components that could affect personnel safety must be 
designed to the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Section VIII or ASME B31.1 piping code. 
Shah (2003) noted that these codes do not address all of the materials useful to high-temperature 
helium design or the highest temperature regimes of operation. Nonetheless, the designers should 
consider the safety factors specified in these design codes.
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3.4 Related Operating Experiences Supporting the FMEA 
The literature was searched for any helium operating experiences. The most applicable 
experiences located were those of the helium-cooled fission reactors, even though many of these 
reactor plants operated many years ago. The first plant discussed is the Dragon Project, a 20 MW-
thermal plant in the UK (Gray 1969). The Dragon Project had a helium release design goal of 
0.1% of the helium primary coolant inventory per day, based on allowable leakage carrying 
radioactive products from the fission fuel (e.g., tritium, krypton and xenon isotopes, etc.) rather 
than cost of helium gas. When the fuel proved to be more leaktight than anticipated, the helium 
leakage value was judged on cost rather than fission product release. Dragon operating experience 
demonstrated that they could operate at a leak rate of 0.046%/day, easily remaining within the 
0.1%/day value over prolonged operating times. Continuous mass spectrometry of the 
containment building atmosphere gave early verification of helium leaks and could detect down 
to 8 grams/hr of helium leakage (0.01%/day). Great care was taken to keep the Dragon helium 
coolant pure; purging, evacuation, and hot testing helped reduce water and condensable organic 
compounds. Hygrometers measured water vapor and hydrogen, while gas chromatographs 
measured other gas concentrations in volume parts per million (vppm). Typical impurities were: 
CO—1 vppm, CO2—0.5 vppm, H2O—0.5 vppm, H2—1.5 vppm, and CH4—1 vppm. Some of 
these impurities arose due to fission fuel and graphite, but water vapor is certainly an issue for the 
TBM to address. The purification system generally acted rapidly to reduce impurities. The 
purification system had a total cleanup time constant of 0.66/hr. Some of the Dragon valves 
showed sticking behavior of metal-metal seats when they were opened after remaining closed for 
long periods of time. The valves exhibiting sticking phenomena were modified so the motor 
operators would deliver a shock when opening to break the metal-metal contact and there were no 
problems afterward. There were 250 motor-operated valves in the helium purification systems, 
but only one failed (and required replacement) in 3 years of plant operations. (Note: this is a 
1.5Eí07/hour ‘failure to operate’ failure rate for these valves.) The helium circulators operated 
well; only one 100-hp unit suffered a gas bearing failure in an aggregate 180,000 operating hours. 
Three of the six 100-hp circulators were overhauled (stripped and rebalanced) in the first 3 years; 
loose contamination was slight and easily swabbed. The helium to water heat exchangers suffered 
some tube leaks that were severe enough to prompt replacement of all six heat exchangers after §
3 years of operation. The dose rates generated by fission products (Cr-51, Mn-54, Fe-59, etc.) at 
1 ft from the heat exchangers were 32 mrem/hr gamma and 30 mrem/hr beta, and the entire job of 
six units being replaced spanned 30 days. Gray also noted that Dragon helium coolant had “non-
ideality,” meaning that the ideal gas equation prediction was higher than the actual helium 
density. At 100 atmospheres pressure the helium density was 10% below the ideal gas density, 
and at the operating pressure of 20 atmospheres the helium density was 1% below ideal gas 
density. The Dragon also had three purification systems: one for the primary helium coolant, one 
for gas flow purge directly from the fuel, and one spare system.  
The Peach Bottom Unit 1 reactor, a 115 MW-thermal plant, also reported some operating 
experiences. The piping and gas circulators worked well, but the helium-to-water superheat steam 
generator tubes suffered from chloride stress corrosion cracking. Hygrometers were used on the 
helium system to sense moisture intrusion. The main source of moisture was from steam 
generator tube leakage. Electrolytic hygrometers were used, but these units had short functional 
life spans that necessitated frequent changeouts, so personnel maintenance time and personnel 
radiological exposure were both large for these monitors. The plant staff recommended infrared 
or optical detectors rather than electrolytic units.  
It is noted that the Dragon reactor, Peach Bottom, and the Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
Versuchreaktor (AVR) (the working group research reactor) plant all described their system leak 
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rates. Gray (1969) stated that the 20 MW Dragon reactor had a design goal leak rate of 0.1% of 
the primary system helium inventory per day at the operating pressure of 20 atmospheres. In 
practice, Capp (1976) stated that the actual leak rate could reach about 0.12% per day (about 
0.2 kg/day from the § 180 kg helium inventory in the primary system [Capp 1976]). Another § 1 
kg was taken from the Dragon reactor per day to sample the helium for various activated products 
and impurities. Green (1969) stated that the 115 MW Peach Bottom plant operated at about 23 
atmospheres and had a design leak rate goal of 0.09 kg/day (this was probably a 0.01% leak rate 
per day for a § 900 kg-helium inventory) but in actuality leaked up to 2.7 kg/day or 0.3%/day. 
Cautius (1969) stated that the 46 MW-thermal AVR plant operated at 10.8 atmospheres, and 
leaked on average one complete helium charge (one primary coolant inventory) of 4,000 cubic 
meters STP (§ 715 kg helium) per year. That is a leak rate of 0.27% or 1.96 kg per day. Shaft 
penetrations were an issue, and flanges that had to be opened and resealed were another issue.  
The Fort St. Vrain plant was a large helium-cooled reactor of 824 MW and 330 MW-
electric, this plant had a technical specification overall allowable leak rate of 880 kg/day. Metallic 
pressure boundaries in the concrete vessel did not leak, but valve shaft seals gave more than their 
allocated allowable leak rate. The conventional valve stem packing was replaced with Teflon and 
metal rings that lowered the leak rate to less than the allocated allowable value. The reciprocating 
piston helium compressors had major maintenance problems despite design for helium service 
(Simon 1992). Additionally, Fort St. Vrain had trouble with moisture monitors that required 
frequent maintenance. Fort St. Vrain also had a few other operating experience suggestions, 
namely, to use copper oxide beds instead of titanium sponge beds for hydrogen removal from the 
helium and to use magnetic bearings rather than water-cooled bearings in gas circulators—this 
would make auxiliary systems to gas circulators simpler (auxiliaries were high failure rate items 
at this plant) and prevent moisture ingress into the helium coolant (Fuller 1989). Copinger (2004) 
had some other operating experience data on Fort St. Vrain. The helium purification system must 
have good moisture removal or the moisture will freeze and plug the cold charcoal beds that 
capture noble gases. Perhaps ITER TBM coolant will not have any concern about noble gas 
cleansing, but moisture in a system is problematic for corrosion as well as plugging cryogenic 
purification units. Other issues with Fort St. Vrain included moisture intrusion from water-cooled 
bearings on the gas circulators. This must be precluded in the TBM design, perhaps by using 
either gas-cooled or magnetic bearings. 
The High Temperature Engineering Test Reactor (HTTR) in Japan is a helium-cooled high 
temperature (850 to 950°C) reactor presently in operation. This reactor has set goals for helium 
coolant purity (Sakaba 2004) during operation:  
Impurity Concentration (ppm) 
Hydrogen 3 
Carbon monoxide 3 
Water vapor 0.2 
Carbon dioxide 0.6 
Methane 0.5 
Nitrogen 0.2 
Oxygen 0.04 
The HTTR uses a pre-charcoal trap, an inlet heater, two copper oxide fixed beds, gas 
coolers, two molecular sieve traps, two cold charcoal traps, and small gas circulators to cleanse 
the helium gas. Dual units provide the ability to regenerate or service equipment while the system 
remains on line. The purification system has a 200 kg/h flow rate and processes >10% of the 
31
primary coolant inventory each hour. The copper oxide catalyst bed oxidizes hydrogen to water 
vapor and carbon monoxide to carbon dioxide. The molecular sieve traps water vapor and carbon 
dioxide. The cold charcoal trap at í195°C adsorbs oxygen and nitrogen (i.e., air), methane, and 
noble gases. The charcoal trap only flows 50 kg/h and bypasses the rest of the helium gas in the 
purification flow stream. The HTTR has concerns for fission product noble gases (krypton and 
xenon); these are held on the cold trap for about 50 days and then are sent to the gaseous radwaste 
treatment system. The HTTR removed about 0.75 kg of water from the primary system during 
commissioning tests. Most of the initial impurities were traced to the graphite in the fission 
reactor core, the heat insulator in the gas duct, and original impurities in the helium gas supply. 
The HTTR helium coolant is supplied from gas storage tanks. It is noted that other gas-cooled 
reactors (e.g., the carbon dioxide-cooled Magnox and Advanced Gas Reactor plants) used 
cryogenic gas supply for enhanced gas purity (Poulter 1963).  
3.5 FMEA Failure Rate Data 
There is no database, similar to the liquid metal CREDO database, for gas components and 
no compilation of component failure rate data from past helium-cooled fission reactors such as 
the Peach Bottom and Fort St. Vrain units, nor from the German AVR and Thorium High 
Ttemperature Reactor (THTR) plants. The newest plants, the Japanese HTTR and Chinese HTR-
10, have only operated for about 4 to 8 years—that amount of time may not be adequate to give 
matured failure rates for small numbers of components in these small reactor plants. The Helium 
Loop Karlsruhe (HELOKA) is planned to test helium cooling loops and generate reliability data 
for ITER TBM usage (Ghidersa 2006). At present, the component failure rate data used in this 
FMEA came from several sources on gas system components. Some data arose from non-nuclear 
gas applications and some data came from gas systems in use in nuclear and radiological facilities 
at the Savannah River Site in the U.S. The best available data were used, but these data are 
generic and are in no way specific to the TBM application. The data sources used here included 
some sparse helium-cooled and carbon dioxide-cooled fission reactor data (Hannaman 1978), 
compressed gas system data (Blanton 1993), and some inferred data were taken from water 
reactor data reports (NUREG 2007). While these coolants are dissimilar, the water-cooled fission 
reactors do have a wide body of data to draw from. There are a few helium component data 
values reported in the literature (for example, Bittermann 1977; Solomon 1975) but these are 
scattered data of unknown origin; the data may or may not come from helium system operating 
experiences. Component sizes vary widely from the small TBM to the larger power plant scale, 
but given the sparse data the values were applied to the smaller equipment.  The data cited in the 
preliminary FMEA tables are considered to be the most representative data available at this time 
to apply to TBM components.  Data verification efforts are described below. 
To test validity of the data cited in the FMEA, a literature review was performed to identify 
any gas system component failure rate data generated by operating experiences. One of the most 
recent documents (Chamberlin 2005) described that compressed natural gas-specific hardware 
failure rate data would be needed for more detailed quantitative work; for their task the authors 
used military and chemical industry published data and compiled natural gas vehicle fleet 
operations experience data to quantify their fire risk fault trees and event trees. Their statement 
indicates that there is not a recognized source gas system component failure rates. Data from gas 
system operating experiences were sought in the literature; few reports were found. The author 
believes the sparse number of data sets is due to the lack of a regulatory mandate to collect and 
analyze the data. If companies collect data for their own purposes (such as - maintenance 
planning, spare parts procurement, facility life cycle planning, etc.), then these data are not 
reaching publication. Some literature that suggested great promise of failure rate data was 
actually tutorial in nature and contained no data (Wilcox 2001) or the data was expert judgment 
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used to determine overall system function, and was not experience-based failure rate data (Deleris 
2006). Of the few studies actual failure rate data, two were from Nederlandse Gasunie (Bosman 
1985; Lammerse 1985) the Holland natural gas distribution and retail sales company, and two 
were from Italgas data sets (Piccininni 1988; Scarrone 1989). The components used in natural gas 
distribution are much, much larger than those in the TBM flow loop, and distribution piping has 
the additional environment concerns of weather (lightning, wind, ice, etc.), buried pipe corrosion 
and strikes from unauthorized digging or above-ground pipe concerns of vehicle impact and 
weather. Bosman gave a mean time to failure (MTTF) of 400 hours (or, 2.5Eí03/h) for four 
large, de Laval reciprocating piston compressors, and he cited instrument, valve, and electrical 
component failure rates from the UK Atomic Energy Authority data sets from nuclear fission 
reactor operating experience data. Lammerse gave some data on a larger set of thirteen 
compressors, MTTF=680.42 h (or, 1.5Eí03/h) and a mean time to repair of 6.7 h. Shut-off valves 
for impulse lines were 2.4Eí05/h and gas control valves were 2.7Eí05/h as “all modes” failure 
rates. Temperature sensor-transmitter units were 8Eí06/h and pressure transmitters were 
2.5Eí05/h. These values are all greater than the values used in the FMEA tables in the appendix. 
This discrepancy is believed to be due to two main reasons. First, the Gasunie data is for much 
larger equipment in a more harsh environment, and sometimes the component designs are very 
different. Second, the Gasunie data values were reported for “all modes,” so decomposition of the 
values into specific failure modes like those cited in the FMEA would bring the Gasunie data 
closer to agreement with the values used in the FMEA. The Italgas data was detailed, but treated 
many components important to gas sales but not used in the TBM gas flow loop—gas pressure 
regulators (not addressed yet in TBM design), gas monitoring regulators, ‘slam-shut’ isolation 
valves, diaphragm vent valves, gas filters, and water intrusion concerns. These data were in the 
1Eí05 to 1Eí07/h range for overall, “all modes” failure rates. The range of data values from the 
Italgas tables are in cursory agreement with the failure rates in the FMEA table in Appendix B. 
Other gas system reliability data was sought. Labath (1986) used nuclear and general 
chemical industry data to quantify fault trees for a hydrogen sulfide storage plant, as did a 1980’s 
landmark risk study of industrial plants (Risk 1982). Medhekar (1993) used a nuclear plant piping 
reliability prediction method to apply to liquid and gas products in chemical plants. Simion 
(1993) evaluated hydrogen cooling systems for generators in nuclear power plants, but used 
operations experience to give a hydrogen leak frequency with fire or explosion of 6Eí03/plant-
year rather than model the pipework and cooling system components. More recently, Nelson 
(2007) used a combination of chemical industry and gas reactor-light water reactor data to 
quantify a hydrogen production plant risk assessment. Given these findings—the sparse data 
available is a fair comparison to the data used and that several studies have used nuclear power 
plant data to apply to gas systems, the data used are considered to be reasonable values at present. 
When more design information on TBM gas loop components is known the data will be revisited 
and vendors can also be asked to provide data rather than rely on generic data from handbooks 
and large plant operating experiences. 
An important failure rate for this flow loop was the helium circulator failure to operate. It 
is recognized that the UK has the most experience with gas movers since they have operated a 
fleet of carbon dioxide-cooled fission reactors for decades. However, no recent information on 
gas circulator reliability was found in a literature search. An older paper by Cave (1977) gave 
some data about Magnox gas circulators (axial flow turbomachine units, vertical or horizontal, oil 
or gas cooled bearings, either steam turbine- or electric motor-driven). These units are large, in 
the 200 to 500 kg/s flow range at 6 to 20 atmospheres pressure. The TBM unit is smaller, less 
flow (maximum of 1.82 kg/s) and higher pressure—but these fission experiences are the most 
applicable to estimate reliability of the TBM circulator. Cave (1977) gave 35 individual, electric-
driven circulator failures to run at the Berkeley, Bradwell, Hinkley Point A, Trawsfynydd, and 
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Sizewell Magnox and Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR) plants. There are 8 gas circulators per 
reactor (Loftness 1964) and the combined reactor operating time of 117 reactor-years gave 936 
circulator-years, or a failure to operate of 3.7Eí02/circulator-year. For these plants at that time, a 
reactor year was § 75% of a calendar year or § 6,600 h/year (Dixon 1974). Therefore a failure 
rate of 3.7Eí02/circulator-year gave 5.6Eí06 failures to run per circulator-hour. It is noted that 
most of these Magnox plants had two circulators per cooling circuit, so the loss of one unit was 
not a ‘scram’ event at most of these fission reactors if the operator could halt reverse gas flow 
after a circulator outage. There were no common cause failures in these reported failure events. 
As a comparison, the Japanese HTTR helium cooled fission test reactor had first criticality on 
November 10, 1998, but has not operated for full calendar years since then. The HTTR has 4 
vertical gas circulators, three in the primary coolant system that flow at about 3 kg/s at 4 MPa, 
2,000 to 12,000 rpm, and another circulator is in the intermediate cooling loop. These units use 
gas bearings (Furusawa 2004). Recall that the TBM circulator is 1.76 kg/s at 8 MPa. Data on 
HTTR circulator operating experience has not been found in the literature. One internet source 
noted a trip of one primary gas circulator on May 16, 2003 during plant startup (JAERI 2005). An 
electric part failed, it was replaced. Electric power parts are outside the component boundary of 
the circulator; that is, the circulator component itself is not accountable for failing to run if it lost 
electrical motive power. Assuming no failures of these four units (since no failures have been 
reported or described in the technical literature) and § 25% availability of the HTTR (over 8 years 
of operations) in its lifetime (see JAERI 2002 for an HTTR schedule) gives an average, or 50%, 
failure rate calculation of O=F2(50%,2dof)/2T, where ‘dof’ is degrees of freedom for the chi-
squared distribution and T is the accumulated operating hours (equation from IAEA 1992). For 
zero failures (dof=2) the 50% chi-squared distribution tabulation is 1.39, and the denominator is 
2[(8 years)(8760 h/y)(0.25 available)(4 units)]. Making the calculation, the average failure rate 
from these assumed data is 9.9Eí06/hour, which is a factor of 1.8 greater than the 117 reactor-
year Magnox value. The short operating time HTTR value is reasonably close to the larger 
population Magnox value, if the reader uses the definition of failure rate good agreement being  
within a half-order of magnitude (10, or a factor of 3.16). With this good agreement, a judgment 
is made to use the data with the most experience, since it is expected that as HTTR operates 
longer the circulator failure rate would decrease. Therefore, the TBM gas circulator ‘failure to 
operate’ failure rate is 5.6Eí06/h. The TBM helium circulator failing to run would be 
1.7Eí02/year, which is a Category II event. This is a somewhat high frequency considering the 
consequences of loss of TBM helium flow. The TBM designers can either specify a highly 
reliable circulator that undergoes extensive testing and overhaul, or add a second, independent 
100%-flow unit to increase gas flow reliability. A few of the notable gas circulator events on 
Magnox reactors have been Rizk (1965) where a diffuser channel shell had failed due to fatigue 
cracking caused by an acoustic-aerodynamic forces. The higher harmonics of blade passing 
frequency gave excitation to circulator parts, fatiguing the diffusers and spokes. The circulators 
were redesigned with inlet vanes, flow straighteners, and diffuser channel supports. Gould (1987) 
discussed that a thrust bearing on a horizontal shaft, axial flow gas circulator at the Oldbury plant 
failed. The failed bearing allowed the circulator’s rotating assembly moved back until the 
impeller made contact with the circulator diffuser and casing. The impeller rubbed severely 
before the circulator stopped rotating. The failure occurred in May 1983 and required replacement 
of the gas circulator unit. The Oldbury plant returned to operation in October 1984—
investigations, lead time to purchase a new unit, and repair/replacement activities required more 
than a year. As a comparison, the actual replacement activity took 45 days when the Fort St. 
Vrain plant replaced a helium circulator (Simon 1992).  
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3.6 TBM Preliminary FMEA Results 
The TBM helium flow loop FMEA covered the gas flow loop in normal, pulse operation. 
The TBM module itself was treated as a flow channel in this analysis. If needed, future work can 
expand the FMEA to cover other helium operating modes of the DCLL TBM design, e.g., 
bakeout.
x The preliminary FMEA on the helium flow loop is given in Appendix A. The main results 
were not surprising for this single-pass flow loop that cools a small section of the ITER 
blanket/first wall. There are, however, a number of single faults that result in TBM 
shutdown with consequent ITER shutdown. The ITER project may not wish to accept this 
additional unavailability arising from the TBM cooling circuit. Table 3-1 summarizes the 
PIEs from the FMEA results (the PIE format and definitions are given in Section 2). Only 
the events involving helium are considered in this FMEA.  
Table 3-1. Helium loop FMEA results for postulated initiating events. 
PIE Family FMEA Faults and Annual Frequency Frequency Summation 
LBP2—small
LOCA in port 
cell
Pipe leaks, 8Eí03/yrr 8Eí03/yr 
Category III 
LBP1—LOCA in 
port cell 
Pipe ruptures, 8Eí04/yrr 8Eí04/yr 
Category III 
LBO3—heat
exchanger tube 
faults
Heat exchanger tube leak, 0.04/yr 
Heat exchanger tube rupture, 2Eí03/yr 
0.042/yr 
Category II 
LBO2—small 
LOCA in TCWS 
room 
System pipe leaks, 7.1Eí02/yr 
Pressure control pipe leaks, 8Eí03/yr 
Helium purification pipe leaks, 8Eí03/yr 
Relief valve leaks, 8.4Eí04/yr 
Valve leaks, 8.4Eí04/yr 
9.1Eí02/yr 
Category II  
LBO1—LOCA in 
TCWS room 
Relief valve spurious open, 8Eí02/yr 
Relief valve internal rupture, 4Eí03/yr 
System pipe ruptures, 2.4Eí03/yr 
Relief valve external rupture, 1Eí04/yr 
Pressure control pipe ruptures,  
2.7Eí04/yr 
Helium purification pipe ruptures,  
2.7Eí04/yr 
8.7Eí02/yr 
Category II 
FB1—loss of 
helium flow 
Valve failures, 2.8Eí02/yr 
Gas circulator faults, 2.3Eí02/yr 
5.1Eí02/yr 
Category II 
HB1—loss of 
heat sink 
Valve faults bypass HX, 9Eí02/yr 
Pressure control system fails, 1Eí02/yr 
HX tube fouling, 4Eí02/yr 
HX tube plugging, 4Eí03/yr 
Secondary cooling system fails,  
1.2-03/yr 
Heater spurious actuation, 1.2Eí03/yr 
0.146/yr 
Category II 
(could be Category I) 
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3.7 Notes from Similar FMEA Studies 
Pinna (2006) discussed an event where a water cooling line to the ITER first wall/blanket 
leaks or ruptures in the port cell and exposes the HCPB TBM cooling systems to a steam/water 
spray/humid air environment. The cooling systems to the ITER first wall and divertor are rated at: 
125°C, 3 MPa, 140 m3 water per cooling loop (GSSR 2001). Given an in-port LOCA, there are 
concerns about steam damage in the port cell. The outer surface of the insulation on the helium 
piping will be 68°C, which is about half the temperature of the intruding steam. Heat transfer is 
expected to be slow through the pipe and tank insulation to the steam in the room. The effects of 
steam engulfment of motor-operated valves and the circulator motor are unknown. Certainly this 
equipment will be required to be operable in harsh environments (such as steam atmospheres) so 
that the TBM can be safely shut down in case of emergencies. 
3.8 Conclusions 
The helium coolant is the primary cooling system for the DCLL TBM.  This preliminary 
FMEA has shown that there are many single-component faults that will cause the cooling system 
to give degraded or no cooling performance, thus requiring ITER to shut down to repair the TBM 
helium cooling loop. Such forced outages may not be tolerable from the ITER operations point of 
view, since the operators will be striving to maximize machine availability. Also, the frequencies 
of events are high. This is believed to be due to two factors, assumptions on piping lengths 
(assumed 600 m of piping in the helium pressure control and helium purification systems) and the 
existing component failure rate data. Even with overestimates of pipe length that could be a factor 
of 3 greater than actual, the resulting frequency Categories would not change. Regarding the 
failure rate values, the best data sources available were used and applied to this intermediate size 
system. The cooling system is not large like a power plant, and not small like a laboratory 
experiment, so the data values may not accurately represent the TBM components. Another factor 
is that the data sources used did not originate from helium system operating experiences. 
Certainly most of the helium-cooled power plants (AVR, THTR, HTTR, Peach Bottom) have 
operated better than these data values would indicate, but no data compilations are available from 
those fission experiences. The failure rate data used were compared to published natural gas 
distribution equipment failure rates. The component failure rate values used here were lower than 
those data, so the results are considered to be reasonable for present purposes.
Based on existing FMEA results, many individual component faults in the helium cooling 
system will cause the system to stop operating; many of the failures are so-called ‘single failures’ 
that will result in taking the TBM off-line and consequently taking ITER off-line. These faults do 
not necessarily result in radiological releases, but they do impact ITER availability. Based on 
these results, design consideration should be given to overdesigning some components to be as 
robust (highly reliable) as possible, performing rigorous maintenance schedules and post-
maintenance tests, and considering use of redundant equipment for some components, e.g., gas 
circulator.
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4. PRELIMINARY FMEA ON U.S. DCLL TBM MODULE BOX 
The FMEA for the DCLL TBM module box investigated potential accident-initiating 
events with the TBM module box, which is part of the ITER first wall. The module box is cooled 
by both helium (primary coolant) and lithium-lead liquid metal (a tritium-breeding coolant). The 
helium primary coolant to the TBM module box removes 54% of the total TBM energy at 
maximum operating levels. The FMEA results provide insights to the possible accident-initiating 
events that could occur with the TBM. These events are referred to as PIEs in the ITER safety 
approach, and are component or human failures that place the facility in an off-normal condition. 
If redundant systems, backup systems, and/or safety systems function correctly, the ITER facility 
returns to a stable shutdown condition with no damage or releases. If there are additional failures, 
the accident event could result in small radiological releases to the environment and unintended 
machine downtime.  
4.1 TBM Module Box Description 
The module box is constructed of low activation ferritic steel. The module is mounted into 
a water cooled metal frame that supports the TBM module box in proper position. A stainless 
steel 316 shield plug (, i.e., a steel plate) is inserted behind the TBM module box for shielding 
and structural support. Pb-17Li, the tritium-breeding coolant, flows at low speed poloidally 
through the TBM module box. Helium coolant is used throughout the TBM module box, 
including the first wall portion of the box. Helium flows in separate channels from the Pb-17Li 
breeder-coolant. The helium coolant typically removes 54% of the heat from the module via a 
helium gas heat transfer flow loop and transfers the heat to the TCWS. If the Pb-17Li flow or 
coolant is lost, the helium can remove enough heat that the TBM can continue to operate without 
risk of overheat damage, but the reverse is not true—losing helium cooling requires TBM shut 
down for safety (and ITER shutdown as well). The TBM module box is shown in Figures 4-1 
through 4-6. The module box consists of 6 subassemblies. The module box sees helium flowing 
at 8 MPa, 460°C, and 65 m/s, and Pb-17Li at 2 MPa, 340-460°C, and 2 m/s. Helium flows in 
approximately square cross-section tubes, 4 mm wall thickness, 20 mm channel width and 
19.25 mm channel depth. There are 80 of these square tubes stacked upon each other and bonded 
together to make the module box first wall. The total tubing distance is (338 mm + 645 mm + 
338 mm)x80 § 105.7 m. The length of bonding will be (338 mm + 645 mm + 338 mm)x40 §
52.8 m, to bond the top and bottom of each square tube and the top and bottom tubes to the 
module box.  
The module box will be heated by flowing hot helium gas to bring its temperature up to 
operating temperature. An electric heat source warms the helium coolant in the TCWS vault 
room, and helium coolant circulator heating will also heat the helium. These heat sources will 
raise the helium temperature at a rate of 200°C/hour if uniform heating is assumed (Wong 2005). 
Due to heat transfer, the module box heating rate will be less than the helium coolant temperature 
ramp rate but would be a high value nonetheless.  
It is possible that a helium-to-water heat exchanger breach could allow the high pressure 
helium coolant to accept some traces of moisture in a diffusion exchange process through a 
breach location despite the helium being operated at higher pressure than the water coolant. 
Fission reactor experience was examined to determine tolerable helium impurity levels from a 
corrosion perspective, some allowable ppm values were cited in Section 3.  
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Figure 4-1. U.S. DCLL TBM module front view. 
Figure 4-2. U.S. DCLL TBM module box exploded view. 
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Figure 4-3. U.S. DCLL TBM module box rear view showing support elements. 
Figure 4-4. U.S. DCLL TBM module box plan view in cutaway. 
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Figure 4-5. U.S. DCLL TBM module backplates and helium gas routing. 
Figure 4-6. U.S. DCLL TBM module box rear view with helium manifolds. 
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At the HTTR, the oxide species can be radiolytically decomposed.  Such decomposition 
would pose concerns in the TBM box, so keeping their concentrations low is useful. Keeping 
oxygen and oxide concentrations low will prevent oxygen interaction with wall materials and 
reduce concerns about fouling or plugging. Thus far, HTTR operating experience is 
demonstrating that ppm levels are adequate to keep heat transfer surfaces clean, oxide buildup 
low, and material corrosion low. 
4.2 TBM Operation 
ITER plans to conduct 3,000 plasma pulses in a year. The dwell time between pulses is 
§ 2,000 s. A typical pulse scenario is 100 s ramp up, 400 s pulse flat top, and 100 s ramp down to 
the dwell time. Thus, one pulse requires 43.3 minutes. ITER is also stated to have a 25% duty 
factor. GSSR volume IV, “Normal Operation,” page 36, states that the planned ITER operation is 
a 35-day operating campaign with 10-hour pulse days, and 20-22 pulses performed per operating 
day. Each campaign will give § 750 pulses, with 4 campaigns per year (35 days of operation and 
45 days of post-operation shutdown) and the last 3 months of the year is reserved for a long 
maintenance shutdown.  
At the end of the operating day and during outages, only the helium cooling system will 
operate at reduced circulator speed to remove any decay heat from the TBM module box. If the 
level of decay heat is low enough, natural circulation will remove the heat and save circulator 
operating costs. If the helium loop requires repairs, it is cooled and the helium is evacuated, then 
the piping is opened to air. Thus, the module box will be exposed to an air atmosphere on rare 
occasions. Startup after repair requires drawing a vacuum to 100 Pa over 24 hours, then flooding 
with helium pressurized to 4.5 MPa at 25°C. The helium is heated with the electric heater and the 
gas circulator turning at partial speed until the gas reaches 380°C within a few hours. Then a 
bakeout session is conducted at the 380°C temperature with the gas cleanup system operating to 
remove atmospheric gases while the circulator runs up to rated speed. With the temperature at 
380°C and the pressure at 8±0.3 MPa, the subsystem is ready for operation.  
4.3 Design Information of Interest 
In nuclear fission reactor Final Safety Analysis Reports, it is noted that the carbon steel or 
ferritic steel (clad with stainless steel overlay for corrosion resistance) has limits on allowable 
heatup and cooldown to keep thermal stresses manageable. For the Advanced Westinghouse 600 
MW-electric pressurized water reactor (PWR) design (AP600), the maximum allowed heatup rate 
is 55.6°C/hour (100 F/hour) (Westinghouse 1992). The AP600 also gave a set of cooldown rates: 
40, 60, 80, and a maximum of 100 F/hour. Similar rates are also given for existing PWR plants, 
with a maximum heatup rate of 38.7°C/hour (100 F/hour), but with a staged cooldown rate of 620 
F to 350 F in 4 hours (§ 20°C/hour or § 68 F/hour) and then a slower 350 F to 140 F in 36 hours 
(3.2°C/hour or 5.8 F/hour). This staged cooldown allows the PWR’s Residual Heat Removal 
System to come on line at 4 hours after core shutdown for long-term reactor core fission product 
decay heat removal. The TBM does not have a reactor core of short- and long-lived fission 
products adding many MW of heat, so the 38°C/hour cooldown rate is likely to be acceptable 
down to ambient temperature when ITER shuts down. However, faster heatup or cooldown could 
create difficult-to-manage thermal stresses. Shah (2003) gives some design guidance for high 
temperature, helium-cooled fission reactors based on existing pressure vessel design codes that 
were meant to address light water fission reactors. That guidance for high temperature materials 
might prove useful to the TBM design community as well. 
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Regarding reliability of the gas coolant channels, a similar application is found in rocket 
nozzle cooling. Spacecraft reusable rocket engines sometimes use integral, machined cooling 
channels or tubular (both square and circular) cooling channels on the rocket throat and nozzle. 
Cryogenic liquid hydrogen fuel is first pumped through these channels to cool down the nozzle 
materials and then the warmed fuel is routed to the nozzle throat to be burned for thrust. These 
channels have been susceptible to a phenomenon termed “thermal ratcheting”. This is a failure 
mode where cycling cryogenic fuel as a coolant (LH2 at -253°C) on one side of the channel wall 
and cycling the very hot combustion reaction products (about 540°C) on the other side of the 
channel wall over many sessions (dozens of rocket engine operating cycles) causes the wall 
facing the hot side to begin to deform (Rapp 1993). This is a metal creep failure, a shape change 
while under stress and strain. The bulging wall has been referred to as ‘tenting out’ or ‘doghouse 
failure mode’ to signify the wall bulging outward toward the high heat flux and giving the 
appearance of a tent or roof. In some cases, the cooling channel wall deformed enough that it 
cracked and opened a through-wall breach. Jankovsky (1990) compared machined rocket nozzle 
channels to brazed tubes and found that the tubes had double the lifetime of channels. The 
stresses and strains in the tubing walls were 20 to 25% less than in channels. Fortunately, this 
failure mode is not expected to occur with the TBM cooling channels for several reasons. The 
TBM coolant is at elevated temperature (over 400°C) rather than cryogenic temperature (so there 
is no large thermal gradient on the channel walls), TBM temperatures will remain elevated 
between plasma shots (less heatup-cooldown thermal stress over the module box lifetime), and 
rocket cooling lines are often fabricated of copper tubing or milled copper passages for high heat 
transfer while TBM channels will be fabricated from much stronger and more creep-resistant 
ferritic steel. The TBM channel wall, at 4 mm, is also much thicker than rocket engine coolant 
channel walls at 0.89 mm.  
There are also irradiation issues of importance for the blanket box. Metals as a class of 
materials tend to have high thermal conductivity that dissipates radiation heating and avoids 
radiation heating damage. Metals also tend to have high electrical conductivity that tends to 
dissipate the effects of charged particles (ions and electrons). The primary concern with radiation 
damage in metals is displacement of atoms in the metal structure and transmutation effects that 
change the elements within the metal alloy. As low alloy steels are irradiated past 1E+18 fast 
neutrons/cm2, the ultimate tensile strength and yield strength slowly begin to increase; this also 
means the metal gets more brittle (Ma 1983). Finer grain structures tend to resist the effects of 
irradiation better than coarse grain steels. The TBM steel in question here also operates at over 
400°C, so there is some radiation damage ‘healing’ of the metal lattice through high temperature 
annealing. If ITER has a fast neutron flux of about 1E+13 n/cm2-s and the TBM lifetime is 
3.6E+07 s (10,000 operating hours) (Wong 2005) then the irradiation damage at 3.6E+20 n/cm2
fast neutron fluence is reduced ductility, increased embrittlement, increased yield and tensile 
strengths. The 1E+20 to 1E+22 fast n/cm2 range is a threshold level for irradiation effects (Ma 
1983; Kircher 1964; Glasstone 1981). 3.6E+20 n/cm2 is at the low end of the irradiation effects 
range, so the radiation effects of strength change, and ductility change are expected to be mild 
over the TBM lifetime. Two other issues are swelling and creep. Swelling has been noted to not 
be significant in Eurofer and other low activation ferritic steels (Schaeublin 2002) and therefore is 
not expected to be significant for the short lifetime TBM module. Creep is not expected to be an 
issue for the TBM since the highest accelerating material creep only occurs under neutron 
irradiation in metals at over half their melting point and at high tensile stresses (Glasstone 1981). 
The TBM module box will typically operate at § 46o to 470°C, and the Eurofer alloy has a 
melting temperature of § 1500°C, so the TBM operates at less than one third of the melting 
temperature. Fernandez (2005) stated that tests of Eurofer showed increased creep at aggressive 
test values (> 500°C, > 170 MPa) over 9,000 hours of testing. Creep strength deteriorated at 
500°C, 200 MPa, and 15,470 hours of testing. The TBM operates at close to this temperature, but 
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at much lower stress and for less than 15,470 hours, so creep is not expected to be a reliability 
issue. The TBM module box can be changed out if necessary at less than 15,470 hours of 
operation.  Evans (1992) pointed out that oxide dispersion strengthened alloys have good creep 
resistance at below 525°C; the TBM module box will operate below this temperature. 
4.4 Related Operating Experiences Supporting the FMEA 
The literature was searched for any similar operating experiences that would help support 
judgments of module box reliability. The module box is rather unique—a combination of gas and 
liquid metal coolants, high temperature (470°C) operation, a new, reduced activation alloy ferritic 
steel, hot isostatic press bonding, and silicon carbide usage as liner plates in the liquid metal flow 
channels. Some use of individual aspects of the TBM module box were found in the literature and 
are discussed in the failure rate data section below. The main promise of the TBM module box is 
that it consists solely of passive components, no active components like pumps, valves, etc. The 
cooling loop active components have been addressed in previous chapters. 
4.5 FMEA Failure Rate Data 
There is no database to draw from for the TBM module box components and parts. 
Nonetheless, an important concern is that without accurate failure rate data applied to the pieces 
and parts then the overall result will be a large value that is overly conservative (Cadwallader 
1996). No published failure rate data on square cross section tubes were found in the literature 
search, and there are no readily available data on flat plates or manifolds in radiation and high 
temperature—the Pb-17Li will typically operate at 340 to 470°C but can ramp up to 650°C 
contained in its flow channels (Wong 2005), while the helium coolant operates at 380 to 460°C in 
the module box.  
Some assumptions have been made to allow an initial quantification of the module box 
reliability so that the component fault events can be placed in frequency categories. First, the 
square tubes that comprise the TBM first wall (FW) are similar in width to the circular cross-
section tubes used in heat exchangers. As a first approximation, steam generator tube values are 
applied to the TBM FW tubes. Generally, shell-and-tube heat exchangers in industry have tubes 
in tube bundles that can be very long (many meters) and are thin-walled, perhaps 0.75 to 1.25 mm 
thick, to enhance heat transfer between fluids (Cadwallader 1996a). The TBM square tubes at 
4 mm wall thickness are more robust construction than heat exchanger tubes and operate at lower 
pressure. Considering that a fission reactor’s steam generator could have a ¨P of § 8 MPa 
between primary water and secondary steam and those tubes are § 1 mm thick inconel 690 alloy, 
the TBM is built more conservatively. Most U.S. pressurized water reactor (PWR) fission plant 
steam generators (SGs) are U-tube units having an average § 9,000 tubes per tube bundle and the 
tubes can be an average 30 m long (see the U.S. NRC fact sheet on Steam Generator Tube Issues, 
at nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/steam-gen.html) then some preliminary failure 
rates for tubes can be obtained. There are typically four SGs per PWR plant. Therefore (4 
SG/plant)(9,000 tubes/SG)(30-m/tube) gives 1.08E+06 m of tube run/plant. The operating 
experience event frequency for steam generator tube rupture is 7Eí03/plant-year (Poloski 1999); 
it is worth noting that earlier work by Adams (1990) gave 9.76Eí03/reactor-year. Dividing gives 
7Eí03/plant-year ÷ 1.08E+06 m/plant or 6.5Eí09 tube ruptures per meter-year. Over the majority 
of the data collection time, the fission plants operated at § 75% or more of a calendar year, so 
roughly 6,570 calendar hours per year. Therefore, the SG tube rupture failure rate is 9.9Eí13
rupture/m-h, which is rounded up to 1Eí12 tube rupture/m-h for this preliminary estimate. 
Adams (1990) suggested that multiple tube rupture events would be a factor of 10 less frequent 
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than the single tube failure value. Since the TBM square tubes are thick-walled and form a 
bonded unit, they should be able to meet this 1Eí12/m-h experience value unless outside forces 
act on the tubes. Another important issue is that a SG tube rupture can release appreciable flow 
rates, even though they are small diameter. Rupture flow rates up to 79 kg/s water (Adams 1990) 
have been recorded with an average of § 25 kg/s. The high flow rate is a factor of ten above the 
makeup water supply capability. Leaks in SG tubes were much smaller flow rates, the lowest 
reported leak rate was 0.0003 kg/s of water and the highest at 2.5 kg/s. A PWR flows perhaps 
17 Mg/s water in the primary system (Nero 1979). An estimate of typical flow in an individual 
PWR SG tube during normal plant operation is (17 Mg/s y 4 SGs)(1 SG/9000 tubes) § 0.5 kg/s, 
but a breach opening to lower pressure can increase the flow rate. Using Adams’ data, 78 tube 
leak events in 512 reactor-years would give 0.15 tube leak/reactor-year. Converting the data into 
tube results: (0.15 tube leaks/reactor-year)/(1.08E+06 m/reactor)(6570 h/yr) or 2.1Eí11 leaks/h-
m for SG tubes. As stated above, for a first approximation these round, thin-walled tubing leak 
failure rates will be applied to the square, thick-walled TBM tubes to estimate tube failure rate. 
Note that external forces, such as runaway electrons or plasma disruption energy will be treated 
separately. Granted, the SG and TBM materials differ; typically incoloy SG tubes versus TBM 
ferritic steel. The SG secondary side water-steam coolant has had chemical plateout after boiling 
that has contributed to tube corrosion problems while helium and vacuum should not present such 
problems for TBM tubes. Both the fission SG and the TBM tubes will experience the 
environments of high differential pressure, high flow velocity, and vibration. To give a 
comparison of these results, Marshall (1994) gave suggested failure rates for ferritic steel tubes 
with helium coolant. The analyst judgment tube leakage value was 5.4Eí09/m-h and tube rupture 
was a factor of ten lower, 5.4Eí10/m-h. The SG tube operating experience values are 2.1Eí11/m-
h for leakage and 1Eí12/m-h for rupture, from Adams’ data, which are lower values from actual 
operating experiences. Since the TBM tubing is thick-walled robust construction, the thin-walled 
SG tube operating experience values will be applied to these tubes as a first approximation. Using 
Adams’ data on SG tube leaks, the average leak rate for all 64 leak events that cited a flow rate 
was 0.167 kg/s, or about 33% of the typical flow rate. The smallest leak event was 0.06% of the 
tube flow rate. The helium tubing in the TBM will operate for about 4,032 hours per calendar 
year. Because the helium in the tubes is operating at 8 MPa, if a breach opening occurs, it is 
assumed that the helium will penetrate past the plasma sprayed beryllium on the tube outer 
surface. A two-mm thickness of beryllium is plasma sprayed onto the front face of the tubes 
(Wong 2005). As an initial assumption, given the square nature of the tubes and that the tube-to-
tube bond should be very strong to make the TBM withstand forces acting on it, 25% of the 
breach failures are assumed to leak out toward the vacuum vessel and 25% are assumed to leak in 
toward the Pb-17Li channels. The leaks upward or downward are believed to encounter strong 
bonding between tubes and are therefore expected to be halted without any further leakage.  
Values to apply to square tubing: 
x 2.1Eí11/h-m leaks, smallest water leak is 0.06% of tube mass flow rate, average was 33% 
x 1Eí12/h-m ruptures, average water leak is 5000% of the typical tube mass flow rate  
Leakage from the TBM has more concerns than just the module face tubes. Helium could 
leak out of the module box at many locations. Rivkin (2005) stated that most gas leaks (i.e., small 
leaks) of process gases leaking from 15 MPa gas cylinders and piping undergo a tortuous leak 
path and the leaks are on the order of 0.1 to 1.0 ml/minute of escaping gas. This is an STP leak 
rate; much gas energy is expended to overcome friction and pressure is lost in traversing a tiny 
leak opening. The STP density of helium is 0.179 g/l. Therefore, Rivkin’s mass leak rate would 
be 1.79Eí05 to 1.79Eí04 g/minute. If Rivkin’s very small leak rate is applied to ITER with its 
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§ 43 minute pulses, then at most 0.008 g helium could leak into the vacuum vessel during one 
pulse from a small leak. The helium flowing in the TBM module box is 0.343 m3/s volume flow 
rate, 100 m/s velocity, 1.76 kg/s mass flow rate, at 8 MPa pressure (which is roughly half of 
Rivkin’s pressure). The helium density is 5.33 kg/m3. At Rivkin’s small helium leak rate, ITER 
could operate for a year and accumulate ~24 g helium in the vacuum vessel, and vacuum 
pumping on the vacuum vessel would remove some of the in-leakage helium each day. However, 
over time the helium accumulation in the vacuum vessel might interfere with plasma startup, so 
the small leak might require a maintenance shutdown to make repairs. Nonetheless, the typical 
small leak rate for gases does not appear to cause concern for inducing plasma disruptions. 
Merrill (1991) described calculations for water coolant being injected into the edge of an ITER 
plasma from a first wall cooling line leak. As little as 30 g of water would create a disruption with 
twice the disruptive intensity as a typically expected density limit disruption. A 30-g mass will be 
used as a tentative bound on masses likely to cause disruptions. Using the 0.06% and 33% leak 
rates estimated from tubing leak experience, (0.0006)(1,760 g/s flow rate) = 1.06 g/s leak rate of 
low pressure helium, and (0.33)(1,760 g/s) = 580.8 g/s, both of which will pose a disruption threat 
at the edge of the ITER plasma over a 400-second pulse.  
The TBM module box bonding method of choice is hot isostatic press (HIP) bonding. 
Unfortunately, there is little data available on the reliability of HIP joints. There has been some 
fusion research testing of limited numbers of components for limited numbers of test cycles; 
however, the testing has not been sufficient to definitely prove that this joining is as reliable as 
traditional nuclear industry arc welding. At least one researcher commented that HIP was 
preferred over ‘leaky’ welds (Lorenzetto 2005), which gives an insight that at least some 
materials researchers believe that HIP joints could outperform welds. Basically, the TBM module 
has to perform as well as, or better than, the rest of the ITER first wall. The GSSR volume VII 
gives a first wall in-vessel leak as a Category III event, which has a frequency band of 1Eí02 to 
1Eí04/yr. The TBM is about 1.9 m tall by 0.65 m wide, or 1.2 m2 FW surface area, and the entire 
FW is 672 m2. Thus, one TBM is 0.18% of the entire FW. Applying the Category III frequency 
upper bound of 1Eí02/yr times 0.0018 gives a bounding value TBM leak frequency of 
1.8Eí05/yr. Applying this value to the TBM module edges that could leak appreciable amounts 
of helium into the vacuum vessel gives a result of 1Eí07/h-m for bond leakage. Comparing this 
value to Buende’s weld reliability values (Buende 1991) shows this estimate is at the high end of 
the range of nuclear-grade arc welding failure rates. Therefore, for this preliminary work, HIP 
bonds will be assumed to be as good as arc welding and will be given welding failure rates.  
ITER is built to withstand thousands of plasma disruptions; plasma disruptions are 
considered to be part of normal operations (GSSR 2001, section VII.1.2.2). Consequently, the 
TBM must also withstand disruptions. The ITER GSSR volume III states that approximately 10% 
of plasma shots will end in disruptions. This 10% value has been a long-standing assumption for 
disruptions and another assumption is that 10% of shots will be long duration plasma power 
transient events (Smid 1996). It is expected that most of these disruptions would occur in the H-H 
and D-D phases of operations, but some level of disruptions will still occur in the high power D-T 
operation despite efforts at disruption avoidance. Having no better guidance for D-T operation, 
the GSSR volume III information is used. ITER plans to operate 3,000 pulses/yr. Therefore, we 
would typically expect 300 disruptions/yr. An exceptionally powerful disruption would be 
required to lead to damage beyond the planned-for wall erosion. The physicists and machine 
operators would strive to avoid such high energy disruptions. Considering the rarity of hazardous 
disruptions that have occurred in existing tokamaks, perhaps a few events in thousands of plasma 
shots per year—such as the Joint European Torus (JET) experience (Bertolini 1995), and noting 
disruption statistics in the Axi-Symmetric Divertor Experiment (ASDEX) that showed many 
moderate-intensity disruptions which did not damage the machine (Zohm 1993), a high energy 
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disruption would only occur very rarely. Analyst judgment based on these existing tokamak 
experiences is that very severe disruptions would occur in perhaps 0.1% of all disruptions; that 
assumed likelihood means 0.3 high energy disruptions per year. GSSR volume III also states that 
70% of the disruptions are assumed to deliver their energy to the divertor. The other 30% of 
disruptions are assumed to deliver their energy to the FW. Applying the 30% value to 0.3 high 
energy disruptions gives § 0.09 disruption per year on the FW with high energy to damage the 
FW or TBM. GSSR volume III states to assume a wall surface area of 20 m2 being affected by the 
disruption for erosion purposes while the 2003 ITER Safety Analysis Data List (SADL 2003), 
section 2.2, and GSSR volume VII section 1.2.2 both state that the disruption would deliver its 
thermal energy to the entire 672 m2 (or 680 m2) FW. However, for conservatism, a disruption-
affected 20 m2 wall area will be assumed here. Assuming that a high-energy disruption has equal 
probability of impacting anywhere on the FW, then having some of the 20 m2 disruption area 
overlay on the TBM face could create TBM damage. An analyst judgment was made that 25% of 
the TBM face or more would need to receive the disruption heat energy to cause TBM overheat 
(differential thermal overstress on the TBM face) damage or failure. Quartering the TBM face 
and overlaying a corner of a 4.5 m x 4.5 m (§ 20 m2) surface for each one-fourth of the TBM 
gives a total area of 80 m2 the disruption could impinge and affect a portion of the TBM. Using 
the FW surface area, the likelihood of the TBM being affected is 80/672 = 0.12. A high energy 
disruption partially impinging on the TBM is (0.09 severe disruptions/yr)(0.12 area 
ratio)=1.1Eí02/yr, a Category II event. This is a crude quantification, but satisfactory for the 
preliminary nature of this assessment. 
The TBM must also withstand the electromagnetic jxB plasma forces generated by a 
plasma disruption. These resulting mechanical forces apply torque to the FW and the TBM box, 
attempting to rotate the TBM box around the axis of its inlet-outlet pipework. The TBM box is 
cantilevered in the water-cooled frame, normally with 20 mm clearance between the box and the 
frame around the entire periphery of the TBM box. The 4 metal bar support pins and the 2 metal 
block support keys hold the TBM in place against these forces and the normal vibration forces 
that occur in plasma operations. As an analyst judgment, having one failed support pin or just one 
failed support block is insufficient to move the TBM box against the frame. Analyst judgment 
also concludes that having one failed support pin and one failed support block will allow 
disruption forces to move the TBM box to contact its water-cooled frame. Having these two low-
failure rate components fail in an overlapping time frame is expected to be a very low probability 
event. At 300 disruptions per year, it is expected that there will be 1-2 disruptions per operating 
day. To address consequences of TBM box motion, the water-cooled frame information was 
examined. The frame wall thickness is stated to be greater than that of the 4-mm-thick TBM wall 
but the actual thickness was not found in the 2005 TBM design description document. While the 
distance to travel is small (20 mm), the forces can be very large over very short disruption times 
and would lead to high metal-to-metal pressure at contact points. That mechanical pressure and 
stress could result in tearing the side of the TBM FW face. This is only an analyst judgment at 
present, calculations must be performed on this postulated event scenario. If the TBM box were 
to fail, helium would leak to the vacuum vessel. It is possible, although improbable, that the TBM 
might be sufficiently damaged internally to leak Pb-17Li to the helium coolant passages and 
eventually leak Pb-17Li to the vacuum vessel. The water-cooled frame must be evaluated to 
verify that it is robust against such events so that there is not a water leak into the vacuum vessel. 
Failure rates for simple mechanical parts are not widely published. It is expected that the 
failure rates for these simple steel parts can vary due to the service environment (i.e., corrosion, 
elevated temperature, thermal cycling, pressure cycling, etc.) and planned usage (i.e., stress 
loading, strain loading). An assumption is also made that these parts fabricated from reduced 
activation ferritic steel will perform on par with components fabricated from traditional carbon 
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steel and low alloy steel. For all of these reasons, quantification of these passive component 
failure rates is highly preliminary at this time. A few failure rates are shown here (NPRD 1994; 
Moss 2005; Smith 2005; Green 1972) to provide some insight on elementary mechanical part 
failure rate magnitudes: 
Part Failure Rate 
Machine bolt 2Eí08/h
Machine nut 2Eí08/h
Shaft 2Eí08 to 3Eí08/h
Highly stressed shaft 2Eí07/h
Bracket 3Eí07/h
Chassis 9.2Eí07/h 
Clevis 4.526Eí07/h 
Pin 2.6Eí09/h 
These cast shapes, small solid metal mechanical parts, can reach magnitudes of 1Eí07 to 
1Eí09/h for basic “failure to function” failure rates. Bentley (1993) also reported some 
mechanical component failure rates: nuts, bolts, rods, shafts all had a breakage failure rate of 
2Eí08/h, spring or mechanical joint breakage was 2Eí07/h. Bentley’s values all agree well with 
those listed above. As a crude comparison, metal part data from Vo (1995) is used. Vo (1995) 
gave operating experience failure rates and expert elicitation data values on very large metal 
structural parts used in hydroelectric dam applications where water exerts high stress and also 
strain on the metal components. A metal gate “all modes” failure rate was 1Eí05/h, gate pins and 
beams were 2Eí06/h, metal supports (ribs, stringers, etc.) for gates were 3Eí08/h, shear pins 
were 1Eí05/h, metal stay vanes were 6Eí09/h, metal wicket gates were 1.4Eí07/h, and metal 
bars were 2Eí07/h. Vo did not decompose these “all modes” values into their respective failure 
mode contributions. It is expected that the majority of the failure modes would be failure to 
function (binding, bending, surface corrosion) rather than catastrophic cracking failure due to 
fatigue or material flaw (Smith 2005; FMD-97 1997). These values at 1Eí05 to 6Eí09/h for very 
large, massive metal parts scatter around those listed above for smaller metal parts (automobile 
parts, machine parts, etc.) and show that low failure rates on the order of 1Eí07/h and lower for 
mechanical pieces and parts are plausible even on the large scale of hydroelectric dams. For the 
TBM, a single thickness metal plate failure rate is chosen by the analyst to be 1Eí08/h for failure 
to support or maintain its shape under service conditions; this value is based partially on the list 
above and on the failure rate range guidance given by Carter (1986). A failure rate of 3Eí09/h is 
used for the welded pins on the TBM box, weighted by the FMD-97 data for pin failure modes 
(bend, 78%; break, 22%). Support keys (steel blocks) are assigned a failure rate of 3Eí08/h for 
failure to function, as an initial approximation. This failure rate is assumed to be 50% 
deformation and 50% cracking, based on similar types of parts described in FMD-97. A butt weld 
failure rate of 6Eí09/hour-weld, taken from Buende (1991), is used for the support key and 
support pin ‘detachment’ failure mode. 
The grid plates and coolant channel plates in the TBM are not as easily quantified for 
failure rates. These plates are dual-walled units. While the presence of two walls tends to suggest 
using independent failure rates for two plates, a more conservative assumption of two adjacent 
plates set side-by-side that experience the same environment - thermal load, thermal cycling, and 
radiation - are unlikely to have truly independent failure rates. Common causes could occur 
despite the fact that a material crack cannot propagate through a gap between plates. The typical 
‘beta factor’ method was chosen to address these dual wall components. Vesely (2002) reports a 
typical beta factor for initial assumptions is 0.1 and Andrews (1993) gives data which shows that 
most beta factors are less than 0.1, rather in the 0.04 range. Therefore, using beta=0.1 for the 
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present time should be a conservative, reasonable assumption. A beta factor of 0.1 on the single 
plate failure rate has been used to describe the dual-walled unit failure rate, that is 0.1x(1Eí08/h). 
Therefore, the cruciform grid plate failure rate is 1Eí09/hour for failure to support and to 
maintain its shape. The back plates with their coolant channels are also 1Eí09/h for failure to 
support and to maintain shape. It is assumed if the cruciform grid plate deforms, the silicon 
carbide inserts will fail since ceramic materials tend to be weak against bending stresses. Back 
plate channel plugging is assigned a failure rate of 3Eí06/h from Blanton (1993). Back plate 
leakage is assumed to be a single wall plate failure rate. 
The flow channel inserts are rectangular cross section ducts, or large flow ducts, of silicon 
carbide with a U-cap beneath the top plate to redirect Pb-17Li flow back down the TBM toward 
the outlet piping. No failure rate data were found for this rectangular duct component so 
assumptions are explained here. The silicon carbide “flow channel inserts,” or FCIs, have been 
described as liner plates (see Smolentsev 2006). These have been provided in the design to reduce 
magnetohydrodynamic effects of flowing Pb-17Li in the ITER magnetic field. The FCIs are an 
integral part of the MHD pressure drop and thermal profiles of the TBM; any flaws or failures of 
the FCI significantly impact the MHD and thermal behavior of the TBM (Wong 2005). The four 
FCI plates fit together as tongue-and-groove connections, there is no bonding, brazing or welding 
of the composite material. The FCIs have a thin sealing layer of crystal SiC to prevent penetration 
of the liquid metal into the SiC (Smolentsev 2006). The layer is included in the SiC failure rate. 
The DCLL TBM FCIs are 5-mm thick, operate in the 650—700°C range, and see Pb-17Li 
coolant moving at only a 6 to 10 cm/s flow speed. There is radiation damage in the TBM since it 
is part of the ITER first wall. Given all of these operating conditions, similar experiences with 
large-scale usage of SiC were sought. SiC has been used to great advantage in gas turbines under 
very high temperatures (1,200 to 1,400°C) and stresses. The slow crack growth phenomena that 
can lead to catastrophic failure appears to occur only above 1,000°C (DOE 1994). Lin (1994) 
noted that Nicalon fiber-reinforced SiC composite had reduced strength at elevated temperatures 
(100 MPa under 950°C and 70 MPa at 1,150°C). The TBM will operate well below the 950°C 
temperature, making slow crack growth a highly unlikely failure mode. 
Another use of silicon carbide has been to make electrical “surge arrestor” insulators, 
which have had very low material failure rates. SiC has also been used to make heat transfer 
components, notably gas-gas flat plate and also tubular heat exchangers to recover waste heat 
from flue gases in fossil fuel combustion processes. Silicon carbide has also been tested as a 
fission reactor fuel pebble cladding material, which would never have been considered if SiC 
could not function well in high radiation environments with fast neutrons at fluxes equal to and 
higher than the ITER flux. Fission fuel cladding is also called upon to continue confining the fuel 
during spent fuel storage, so the cladding must have high longevity.  This SiC application to 
fission fuel cladding suggests that SiC material can easily withstand the nuclear environment 
inside the TBM module box. The failure rates from these applications were studied to support 
analyst judgment of a flow channel insert failure rate.  
Lat (1981) gave some data on power distribution arrestors. These units were estimated to 
be 0.6-m tall by 0.1-m diameter, used in a 21 kV power distribution system. Taking away 
moisture ingress failures, vandalism, and lightning strike failure modes left 22 units failed out of 
300,000 ceramic units included in a 3-month study. Those data gave a point estimate failure rate 
of: 22 failures/[(300,000 units)(2190 hours)] = 3.3Eí08/unit-hour. Thus, loss of mechanical 
integrity (cracking, etc.) is a low failure rate. This low failure rate is indicative that SiC ceramic 
surge arrestors are passive components that function well when they are kept free of moisture and 
external influences.
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SiC heat exchanger tubing in tests have not shown any failures by flaws or subcritical 
crack growth, but the small numbers of tubes in short duration tests have not accumulated enough 
time to provide attractively low failure rates. Unfortunately, there is little operating experience 
data compiled for SiC tubes. Qualitatively, Reuter (1986) determined that if the SiC tubes were 
not overstressed, they could operate indefinitely, at least 12 months (8,760 hours) continuous 
operation, in a high temperature burner-duct recuperator that uses waste heat from an industrial 
steel soaking pit to preheat air to 1,255 K. Ten thousand hours is only a short time longer than 
Reuter’s prediction and is likely within the useful lifetime bound Reuter was addressing. Seven 
recuperator tubes were fabricated and exposed to these test conditions: 
Flue Gas Temperature, K (C) Exposure time (hours) 
977 (704) 25 
1086 (813) 360 
1227 (954) 75 
1311 (1038) 25 
1422 (1149) 35 
1533 (1260) 5 
Total 526 hours of testing  
Note: A 2-hour ramp up to test temperature was performed for each test temperature. 
The tubes operated without difficulty; no creep, no corrosion, no thinning of the walls, and 
no crack propagation was noted. Unfortunately, this amount of operating hours is very low and 
the number of tubes tested is very small; there is only low confidence in a failure rate estimate 
from this single batch trial of a few components. As a first attempt at quantification, this data set 
is analyzed as follows. Considering that 700°C is a high temperature for fusion, the exposure time 
hours are summed as high temperature operation. The tubes were roughly 2 meters long, and 6.35 
mm thick. A simple point estimate for reliability tests with no failures would be to assume a Chi-
squared distribution (IAEA 1992). A 50% Chi-squared “average” failure rate would be 
0.6931/(number of units tested•test time), giving 0.6931/(7 tubes•526 hours•2 m/tube), or 
9.4Eí05/m-h. A 95% confidence limit for that failure rate would be 2.9957/(number of units 
tested•test time), or 2.9957/(7 tubes•526 hours•2 m/tube) = 4.1Eí04 per m-h for all modes of 
failure. This average failure rate is rather high for heat exchanger tubing, so it is not an attractive 
value, but the implication from the test session is that the silicon carbide tubes performed well, 
showed no degradation after 52 hours, and could have operated much longer at elevated 
temperature without failure. Therefore, this crude estimate, generated from very sparse data, 
could be considered as an upper bound tubing failure rate. It is also noted that temperature ramp-
up was 2 hours (1260°C—20°C for a delta-temperature of 1240°C) or 10.3°C per minute, which 
is more aggressive heat-up than is used in the nuclear industry for metals. 
Hindman (1995) described an air heat exchanger used on an incinerator to recover heat 
from the incinerator flue gas. This ceramic tube heat exchanger used SiC-alumina and also 
zirconia tubes. Seven SiC tubes were used in a half-year test. Three tubes failed due to steam 
backflow. Planned weekend outages and air fan trips allowed some steam to enter the tubes on 
the air side, and the steam condensed as the tubes cooled for a weekend shutdown. During the 
next incinerator startup, thermal stresses generated by the condensate water heat absorption as it 
boiled caused the tubes to break. These tubes were replaced (note: apparently these tubes cannot 
be repaired in-situ, they must be replaced—this is an important consideration for the FCIs in the 
DCLL TBM, that faulted FCIs will likely require either the Pb-17Li loop to shut down and the 
TBM continue to operate only on helium cooling or TBM module changeout to repair the FCI in 
the hot cell). The tube operating time data is given below: 
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Number of Tubes Operating weeks Total tube length-time (m-h) 
4 27 17,010  
3 19 [failed at 19 wks] 8,977.5  
3 [replacement tubes] 8 3,780 
Total  29,767.5 
Note: The tubes were 1.5 meters long. An operating week was about 105 hours (Monday through 
Friday operation, for 24 hours/day but starting on Monday afternoons). The average week was 
105 on-line hours. 
The tubes operated with 982°C to 1,038°C shell-side incinerator flue gas at 1,633 kg/hour 
and a pressure drop of 0.046 atmosphere. The tube-side air entered at 425°C at 1,633 kg/hour and 
a pressure drop of 0.067 atmosphere. The design heat flux for a tube was 17.8 kW/m2. The tube 
walls varied between 3.2 mm and 6.4 mm thick and had a 10.2 cm outside diameter. The average 
tube wall temperature was 516°C. Air flowed down a metal tube “bayonet” within the ceramic 
tube and then reversed direction and flowed up the 0.95 cm–width annulus out of the tube. Even 
with this higher temperature and longer operating time than the Reuter data above, there was no 
creep, wall thinning, corrosion, or cracking except for the admission of boiling water than 
induced thermal stress cracking. 
Because the tube failures in the Hindman test were due to external operational influences, 
that is, foreign material intrusion (condensed steam) rather than a tube material flaw, flow 
vibration, or a design issue, the tube failures are not counted as part of the operating experience 
for this first approximation of a failure rate to be applied to the TBM. Following the IAEA (1992) 
guidance, a 50% Chi-squared failure rate would be 0.6931/(17,010+8977.5+3780 meter-hours) = 
2.3Eí05/m-h. A Chi-squared 95% upper bound failure rate would be 2.9957/(2•29,767.5) or 
5Eí05/m-h. This average failure rate is over a factor of ten less than the value found in the 526-
hour test discussed above. This failure rate reduction with additional operating time and more 
aggressive operating parameters in heat exchange tubes, and the data from Lat (1981) about the 
very low electrical insulator failure rates, all suggest that the SiC tubing component could survive 
longer operating times. There was a concern that running at the design heat flux could cause the 
tubes to suffer interply or intraply damage, especially transverse to the fiber direction. Those 
forms of damage would not necessarily cause catastrophic tube wall failure. The test results 
showed that the tubes could handle more heat load than predicted, there was no interply or 
intraply damage. Reuter (1986) examined fracture mechanics of SiC and stated that if a safety 
factor of 5 to 10 on material stress was used [note—this high safety factor means keeping the tube 
internal pressure, wall thermal stresses, flow-induced mechanical stresses, and all other stresses 
low], then the probability of tube failure during its service life would be below 1Eí04. Since the 
TBM would require replacement if there was a fault in the FCIs, it is assumed in this preliminary 
work that safety factors on the FCIs would be high. This concept of keeping the stress loading 
small to prolong lifetime has long been used in electronics parts (e.g., parts derating) and has also 
been seen in C-ring tests of ceramic materials (Sandifer 1994). Considering that the tubing 
described above operated at similar or higher temperatures than the TBM and that the tube wall 
thicknesses are very similar to the 5-mm thick TBM FCI, and that the TBM FCIs should 
experience only low mechanical stress due to close tolerances to their support grid plates, then the 
1Eí04 cracking failure probability over the TBM service life of 10,000 hours appears to be 
reasonable to apply to the FCIs. SiC failures due to flaws from inclusions, slow crack growth, or 
any other inherent faults would be 1Eí08/duct-hour for each of the FCI ducts. It is noted that the 
“tongue-in-groove” plate connections could provide sites for collecting impurities from the 
flowing Pb-17Li. Any vibration of SiC duct plates with impurities present could cause scoring of 
the SiC if the impurities are sufficiently hard-surfaced, such as metal precipitates or metal oxides. 
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Scoring could result in fracture and subsequent failure of the tongue-in-groove joints. Use of 
magnetic traps or some other type of RAFS metal oxide traps is advisable to capture metal oxides 
from the flow stream to keep the metals out of the TBM module flow channels. 
The dual-walled inner and outer back plates also pose an interesting challenge for 
quantification. The failure modes of interest are deformation, fracture or cracking, and helium 
flow failures of plugging or flow blockage, and fouling. Deformation is treated like other plates 
described above despite the second dual-walled back plate unit being present to give more 
structural support to the other back plate. Deformation of the inner plate is believed to overstress 
the FCIs and restrict, but not halt, helium flow within the inner back plate. Deformation of the 
outer back plate is believed to not overstress the FCIs but is expected to overstress the helium 
piping connections to the back plate outer wall to the point of multiple leak formation.  
The plasma-sprayed beryllium coating on the face of the TBM is also a concern. Castro 
(1995, 1996, 1998, 1999) tested 4 plasma sprayed samples for 3,000 cycles each at 1 MW/m2 and 
there were no failures in any of the samples. Ramping up to 3 and 5 MW/m2 for 20-second cycles 
led to beryllium damage and hot spot formation on the substrate in only a few cycles. Therefore, 
assuming that the surface area is not a driving issue for good bonding between plasma-spray and 
substrate joining, then using the IAEA (1992) approach, the failure rate of debonding is zero 
failures in 4x3,000 cycles, or a failure rate of 0.6931/12,000 = 5.8Eí05 debondings per cycle. If 
the TBM lives for 5 years and sees 15,000 pulses, then (15,000)(5.8Eí05) = 0.87 chance of 
coating debonding. The JET experiment has had beryllium metal components and evaporative 
deposition beryllium coatings in use in both D-D and D-T operations. JET experiences included 
beryllium droplet intrusion into the plasma; these droplets led to high beryllium concentration in 
the plasma and reduced fusion neutron production but not plasma disruptions (Loarte 2005). At a 
beryllium density of 1.85 g/cm3, and droplets of a reasonably large size, 6.5 mm diameter (or 
0.146 cm3), gives 0.27 gram-Be per drop. Therefore, over 100 drops in proximity at the plasma 
edge would be needed to reach the 30-gram level determined by Merrill (1991). Despite this 
evidence to the contrary, the TBM safety work (Wong 2005) assumes a plasma disruption occurs 
if the beryllium coating debonds or melts and sends beryllium out from the TBM face into the 
edge of the plasma.  
4.6 TBM Preliminary FMEA Results 
The TBM module box FMEA covered the module in normal, pulse operation. If needed, 
future work can expand the FMEA to cover other helium operating modes of the DCLL TBM 
design, e.g., bakeout.  
The preliminary FMEA on the module box is given in Appendix C. The main results were not 
surprising for this small portion of the ITER first wall. There are, however, a number of single 
faults that would prudently result in TBM shutdown with consequent ITER shutdown. The ITER 
project may not wish to accept this additional unavailability arising from the TBM. Table 4-1 
summarizes the PIEs from the module box FMEA results (the PIE format and definitions are 
given in Section 2). Only the events involving the module box are considered in this FMEA. 
Because the module box contains both helium and Pb-17Li coolants, there are several initiating 
event categories included in this FMEA. 
55
Table 4-1. TBM module box FMEA results for postulated initiating events. 
PIE Family FMEA Faults and Annual Frequency Frequency Summation 
LBV1—rupture
flow out of TBM 
Tube rupture, 1Eí07/y 
Magnetic-driven missile strikes TBM, 
 1Eí04/y 
Plasma disruption on TBM, 1.2Eí02/y 
Top/bottom plate rupture, 1.7Eí04/y 
Outer back plate rupture, 4Eí06/y 
Manifold rupture, 1.4Eí05/y 
Supply line rupture, 2.7Eí05/y 
1.2Eí02/y 
Category II 
LBV2—large
leak out of TBM 
Tube large leak, 2Eí06/y 
Top/bottom plate leak, 1.7Eí03/y 
Outer back plate rupture, 4Eí05/y 
Manifold rupture, 4Eí04/y 
Supply line rupture, 8Eí04/y 
3Eí03/y 
Category III 
LBV3—small 
leak out of TBM 
Small tube leak, 2.1Eí05/y 2.1Eí05/y 
Category IV 
LBB1—rupture
in TBM 
Tube rupture, 1Eí07/y 
Top/bottom plate rupture, 1.7Eí04/y 
Center plate rupture, 4Eí06/y 
Inner/outer back plate rupture, 8Eí06/y 
1.7Eí04/y 
Category III 
LBB2—large
leak in TBM 
Tube leak, 2Eí06/y 
Top/bottom plate leak, 1.7Eí03/y 
Center plate leak, 4Eí05/y 
Inner/outer back plate leak, 8Eí05/y 
1.8Eí03/y 
Category III 
LBB3—small 
leak into TBM 
Small tube leak, 2.1Eí05/y 2.1Eí05/y 
Category IV 
FB2—partial loss 
of flow 
Heat transfer surface fouling, 5Eí04/y 
Flow blockage, 6.3Eí04/y 
Deformation restricts flow, 8Eí06/y 
Plate internal flow leak, 8Eí04/y 
1.9Eí03/y 
Category III 
FB1—loss of 
flow
Inner and outer back plate internal ruptures, 
8.1Eí05/y 
8.1Eí05/yr 
Category IV 
VVA2—Air 
ingress to VV 
Vessel penetration faults, 1.9Eí03/y 1.9Eí03/y 
Category III 
4.7 Conclusions 
The TBM module box itself is an assembly of simple mechanical components, it is a 
passive component with no moving parts. Passive, mechanical components tend to have low 
failure rates. Mechanical components tend to have long term, chronic degradations, such as 
repeated stress cycles, or wear, rather than acute failures. An important degradation for blanket 
modules is exposure to repeated thermal cycles and plasma disruption forces. The blanket module 
components themselves have only a few failure modes—leakage, rupture, heat transfer surface 
fouling, and flow blockage. This preliminary FMEA has shown that there are many single-
component faults that will cause the blanket module to give degraded performance, but most of 
the faults are low frequency, in the Category III and Category IV ranges as seen in Table 4-1. The 
data sources used in this preliminary FMEA were scattered and the majority of component failure 
rate values did not originate from fusion blanket testing or any known system operating 
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experiences. Based on existing results, some of the identified component faults in the TBM 
module box will cause the box to overheat and this could lead to mechanical failure due to 
stresses from thermal expansion. Such failures will result in taking the TBM off-line and 
consequently taking ITER off-line until the TBM module box can be replaced. Overall, the TBM 
module box faults do not necessarily result in radiological releases that threaten the public, but 
they do impact ITER availability. Based on these results, design consideration should be given to 
testing the TBM components in fusion environments. 
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5. FMEA RESULTS 
The preliminary FMEAs for the three DCLL TBM subsystems were completed and 
presented in the previous chapters. The overall results are given by PIE category and frequency 
category. The ITER frequency categories are defined in Table 5-1 below (GSSR 2001). The 
FMEA results are given in Table 5-2.  Overall, it is noted that for some TBM faults, the prudent 
safety measure is to shut down ITER to prevent TBM module box damage and potential ITER in-
vessel contamination from overheated or melted materials.  The TBM cooling systems must be 
built to high standards to preclude ITER shutdowns from TBM issues. 
Table 5-1. Event frequency categories. 
Event category I II III IV 
Category 
description
Operational
events and plant 
conditions
planned and 
required for 
ITER normal 
operation,
including some 
fault events 
which can occur 
as a result of the 
ITER
experimental 
nature.
Likely event 
sequences not 
planned but 
likely to occur 
one or more 
times during the 
life of the plant 
but not included 
in Category I. 
Unlikely event 
sequences that 
are postulated 
but not likely to 
occur during the 
life of the plant. 
Extremely 
unlikely event 
sequences that 
are postulated 
but are not likely 
to occur during 
the life of the 
plant with a very 
large margin. 
Frequency range, 
f
 f > 1E-02/yr 1E-02/yr > f 
> 1E-04/yr 
1E-04/yr > f 
> 1E-06/yr 
ITER plant 
condition
Normal 
operation
Incident Accident Accident 
From the reference GSSR (2001). 
To determine the most consequential accident sequences, the most frequent events with the 
highest inventories are identified.  The radiological inventories of the various portions of the 
TBM system are therefore considered. The helium cooling loop is not expected to have activated 
corrosion products or activated coolant, so losses of the helium loop are only a concern if such 
losses allow the TBM face to remain uncooled while the plasma is pulsing, resulting in melting. 
TBM face melting creates a breach pathway from wherever the helium loop breached (i.e., 
TCWS vault, port cell, pipe chase, etc.) to the interior of the ITER vacuum vessel. The path is a 
set of irregular small openings in a small diameter pipe, but it is a path nonetheless. Since that 
event would be a confinement bypass breach between a heat transfer room (or some other 
location) to the vacuum vessel, it is an important accident to analyze.  
The Pb-17Li loop would have activated coolant, elemental tritium, and activated corrosion 
products. A breach of this system would release some of that inventory to the VV or Port Cell—
the entire Pb-17Li system is housed in the Port Cell. Since loss of flow and loss of heat sink are 
not consequential for the Pb-17Li system because the liquid metal can withstand very high heat 
Table 5-2. U.S. DCLL TBM preliminary FMEA results. 
ITER Postulated Initiating Event Family Frequency Category  
Pb-17Li Cooling and Breeding Flow Loop 
LMP2
Small Pb-17Li LOCA to Port Cell 
Category II  
5.6E-02/yr for small leaks from the Pb-17Li 
system. 
LMP1
Pb-17Li LOCA to Port Cell 
Category II  
1.1E-02/yr for large leaks or ruptures from the 
Pb-17Li system.  
VMM2
Small Pb-17Li LOCA to VV 
Category II  
1E-02/yr for TBM module leaks to the vacuum 
vessel.
VMM1
Pb-17Li LOCA To VV 
Category III  
1E-03/yr for TBM module large leaks to the 
vacuum vessel.  
LBB2
Small He LOCA in TBM 
Category II  
1E-02/yr for helium leaks into the Pb-17Li.  
LBB1
He LOCA in TBM 
Category III  
1E-03/yr for large helium TBM coolant leaks 
into the Pb-17Li.  
LMM2
Small He LOCA in TBM HX 
Category III  
3.3E-03/yr for secondary helium leaks into Pb-
17Li.
LMM1
He LOCA in TBM HX 
Category III  
3.3E-03/yr for secondary helium rupture into 
Pb-17Li.
Helium Cooling Flow Loop 
LBP2
Small LOCA in port cell 
Category III  
8E-03/yr for pipe leaks. 
LBP1
LOCA in port cell 
Category III  
8E-04/yr for pipe ruptures. 
LBO3
Heat exchanger tube faults 
Category II  
0.042/yr for heat exchanger tube leaks and 
ruptures.
LBO2
Small LOCA in TCWS room 
Category II  
9.1E-02/yr for pipe, interfacing pipe, and valve 
leaks.
LBO1
LOCA in TCWS room 
Category II  
8.7E-02/yr for relief valve faults, pipe ruptures. 
FB1
Loss of helium flow 
Category II  
5.1E-02/yr for valve closure failures and gas 
circulator failures. 
HB1
Loss of heat sink 
Category II (may be Category I) 
0.146/yr for valve faults, heat exchanger faults. 
Table 5-2. (continued). 
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ITER Postulated Initiating Event Family Frequency Category  
TBM Module Box 
LBV1
Rupture flow out of TBM 
Category II  
1.2E-02/y for plasma events, top or bottom 
plate ruptures 
LBV2
Large leak out of TBM 
Category III  
3E-03/y top or bottom plate leaks, tube leaks 
LBV3
Small leak out of TBM 
Category IV  
2.1E-05/y for small tube leaks from the TBM. 
LBB1
Rupture in TBM 
Category III  
1.7E-04/y for tube ruptures, plate cracks. 
LBB2
Large leak in TBM 
Category III  
1.8E-03/y for tube leaks, plate leaks. 
LBB3
Small leak into TBM 
Category IV  
2.1E-05/y for small tube leaks, plate leaks. 
FB2
Partial loss of flow 
Category III  
1.9E-03/y for fouling, flow blockage, 
deformation that restricts flow. 
FB1
Loss of flow 
Category IV  
8.1E-05/yr for inner or outer back plate internal 
ruptures.
VVA2
Air ingress to vacuum vessel (VV) 
Category III  
1.9E-03/y for VV penetration faults. 
without expansion, thermal decomposition, boiling, etc., then the hazardous and radioactive 
inventories in the Pb-17Li remain confined in those transients.
From Table 5-2, considering the radiological inventories of the flow loops, the most 
consequential events are the Category II frequency LOCAs.  It is noted that the TBM module box 
is passive, it has no moving parts, and its failure frequencies tend to be lower than those of the 
flow loops with active components. The primary safety issue for the TBM module box is that it 
maintains its confinement function as a part of the ITER first wall. If the TBM box fails (melting, 
mechanical overstress, seal failure) then the vacuum vessel is breached to the port cell, a 
Category III event. The TBM module interior should not contain any easily mobilized radioactive 
or hazardous materials—the liquid metal channels are lined with SiC (so no corrosion product 
formation is expected) and any tritium or radiological inventories are mainly in the Pb-17Li or 
helium coolant channels. Volumetric neutron activation in the TBM, that is, radioactive structural 
compoents, is not easily mobilized. The TBM failing to confine the ITER vacuum vessel 
inventories would be the greatest safety issue requiring analysis.  
Past TBM work (GSSR 2001a) treated these accidents: 
x Helium cooled pebble bed design 
- Loss of coolant into the vacuum vessel 
- Loss of coolant into breeder box (several leak sizes analyzed) 
- Loss of coolant into heat transfer vault (large LOCA) 
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x Water cooled lithium lead design 
- In-vessel loss of coolant accident 
- Loss of coolant inside breeder box 
- In-vessel and in-TBM LOCA with rupture of First Wall 
- Ex-vessel TBM coolant leaks 
x Water cooled pebble bed design 
- In-vessel loss of coolant 
- Loss of coolant inside the breeder box 
- Ex-vessel TBM coolant leaks 
x Lithium self-cooled TBM design 
- In-vessel loss of coolant, TBM FW break or FW shielding break 
- Ex-vessel TBM coolant leaks. 
These listed accidents bound the inventory-based safety inspection effort described above. Ex-
vessel events can lead to in-vessel overheat and failure, creating a path from the VV to a heat 
transport room. In-vessel LOCA events can cause intense disruptions that can potentially damage 
the ITER vessel and lead to further releases. The TBM breaching the VV wall should be 
examined as well. 
Accident analyses already performed in the DDD (Wong 2005) include DCLL TBM 
coolant leaks – both in-vessel and ex-vessel – which are expected with cooling flow loops, and 
internal module box leaks as well.  The DDD analysis also includes a complete loss of active 
cooling event.  The DDD events envelope these FMEA findings, including VV breach.  All the 
events analyzed have included aggravating failures (e.g., loss of electrical power, damaging 
plasma disruption) that would not be identified in a FMEA analysis since the FMEA examines 
individual component failures rather than multiple, simultaneous faults.  Therefore, the analyses 
already performed are more strict than the FMEA findings.  For the DCLL TBM, loss of flow or 
loss of heat sink events occurring to just one of the coolants are not events of great safety 
concern, since with typical instrumentation and monitoring called out in the design, the TBM 
event is sensed and the module and/or ITER can be safely shut down.  That is, losing helium 
cooling will overheat the Pb-17Li but overheated liquid metal does not overpressurize or deform 
the module.  Given the thermal excursion effects on the module box, early changeout would be 
recommended after one of these events.  Likewise, losing Pb-17Li cooling is not a safety 
consequence,  the TBM can continue operating with helium coolant available.  The loss of 
coolant events do pose safety concerns, these events will lead to the highest amount of TBM 
damage and the highest releases into the VV, cell, or TCWS vault.  However, as shown in the 
DDD (Wong 2005), the TBM radiological inventories are small compared to ITER inventories, 
so TBM releases should be manageable.  Breaching the helium coolant system does not 
overpressurize the building, and any hydrogen generation from first wall water coolant and TBM 
metal reactions remains below the ITER limit of 2.5 kg.   
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Appendix A 
Preliminary Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
for the Pb-17Li Flow Loop 
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Component 
Operational
State
Failure 
Mode 
Frequency 
Category Possible Causes 
Preventive
Action on 
Possible Causes Consequences 
Corrective or 
Preventive Actions 
on Consequences 
ITER Postulated 
Initiating Events Comments Frequency 
Comment on 
frequency 
calculation Design comments 
Pump motor 
controller 
NO fails to 
operate 
Category II electronic
component 
fault, software 
error, loss of 
control power, 
human error  
controller 
redundancy, 
regular 
inspection, 
software QA, 
diverse power 
supplies, detailed 
operating 
procedures 
Controller may allow 
the pump motor to 
continue to run as-is, or 
pump motor may slow 
to a stop depending on 
the controller design 
parameter selection.  
Possible loss of flow 
event.
If the TBM has 
helium cooling 
available, ITER can 
continue to operate 
to the end of the 
campaign 
Pb-17Li LOFA but 
it is not an IE N/S 
Despite the low 
radiological inventory of 
this system, a nuclear-
grade controller failure 
rate was chosen.  
2.6Eí05/h NUREG/CR-
4639, vol. 5, 
page A-4 
Designers must choose how this 
unit will control in a failure event, 
its failure position: "fails as-is", 
"fails on" or "fails off".  Fails off is 
the most safety conservative failure 
state.
erratic
operation         
(overspeed or 
underspeed 
signals) 
Category II controller fault, 
command fault 
controller 
redundancy, 
inspection, 
periodic system 
testing, software 
QA
Overcooling or 
undercooling the TBM, 
induce thermal stress as 
TBM temperature 
deviates from normal 
Throttle secondary 
coolant flow to HX 
as needed to decrease 
Pb-17Li coolant 
temperature 
deviations 
Not an IE  N/S The TBM Pb-17Li is 
very forgiving.  It can 
stagnate in the TBM 
module and accept heat 
while not causing 
overpressure, a system 
breach or release event. 
5Eí06/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Circuit breaker 
for pump motor 
NO spurious 
operation 
Category III mechanical 
failure, 
command fault 
periodic testing, 
inspection, 
software QA 
De-energizes pump for 
a loss of Pb-17Li flow 
during ITER operation 
If the TBM has 
helium cooling 
available, ITER can 
continue to operate 
Pb-17Li LOFA but 
it is not an IE N/S 
Circuit breaker 
spuriously transfers 
from closed to open.  
The TBM is not 
damaged by a loss of 
Pb-17Li flow. 
3Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
To include electric power loss, 
only a circuit breaker fault is 
considered.  A more widespread 
power outage would affect some or 
all of ITER.  A widespread power 
outage on TRITEX allowed the 
entire system to freeze. 
20 kW pump 
motor 
NO fails to start Category II motor winding 
fault, shaft 
binding, motor 
overheated 
regular 
inspection, 
testing 
No flow received, but 
ITER can continue to 
operate if helium 
cooling is available  
Extend ITER 
downtime to repair 
the motor 
Not an IE, N/S Assume that the motor 
runs continuously during 
a pulse campaign, so the 
"fails to start" mode 
would be discovered at 
the beginning of one of 
the 4 annual pulse 
campaigns, during 
system operability 
checks, and discovery 
would cause a shift in 
ITER operation to not 
run the TBM Pb-17Li 
loop  
5Eí03/d EGG-SSRE-
8875 
As a first estimate, use 4 
operational start demands per year 
(not counting any maintenance-
related or system operability test 
starts).  ITER could still operate 
without the Pb-17Li loop operable. 
fails to stop Category III circuit breaker 
fault, command 
fault, controller 
fault, human 
error
regular 
inspection, 
software QA, 
detailed 
operating 
procedures 
This is a post operation 
event, overcooling the 
TBM, induce thermal 
stress as TBM is 
overcooled 
Open breaker at 480 
Volt MCC or 
switchgear to stop 
pump.  Verify 
helium cooling to 
TBM is on line. 
Not an IE, N/S Assume that the motor 
runs continuously during 
a pulse campaign, so the 
"fails to stop" mode 
would only be 
discovered at the 
completion of one of the 
4 annual pulse 
campaigns, during 
system shutdown, and 
discovery would simply 
generate a maintenance 
work request for repair.  
5Eí04/d EGG-SSRE-
8875 
If the TBM is overcooled, there is a 
mild concern that thermal stresses 
could increase on the TBM frame 
or module box.   
Centrifugal pump NO fail to 
operate 
Category II command fault, 
human error, 
shaft seizure, 
shaft shear 
periodic system 
testing, software 
QA
Loss of Pb-17Li flow 
during ITER operation 
Drain Pb-17Li to 
drain tank for 
remainder of the 
ITER campaign 
Pb-17Li LOFA but 
it is not an IE, N/S 
Pump can be repaired in 
the next ITER outage. 
5Eí05/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
The helium coolant can adequately 
cool the TBM module and allow 
continued ITER operation. 
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Component 
Operational
State
Failure 
Mode 
Frequency 
Category Possible Causes 
Preventive
Action on 
Possible Causes Consequences 
Corrective or 
Preventive Actions 
on Consequences 
ITER Postulated 
Initiating Events Comments Frequency 
Comment on 
frequency 
calculation Design comments 
    external leak Category III casing crack, 
weld failure, 
shaft seal failure 
Specify high 
quality parts, 
regular 
inspection 
Small loss of Pb-17Li 
coolant 
Shut down Pb-17Li 
pump to limit 
outflow, open drain 
tank valves to 
confine coolant 
Small LOCA, 
LMP2
  3Eí06/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
The helium coolant can adequately 
cool the TBM module and allow 
continued ITER operation. 
Centrifugal pump NO external
rupture 
Category III casing
catastrophic
failure, large 
weld failure 
Specify high 
quality parts, 
regular 
inspection 
Large loss of Pb-17Li 
coolant 
Shut down Pb-17Li 
pump to limit 
outflow, open drain 
tank valves to 
confine coolant 
LOCA, LMP1 3Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
The helium coolant can adequately 
cool the TBM module and allow 
continued ITER operation. 
pump 
underspeed 
Category II shaft binding, 
bearing fault 
regular 
inspection,  
periodic system 
testing 
Overheating the 
stagnant Pb-17Li 
coolant 
Shut down Pb-17Li 
pump to limit 
damage, open drain 
tank valves to store 
coolant until pump 
can be repaired 
Not an IE, N/S 2.9Eí05/h EBR-II PRA The helium coolant can adequately 
cool the TBM module and allow 
continued ITER operation. 
Level instrument 
on pump 
NO fails to 
operate 
Category III fouling, drift, 
calibration error 
Coolant cleaning 
in the cold trap, 
periodic 
instrument 
recalibration  
Loss of sensor data may 
cause loop shutdown.  
Increasing level will 
overfill pump volute; 
placing hot Pb-17Li on 
shaft freeze seal and 
can lead to premature 
shaft seal failure and 
require extra 
maintenance 
Other sensors may 
provide enough data 
to allow continued 
safe TBM 
operations.  The Pb-
17Li coolant system 
could be shut down 
for the remainder of 
the campaign and 
repaired in the next 
outage. 
Not an IE, N/S Assumes that failure to 
operate may cause a 
shutdown of the Pb-17Li 
loop since level is a 
safety indicator of loss 
of fluid.  Drawing 
suggests that the level 
sensor is a differential 
pressure unit.   
1Eí06/h INEL-
96/0295 
Note on instruments:  Placing 
redundant sensors would allow the 
system to continue operating and 
not be placed in standby due to a 
sensor failure.  Note on fouling: 
Instrument lines tend to act as 
diffusion cold traps for impurities 
in the liquid metal system; keeping 
the line temperature above the 
saturation temperature of 
impurities will reduce impurity 
buildup in the lines.  Dietrich and 
Zinn, "Solid Fuel Reactors", 
Addison Wesley Publishers, 
Reading, MA, 1958, p 84. 
    improper 
reading 
Category III calibration error, 
drift, impurity 
buildup on 
instrument  
Periodic
recalibration 
Reading high or low 
will affect volume flow 
in the TBM, not a large 
concern 
Could result in 
temperature transient 
in the Pb-17Li.  No 
immediate effects. 
Not an IE, N/S Assumes that failure to 
operate may cause a 
shutdown of the Pb-17Li 
loop since level is an 
indicator of loss of fluid.   
1.4Eí06/h INEL-
96/0295 
Instrument recalibration is an ORE 
concern, instruments capable of 
remote calibration would reduce 
personnel exposure.  
    external leak Category IV instrument tap 
crack,
instrument line 
crack, weld 
crack, vibration 
failure
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, 
system 
operability 
testing, reduce 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design 
An instrument line leak 
will either leak inert 
gas, depressurizing the 
pump, or leak coolant.  
A small coolant leak 
from the pump volute 
could be an operational 
concern.  
No immediate 
actions needed, 
assume that a very 
small leak can 
probably be tolerated 
until the end of the 
campaign, then shut 
down TBM to repair 
the leak. 
Small LOCA, 
LMP2
At high temperatures 
Pb-17Li is reputed to be 
very fluid, low viscosity, 
so leak flow rates could 
be appreciable. 
1Eí09/h, 
assuming <1 
m of tubing 
WSRC-TR-
93-262 
The TBM can withstand ITER 
pulsing with just helium coolant 
operational.  The Pb-17Li flow is 
slow, but it is at 2 MPa and 
breaches to a nominally 0.1 MPa 
room.  Instrument leaks should be 
very low flow rates, such as 
through cracks, assume <<1% of 
the coolant flow rate, i.e., 
drops/minute.  An important issue 
is release of activated gases, such 
as mercury and tritium, that evolve 
from the Pb-17Li.  Amounts of 
these gases should be small. 
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    external 
rupture 
< Cat IV instrument tap 
line material 
failure, weld 
failure, over-
pressure on 
instrument 
weld NDT, 
reduce flow-
induced
vibration in 
design 
Instrument line rupture 
leakage from pump 
volute could be high 
volume. 
Shut down pump, 
isolate pump.  If 
needed, open drain 
line to store Pb-17Li 
in the drain tank.  
ITER can continue to 
run. 
LOCA, LMP1   3Eí11/h, 
assuming <1 
m of tubing 
WSRC-TR-
93-262 
The TBM can withstand ITER 
pulsing with just helium coolant 
operational. 
Pressure 
instrument 
NO fails to 
operate 
Category III fouling, 
calibration error, 
power loss 
Coolant filtering 
and cleaning, 
periodic 
recalibration, 
redundant power 
and redundant 
sensors  
Loss of signal regarding 
gas pressure may mean 
that the gas pressure is 
lost and that air could 
intrude into the piping.  
Intruding air can react 
with the lithium.   
Shut down and drain 
loop to prevent air 
reactions with hot 
Pb-17Li.   
Not an IE, N/S Fast fission reactors 
have used metal 
diaphragm pressure 
sensors.  These can 
operate in the 2 MPa 
range.  It must be kept 
free of coolant oxide and 
crud, and not allow 
liquid metal freezing on 
the diaphragm.  Fiber 
optics can be used to 
sense the diaphragm 
bulging.  Sensor 
maintenance is an ORE 
concern. 
1Eí06/h INEL-
96/0295 
Designers should consider sensor 
redundancy in the design, since 
replacing failed sensors will be a 
difficult task.  If penetrations for 
sensors are robust (i.e., sensor 
'tree') and common causes of 
failure are controlled, then 
redundancy will allow use of 
voting logic to filter out spurious 
noise signals and allow continued 
TBM operation with a sensor 
failure.    
improper 
reading 
Category III calibration error, 
drift, diaphragm 
damage  
Periodic
recalibration 
Loss of signal regarding 
gas pressure may mean 
that the gas pressure is 
lost and that air could 
intrude into the piping.  
Intruding air can react 
with the lithium.   
No immediate 
actions needed, run 
to next shutdown 
period if other 
sensors can provide 
adequate information 
to operate the TBM 
safely.
Not an IE, N/S Recalibration activity 
could result in a 
significant personnel 
radiation exposure 
1Eí06/h INEL-
96/0295 
Use sensors that can be remotely 
recalibrated whenever possible to 
reduce personnel exposure 
external leak Category IV instrument pipe 
tap crack, 
instrument line 
crack, weld 
crack
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design 
Leaks Pb-17Li  to the 
30 C air atmosphere in 
the equatorial test port.   
Isolate leak if 
possible, assume that 
a very small leak can 
be tolerated until the 
end of the campaign, 
then shut down TBM 
to repair the leak. 
Small LOCA, 
LMP2
1Eí09/h, 
assuming <1 
m of tubing 
WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Instrument leaks should be very 
low flow rates, such as through 
cracks, assume <<1% of the 
coolant flow rate, I.e., drops per 
minute.  An important issue is 
potential release of activated gases, 
such as mercury and tritium. 
external
rupture 
< Cat IV instrument tap 
material failure, 
instrument line 
material failure, 
weld failure 
Same as external 
leak, given 
above
Leaks moderate to large 
amount of Pb-17Li to 
the equatorial test port 
Isolate the leak if 
possible, open the 
drain tank to limit 
the release.   
LOCA, LMP1 3Eí11/h, 
assuming <1 
m of tubing 
WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Hot Pb-17Li leak could threaten 
the bellows seal on the port, if the 
leak touches the bellows.  Some 
type of guard pipe, catch pans, or a 
protective sleeve for the bellows, 
should be considered. 
Temperature 
instrument 
NO fails to 
operate 
Category III fouling, drift, 
calibration error 
Coolant filtering 
and cleaning, 
periodic 
recalibration  
  No immediate 
actions needed, run 
to next shutdown 
period if other 
sensors can provide 
adequate information 
to operate the TBM 
safely.
Not an IE, N/S Assume that either a 
platinum thermocouple 
or RTD will be used for 
this 340 to 470 C (or 
650 C) operating 
temperature range.  
Sensor maintenance is 
an ORE concern. 
2.2Eí06/h INEL-
96/0295 
Several authors noted that 
redundant instrumentation was 
very useful for flow loop 
operations. 
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    improper 
reading 
Category II calibration error, 
drift, impurity 
plateout 
Periodic
recalibration 
Overcooling or 
undercooling transient 
with Pb-17Li 
No immediate 
actions needed, run 
to next shutdown 
period if other 
sensors can provide 
adequate information 
to operate the TBM 
safely.
Not an IE, N/S Overcooling would 
reduce the 100 C margin 
above melt temperature.   
1.7Eí05/h INEL-
96/0295 
    external leak Category II instrument tap 
line crack, 
instrument line 
crack, weld 
crack
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design, NDT 
Leaks Pb-17Li  to the 
30 C air atmosphere in 
the equatorial test port.   
Isolate leak if 
possible.  Assume 
that a small leak can 
be tolerated until the 
end of the campaign, 
then shut down TBM 
to repair the leak. 
Small LOCA, 
LMP2
Thermocouple fitting is 
a flange connection.  
Use flange failure rate. 
1Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
9639 
Instrument leaks should be very 
low flow rates, such as through-
wall cracks or pinhole leaks, 
assume <<1% of the coolant flow 
rate (I.e., drops/minute).  An 
important issue is release of 
activated gases, such as mercury 
and tritium - concentrations should 
be low. 
    external 
rupture 
Category III instrument tap 
line material 
failure, weld 
failure
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design, NDT 
Leaks moderate to large 
amount of Pb-17Li to 
the equatorial test port 
Turn off the pump, 
isolate leak if 
possible, open the 
drain tank to capture 
Pb-17Li to limit the 
release.
LOCA, LMP1 The TBM DDD stated 
that activated mercury 
gas could be present, 
and small Curie amounts 
of tritium might escape 
as well.  Hot helium gas 
at 340 C or higher would 
be a safety concern. 
1Eí10/h EGG-SSRE-
9639 
Hot (470 to 650 C) Pb-17Li 
leaking from a 9.5-mm instrument 
tap onto the bellows that seals the 
port from the cryostat could lead to 
a bellows breach, which would 
lead to a loss of cryostat vacuum.  
The vacuum would draw some Pb-
17Li into the cryostat as well as 
humid air, all of which would 
freeze onto the magnets, creating 
contamination issues for the 
magnets.  Some type of catch pan 
or bellows inner sleeve should be 
used to preclude contact. 
Piping NO external leak Category III Weld fault, pipe 
wall flaw, 
construction 
fault 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design, NDT 
Leaks small to 
moderate amount of Pb-
17Li to the equatorial 
test port 
Small loss of coolant 
accident.  Shut down 
ITER by the end of 
pulse, drain Pb-17Li 
to drain tank to limit 
release, increase 
helium cooling to 
TBM and increase 
frame cooling. 
Small LOCA, 
LMP2
Assume § 200 m total 
piping length runs and 
3360 h per year.  Even at 
650 C, Pb-17Li is not 
very reactive in air and 
should not pose a large 
chemical reactivity 
concern.  However, the 
spill must be kept from 
the bellows seals to the 
cryostat.
9Eí09/h-m EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Hot liquid metals can cause weld 
slag inclusions to grow into leaks, 
and microfissures or flaws in the 
pipe wall can propagate into leaks 
if there is thermal shocking 
(Mausteller, Tepper, and Rodgers, 
Alkali Metal Handling and 
Systems Operating Techniques, 
Gordon and Breach Publishers, 
NY, 1967, page 138.).  Pb-17Li 
leaks near the port bellows could 
cause bellows breach and loss of 
cryostat vacuum.  Use catch pans, 
guard pipe, sleeve over bellows, 
etc., to preclude contact. 
external
rupture 
Category III Weld failure, 
wall cracking, 
wall thinning, 
construction 
fault 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design, NDT 
Leaks moderate to large 
amount of Pb-17Li to 
the equatorial test port 
Large loss of coolant 
accident.  Drain Pb-
17Li to drain tank to 
limit release, verify 
helium cooling to 
TBM.  Shut down 
ITER to clean up 
spill. 
LOCA, LMP1 Assume § 200 m total 
piping length runs and 
3360 h per year 
9Eí10/h-m EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Pb-17Li leaks near the port bellows 
could cause bellows breach and 
loss of cryostat vacuum.  Some 
type of barrier, either a guard pipe 
around the Pb-17Li pipe, catch 
pans, or a protective sleeve on the 
bellows convolutions is needed to 
protect the bellows. 
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plugging Category III impurity 
buildup, 
corrosion
product buildup, 
foreign material 
buildup 
Good coolant 
chemistry 
control with cold 
trap, keep 
temperature up 
to prevent 
precipitation 
Loss of Pb-17Li flow  Decreasing flow 
accident.  Should 
occur gradually, so 
record flow and 
pumping power and 
track changes.  ITER 
can continue to 
operate. 
LOFA, N/S Assume § 200 m total 
piping length runs and 
3360 h per year 
3Eí09/h-m EGG-SSRE-
8875 
No flow instrument was shown in 
the schematic diagram.  Any flow 
loop should have at least one flow 
instrument. 
Check valve by 
heat exchanger 
(normally open) 
NO fail to open Category III impurity 
buildup, 
corrosion
product buildup, 
hinge fault 
Good coolant 
chemistry 
control with cold 
trap, keep 
temperature up 
to prevent 
precipitation 
Loss of Pb-17Li flow or 
severely limited flow 
Condition should be 
detected in system 
operability testing 
and ITER can still 
start up without the 
TBM Pb-17Li loop. 
Not an IE, N/S   1Eí04/d EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Assume 4 demands per year, one 
per loop startup after each 
maintenance outage 
    plugging Category III impurity 
buildup, 
corrosion
product buildup 
Good coolant 
chemistry 
control with cold 
trap, keep 
temperature up 
to prevent 
precipitation 
Loss of Pb-17Li flow in 
this once-through loop 
Decreasing flow 
accident.  Should 
occur gradually, 
record pumping 
power and track 
changes.  Shut down 
the Pb-17Li loop and 
continue ITER 
operation. 
LOFA condition 
but not an IE, N/S 
  5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
ITER can operate with the Pb-17Li 
flow loop disabled. 
    fail to close Category III impurity 
buildup, 
corrosion
product buildup, 
hinge fault, 
foreign material 
(SiC, weld 
debris, etc.) 
intrusion 
Good coolant 
chemistry 
control with cold 
trap, keep 
temperature up 
to prevent 
precipitation, 
material flaw 
Reverse flow allowed 
in the Pb-17Li flow 
loop 
Close nearest motor 
operated valves to 
isolate the breach.   
Not an IE   1Eí04/d EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Assume 4 demands per year, 
during each TBM shutdown before 
the maintenance outage.  This 
event is not seen as an IE since 
ITER must be going into a 
shutdown to lose pressure that 
allows the check valve to close. 
    internal 
leakage
Category III valve seat wear, 
impurity or 
corrosion
product buildup 
Good coolant 
chemistry 
control with cold 
trap, keep 
temperature up 
to prevent 
precipitation 
Limited reverse flow 
could occur in the Pb-
17Li flow loop 
No actions to take 
for this event 
Not an IE   5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
If valve is closed, ITER is in a 
shutdown 
    internal 
rupture 
Category III valve disc 
failure, hinge 
failure
operations 
testing, 
inspection, NDT 
Reverse flow could 
occur in the Pb-17Li 
flow loop 
No actions to take 
for this event 
Not an IE   5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
    external 
leakage
Category III valve body 
crack,
maintenance 
port leak 
operations 
testing, 
inspection, NDT 
Loss of coolant into 
equatorial port  
Close valves to 
isolate the leaking 
valve.   
Small LOCA, 
LMP2
  5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
ITER can operate with the Pb-17Li 
flow loop disabled. 
    external 
rupture 
Category III valve body 
failure
operations 
testing, 
inspection, NDT 
Large loss of coolant 
into equatorial port 
Close valves to 
isolate the ruptured 
check valve body.   
LOCA, LMP1   5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
ITER can operate with the Pb-17Li 
flow loop disabled. 
TBM inlet flow 
isolation valve 
(normally open) 
NO spurious
operation 
Category III command fault, 
electronic noise, 
human error 
periodic testing, 
software QA, 
procedures 
Loss of Pb-17Li flow Re-open valve or 
shut down the Pb-
17Li flow loop. 
Pb-17Li LOFA, 
but not an IE 
5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
TBM can operate with only helium 
cooling flow. 
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plugging Category III impurity 
buildup, 
corrosion
product buildup, 
foreign material 
buildup 
Good coolant 
chemistry 
control with cold 
trap 
Loss of Pb-17Li flow Shut down the Pb-
17Li flow loop 
Pb-17Li LOFA, 
but not an IE 
5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
internal 
leakage
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Not an IE normally open valve 5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
internal 
rupture 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Not an IE normally open valve 5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
external
leakage
Category III stem seal leak, 
valve body 
crack
operations 
testing, 
inspection, NDT 
Loss of Pb-17Li coolant 
to port cell 
Close valves to 
isolate the leaking 
valve.   
LMP1 5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
external
rupture 
Category III stem seal 
failure, valve 
body failure 
operations 
testing, 
inspection, NDT 
Loss of Pb-17Li coolant 
to port cell 
Close valves to 
isolate the ruptured 
valve.   
LMP2 5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Check valve by 
mixing tank 
(normally open) 
NO fail to open Category III impurity 
buildup, 
corrosion
product buildup, 
hinge fault 
Good coolant 
chemistry 
control with cold 
trap, keep 
temperature up 
to prevent 
precipitation 
Loss of Pb-17Li flow or 
severely limited flow 
Condition should be 
detected in system 
operability testing 
and ITER will decide 
if they will start up 
without the TBM Pb-
17Li loop. 
Not an IE   1Eí04/d EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Assume 4 demands per year, one 
per loop startup at the beginning of 
each operating campaign 
    plugging Category III impurity 
buildup, 
corrosion
product buildup 
Good coolant 
chemistry 
control with cold 
trap, keep 
temperature up 
to prevent 
precipitation 
Loss of Pb-17Li flow Decreasing flow 
accident.  Should 
occur gradually, 
record pumping 
power and track 
changes.  Shut down 
the Pb-17Li loop, 
verify helium 
cooling to TBM and 
continue ITER 
operation. 
Pb-17Li LOFA, 
but this is not an 
IE
  5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
ITER can operate with the Pb-17Li 
flow loop disabled. 
    fail to close Category III impurity 
buildup, 
corrosion
product buildup, 
hinge fault, 
foreign material 
(SiC, weld 
debris, etc.) 
intrusion 
Good coolant 
chemistry 
control with cold 
trap, keep 
temperature up 
to prevent 
precipitation, 
material flaw 
Reverse flow allowed 
in the Pb-17Li flow 
loop 
Close nearest motor 
operated valves.   
Not an IE   1Eí04/d EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Assume 4 demands per year, 
during each maintenance outage.  
This event is not seen as an IE 
since ITER must be going into a 
shutdown to lose pressure that 
allows the check valve to close. 
Check valve by 
mixing tank 
(normally open) 
NO internal 
leakage
Category III valve seat wear, 
impurity or 
corrosion
product buildup 
Good coolant 
chemistry 
control with cold 
trap, keep 
temperature up 
to prevent 
precipitation 
Limited reverse flow 
allowed in the Pb-17Li 
flow loop 
No actions to take 
for this event 
Not an IE 5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
If valve is closed, ITER is in a 
shutdown 
internal 
rupture 
Category III valve disc 
failure, hinge 
failure
operations 
testing, 
inspection, NDT 
Reverse flow allowed 
in the Pb-17Li flow 
loop 
No actions to take 
for this event 
Not an IE 5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
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external
leakage
Category III valve body 
crack,
maintenance 
port leak 
operations 
testing, 
inspection, NDT 
Loss of Pb-17Li coolant 
into equatorial port  
Close valves to 
isolate the leaking 
valve.   
Small Pb-17Li 
LOCA, LMP2 
5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
ITER can operate with the Pb-17Li 
flow loop disabled. 
external
rupture 
Category III valve body 
failure
operations 
testing, 
inspection, NDT 
Large loss of Pb-17Li 
coolant into equatorial 
port 
Close valves to 
isolate the ruptured 
check valve body.  
Verify helium 
cooling of TBM. 
Pb-17Li LOCA, 
LMP1
5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
ITER can operate with the Pb-17Li 
flow loop disabled. 
Mixing tank inlet 
flow  control 
valve 
NO fail to open   valve will 
always be open 
to 16 kg/s unless 
plugged 
not applicable not applicable   Not an IE   1Eí03/d EGG-SSRE-
8875 
This valve is assumed to be sized 
to allow at most only 77% (55.5 
kg/s) of the total inlet flow into the 
mixing tank, so that § 16.5 kg/s 
Pb-17Li always travels to the 
TBM.  Perhaps there is a valve disk 
stop so that even fully open the 
valve still sends 23% flow to the 
TBM.  It is assumed that the valve 
gives a significant pressure drop so 
that the TBM outlet Pb-17Li, 
which underwent friction and 
MHD pressure drop in the TBM, 
does not experience flow reversal 
by higher pressure Pb-17Li 
entering the mixing tank from this 
valve. 
    spurious 
operation 
Category III command fault, 
human error, 
electronic noise 
periodic testing, 
software QA 
Poor temperature 
control in mixing tank, 
overcooling the Pb-
17Li 
  Not an IE   3Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Overcooling does not appear to 
present a reliability concern to the 
TBM module, silicon carbide FCIs, 
or flow loop. 
    plugging Category III impurity 
buildup, 
corrosion
product buildup 
Good coolant 
chemistry 
control with cold 
trap, keep 
temperature up 
to prevent 
precipitation 
If plugged, all flow 
routes to the TBM 
module, cannot achieve 
650 C operation but the 
TBM is adequately 
cooled 
Note valve condition 
for future 
maintenance during 
an ITER outage 
Not an IE   5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
    internal 
leakage or 
internal 
rupture 
Category III material failure inspection, NDT Pb-17Li flow bypasses 
TBM
TBM can 
accommodate flow 
bypassing the TBM 
module  
LOFA, Not an IE   5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Due to valve design of always 
providing 16 kg/s through flow, 
this failure mode means that higher 
flow will enter the mixing tank 
than set by operators, a bypass of 
the TBM module but this is not a 
safety event. 
    external 
leakage
Category III valve body 
crack, stem 
leakage
inspection, NDT Small loss of coolant 
into equatorial port 
Close isolation 
valves to isolate the 
leaking mixing tank 
inlet valve.   
Small Pb-17Li 
LOCA, LMP2 
  1Eí06/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
    external 
rupture 
Category III valve body 
failure, total 
stem packing 
failure
inspection, NDT Large loss of coolant 
into equatorial port 
Close isolation 
valves to isolate the 
ruptured mixing tank 
inlet valve, drain Pb-
17Li into drain tank 
to limit release.   
Pb-17Li LOCA, 
LMP1
If isolation valves are 
slow closing units, then 
consider draining the 
Pb-17Li to the drain 
tank. 
1Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Air will enter the Pb-17Li piping, 
so coolant cleanup will be needed 
to prepare the Pb-17Li loop for 
operations again. 
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Single-walled 
piping transition 
to concentric 
piping 
NO external leak Category III weld fault, pipe 
wall crack or pin 
hole leak 
inspection, NDT Small loss of coolant 
into TBM port area 
Close isolation valve 
to isolate the rupture, 
decrease the spill 
amount.  ITER can 
continue operation if 
helium coolant is 
available to the 
TBM.
Small Pb-17Li 
LOCA, LMP2 
Concentric piping is 
about 2 m long, DDD 
page 2-21.  Due to the 
short pipe run, the weld 
failure rate dominates 
the failure probability 
for this component.  Use 
3360 h/year. 
5Eí08/h see note to 
right 
Used R. Buende and S. Fabritsiev 
and V. Rybin, "Reliability of welds 
and brazed joints in blankets and 
its influence on availability," 
Fusion Eng. And Design, 16 
(1991) 59-72.  Assumed 1-m of 
weld for this connection, and 
5Eí08/h-m for longitudinal weld 
small leaks.  Use Buende's 0.01 
multiplier for ruptures. 
external
rupture 
Category IV weld failure, 
wall failure 
inspection, NDT Large loss of coolant 
into TBM port area 
Pb-17Li LOCA, 
LMP1
5Eí10/h see note to 
right 
See above for quantification 
information. 
Concentric pipe 
run 
NO inner pipe 
external
leakage
Category IV pipe defect, 
weld flaw, 
vibration 
Piping NDT, QA Little effect on TBM, 
small leakage routes to 
inlet flow 
Tolerated unless leak 
opening increases 
Not an IE The inner pipe is the Pb-
17Li outlet flow from 
the TBM module.  Small 
leakage to the annulus is 
not a safety concern.  
Concentric pipe is 2-m 
length, DDD page 2-21. 
1.8Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Generally, double walled piping 
has high failure rates due to 
differential thermal expansion that 
allows overstress on the two pipes 
(Ziu, Handbook of Double 
Containment Piping Systems, 
McGraw-Hill, NY, 1995).  This is 
not the case for the TBM, the pipe 
temperatures are maintained quite 
close to each other.   Use single 
walled pipe failure rates in this 
case for each pipe, 9Eí09/h-m. 
    inner pipe 
external
rupture 
Category IV pipe failure, 
weld failure 
Piping NDT, QA Inlet and outlet Pb-17Li 
flow equalize pressure, 
flow to TBM is greatly 
reduced 
Verify helium 
cooling to TBM 
Pb-17Li LOFA, 
Not an IE, N/S 
Inner pipe rupture could 
physically block flow to 
the TBM module and 
will also cause pressure 
equalization of inlet and 
outlet flow, stopping Pb-
17Li flow in the TBM 
module. 
1.8Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Use 9Eí09/h-m and the concentric 
pipe is a 2-m run 
    inner pipe 
plugging 
Category IV impurity 
buildup, oxide 
buildup 
cold trap should 
remove 
impurities and 
oxides 
Loss of Pb-17Li flow to 
TBM
  Pb-17Li LOFA, 
Not an IE, N/S 
If the Li concentration 
of the Pb-17Li alloy 
decreases, the freezing 
point will increase 
toward the Pb value of 
327 C.  This would raise 
the probability of freeze 
plugging the system 
whose low temperature 
is 340 C.  However, T 
production from Pb-
17Li is 2.4 grams/year, 
so the Li consumption is 
very low.   
3Eí09/h-m EGG-SSRE-
8875 
The outer pipe is 0.16-m diameter, 
which is larger than the commonly 
accepted 0.1-m diameter size limit 
for pipe plugging, but with the 
inner pipe taking up flow area, 
plugging is still plausible.  At 
elevated temperature, impurities 
and oxides do not precipitate out 
and liquid metal plugging is a low 
probability event.   
    annulus 
plugging 
Category IV impurity 
buildup, oxide 
buildup 
cold trap should 
remove 
impurities and 
oxides 
Loss of Pb-17Li flow to 
TBM
  Pb-17Li LOFA, 
Not an IE, N/S 
  3Eí09/h-m EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Assume 5-m pipe run 
    outer pipe 
external leak 
Category IV pipe defect, 
weld flaw 
Piping NDT, QA Loss of small amount 
of Pb-17Li coolant to 
the port cell 
Isolate Pb-17Li to 
reduce leak amount, 
verify helium 
cooling to the TBM. 
Small Pb-17Li 
LOCA, LMP2 
The outer pipe is the Pb-
17Li inlet flow to the 
TBM module. 
9Eí09/h-m EGG-SSRE-
8875 
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    outer pipe 
external
rupture 
Category IV pipe defect, 
weld flaw 
Piping NDT, QA Loss of Pb-17Li coolant 
to the port cell 
Isolate Pb-17Li leak 
location and open 
drain tank to reduce 
leak amount, verify 
helium cooling to the 
TBM.
Pb-17Li LOCA, 
LMP1
  9Eí10/h-m EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Concentric pipe 
inlet connection 
to TBM module 
box 
NO inner pipe 
connection
external
leakage
Category II pipe defect, 
capillary flow 
Piping NDT, QA Little effect on TBM, 
leakage of higher 
pressure, cooler inlet 
flow into the hotter 
outlet flow is not 
consequential unless it 
is a very high flow rate 
that bypasses the TBM 
module 
Tolerated unless leak 
opening increases 
Not an IE 3Eí05/h EGG-SRE-
8875 
Assume that the freeze seal 
connection is not as leak tight as 
welded connections.  Analyst 
judgment to use a gasketed flange 
failure rate. 
inner pipe 
connection
external
rupture 
Category II pipe failure Piping NDT, QA Inlet and outlet Pb-17Li 
flow equalize pressure, 
flow to TBM is greatly 
reduced 
Verify helium 
cooling to TBM 
Not an IE 3Eí06/h analyst
judgment 
TBM flow 
passages 
NO internal 
leakage
Category III weld flaw, 
material flaw 
weld and 
material NDT, 
QA
helium at 8 MPa leaks 
into Pb-17Li at 2 MPa 
Helium pressure 
opens rupture disk to 
drain tank, shut 
down ITER pulse 
due to loss of helium 
cooling in TBM 
Helium small 
LOCA, LBB2 
Assume that a small 
helium leak cools the 
TBM adequately for an 
orderly plasma 
shutdown. 
4Eí06/h OREDA 
2002, page 
387 
The TBM module is a unique 
design that uses helium in flow 
tubing and Pb-17Li in larger 
channels.  The TBM can tolerate 
helium inleakage that raises the 
pressure from 2 MPa to close to 8 
MPa.  The TBM module is roughly 
similar to a flat plate heat 
exchanger; analyst judgment is to 
use those data from the OREDA 
2002 book as initial quantification.  
If more refinement is needed, the 
TBM module box failure rate can 
be calculated by summing 
component and weld failure rates. 
    internal 
rupture 
Category III weld failure, 
material failure 
weld and 
material NDT, 
QA
large leak of helium at 
8 MPa into Pb-17Li at 2 
MPa
Helium pressure 
opens rupture disk to 
drain tank, shut 
down ITER pulse 
due to loss of helium 
cooling in TBM 
Helium large 
LOCA, LBB1 
A large helium leak will 
probably need a rapid 
plasma shutdown to 
avoid melting part of the 
TBM.
4Eí07/h analyst 
judgment 
Based on the OREDA value and 
typically a factor of ten reduction 
in failure rate from a leak to a 
rupture, see Eide et al., EGG-
SSRE-9639, 1991. 
    plugging Category III impurity 
buildup, oxide 
buildup, foreign 
materials (SiC 
pieces)
cold trap 
removes 
impurities and 
oxides, consider 
strainer for 
pieces of 
insulator 
Pb-17Li flow passage 
blockage by foreign 
material; overheating 
TBM that leads to 
warping and flow 
channel collapse 
Verify helium flow 
to TBM, continue 
ITER operation 
Pb-17Li LOFA, 
not an IE 
  2Eí06/h OREDA 
2002, page 
387 
Suggest a strainer in the design to 
catch possible FCI (flow channel 
insert) pieces, if these were to fail.  
Impurity buildup in the TBM is not 
expected since the TBM operates 
at high temperature; impurities and 
oxides do not plate out in high 
temperature regions. 
    external 
leakage
Category III plasma damage, 
thermal 
overstress, weld 
flaw, material 
flaw
conservative
approach to 
ITER operation; 
inspection, QA 
leak of Pb-17Li into 
vacuum vessel 
Drain the Pb-17Li 
loop to limit release, 
shut down ITER to 
clean up leak 
Pb-17Li LOCA 
into VV, VMM2 
  3Eí06/h OREDA 
2002, page 
387 
Used failure rate for flat plate heat 
exchanger as initial quantification 
for these flow channels in the TBM 
module 
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    external 
rupture 
Category III extreme plasma 
damage, high 
thermal 
overstress, weld 
failure, material 
failure
conservative
approach to 
ITER operation, 
inspection, QA 
large leak of Pb-17Li 
into vacuum vessel 
Drain the Pb-17Li 
loop to limit release, 
shut down ITER to 
clean up leak 
Pb-17Li large 
LOCA into VV, 
VMM1 
  3Eí07/h analyst 
judgment 
Based on the OREDA value and 
typically a factor of ten reduction 
in failure rate from a leak to a 
rupture, see Eide et al., EGG-
SSRE-9639, 1991. 
    increased 
friction 
pressure drop 
Category IV flow channel 
insert failure 
due to flow 
induced
vibration or 
other causes 
inspection, QA failure of MHD 
insulating panel or 
panels, MHD forces 
increase on Pb-17Li, 
difficult to pump the 
fluid 
Shut down the Pb-
17Li loop until 
repairs can be made 
on the TBM module.  
Operate ITER with 
helium cooling to 
TBM.
Pb-17Li LOFA, 
not an IE 
FCIs provide thermal 
insulation to the TBM 
module and to the 
helium gas from the 
higher temperature Pb-
17Li (DDD 2.2.1.1.4).   
1Eí04/year analyst 
judgment 
Judgment based on SiC ceramic 
heat exchanger tubes.  Basis 
explained in the FMEA text.  
TBM flow 
passage SiC 
plates
NO cracking Category III included flaws, 
vibration 
inspection, QA cracks in SiC Shut down the Pb-
17Li loop until 
repairs can be made 
on the TBM module.  
Operate ITER with 
helium cooling to 
TBM.
Not an IE If MHD effects increase, 
cannot flow Pb-17Li 
through TBM module 
without excessive pump 
power.  Shut down the 
Pb-17Li loop until the 
module can be repaired 
or replaced. 
1.32Eí07/h analyst
judgment 
Silicon Carbide is used as an 
insulator to reduce MHD effects in 
the Pb-17Li flowing in high 
magnetic fields.  The operating 
environment is § 700C, 10 cm/s 
flow of heavy metal in the SiC, 
with irradiation damage over time.  
Analyst judgment is to use SiC 
insulator values for cracking as 
loss of mechanical integrity, 
estimate § 4 insulators to a flow 
channel and 3.3Eí08/h per 
insulator, or 1.32Eí07/h 
catastrophic
failure
Category IV overstress, 
subcritical crack 
growth, 
vibration 
inspection, QA SiC pieces separate, 
enter flow.  If no 
strainer is in the design, 
shut down the pump to 
limit SiC debris in the 
system and protect 
pump impeller, heat 
exchanger tubing, etc. 
Shut down the Pb-
17Li loop until 
repairs can be made 
on the TBM module.  
Operate ITER with 
helium cooling to 
TBM.
Not an IE SiC pieces in the flow 
can cause damage.  Shut 
down the Pb-17Li flow 
loop, drain to the drain 
tank 
<
1Eí04/year 
analyst
judgment 
SiC has been used successfully in 
1,200 C applications in combustion 
turbine rotors and stators, with over 
30,000 hours lifetime.  Reducing 
the temperature will greatly add to 
the service lifetime of the SiC.  SiC 
is also radiation resistant since it is 
used as an impervious fission fuel 
pebble cladding material. 
Concentric pipe 
outlet connection 
from TBM 
NO external 
rupture 
Category IV Material failure, 
thermal 
overstress 
inspection, QA inlet flow bypasses the 
TBM and proceeds 
directly to outlet flow.   
Verify TBM cooling 
by helium and that 
frame is cooled.  
ITER can continue to 
operate. 
Pb-17Li LOFA, 
not an IE 
Sliding seal for the inner 
tube outflow.  Some 
small leakage is 
expected cross this seal 
from the high P cold 
side to the low P hot 
side (TBM DDD, page 
C-4)
<
1Eí04/year 
analyst
judgment 
External leakage is expected and 
small amounts are not 
consequential to TBM operations, 
so there is no external leakage 
failure mode.  The inner pipe is 
held in place by the applied force 
from the concentric pipe transition 
and the TBM joint.  Failure of this 
sliding seal is considered to be a 
low value in the extremely unlikely 
frequency range.   
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Mixing tank NO external
leakage
Category III Thermal 
"striping" of hot 
flow on welds 
before flow 
mixes in tank, 
material flaw, 
corrosion such 
as a pin hole 
leak, faulty weld  
Good design to 
prevent hot Pb-
17Li impinge-
ment on tank 
walls, material 
selection and 
inspection, NDT 
of welds 
Small loss of coolant 
accident, Pb-17Li 
temperature at 470 C. 
Verify TBM cooling 
by helium and that 
frame is cooled.  
ITER can continue to 
operate. 
Pb-17Li Small 
LOCA, LMP2 
Provide catch pans 
under mixing tank.  
Catch pans should be 
insulated to keep 
concrete beneath them 
cool. 
1Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Mixing tank is a design provision 
to allow higher temperature 
operation of the Pb-17Li TBM up 
to 650 C.  The tank accepts 650 C 
inlet Pb-17Li and mixes it with 
cooler 340 C Pb-17Li so that the 
outlet liquid remains at § 470 C, 
which is acceptable from a 
corrosion point of view. 
external
rupture 
Category IV Material failure, 
weld failure, 
high corrosion 
(wall thinning 
can occur at 
high temper-
ature)
Large loss of coolant 
accident, with a Pb-
17Li peak temperature 
of 650 C.  The peak 
temperature could be 
reduced to 470 C by the 
larger inventory of Pb-
17Li in the tank. 
Verify TBM cooling 
by helium and that 
frame is cooled.  
ITER can continue to 
operate. 
Pb-17Li LOCA, 
LMP1
Provide catch pans 
under mixing tank.  
Catch pans should be 
insulated to keep 
concrete beneath them 
cool. 
5Eí09/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
overfill Category III operational 
error, valve fault 
Operating 
procedures, 
sensor alarms 
If the tank overfills, 
tank pressure could 
increase to the point 
where the low pressure 
Pb-17Li flow from the 
TBM module cannot 
easily enter the tank 
and TBM cooling flow 
slows. 
The TBM Pb-17Li 
coolant can 
withstand a large 
amount of heat input.  
ITER can continue to 
operate if helium is 
cooling the TBM 
module. 
Pb-17Li LOFA, 
not an IE 
operator 
error, 
median 
estimate of 
1Eí03/d 
analyst
judgment 
Assume that there are 4 
opportunities per year to 
misposition the valve, and the 
human error will be larger than the 
valve failure rate.  If the inlet valve 
is sized to allow a fixed minimum 
flow of 16 kg/s to flow to the TBM 
module, then the mixing tank can 
not be underfilled.  There is no 
'underfill' failure mode listed.    
Pressure 
instrument 
NO fails to 
operate 
Category III fouling, 
calibration error, 
power loss 
Coolant filtering 
and cleaning, 
periodic 
recalibration, 
redundant power 
and redundant 
sensors  
Forces operators to rely 
on other pressure 
sensors.  Suggest 
redundancy in sensors. 
No immediate 
actions needed, run 
to next shutdown 
period if other 
sensors can provide 
adequate information 
to safely operate the 
TBM.
Not an IE Fast fission reactors 
have used metal 
diaphragm pressure 
sensors.  Such an 
instrument can operate 
in the 2 MPa range.  It 
must be kept free of 
coolant oxide and crud, 
and not allow liquid 
metal freezing on the 
diaphragm.  Fiber optics 
can be used to sense the 
diaphragm bulging. 
1Eí06/h INEL-
96/0295 
Designers should consider sensor 
redundancy in the design, since 
replacing failed sensors will be a 
difficult task.  If penetrations for 
sensors are robust and common 
causes of failure are controlled, 
then redundancy will allow use of 
voting logic to filter out spurious 
noise signals and allow continued 
TBM operation with a sensor 
failure.    
    improper 
reading 
Category III calibration error, 
drift, diaphragm 
damage  
Periodic
recalibration 
Forces operators to rely 
on other pressure 
sensors.  Suggest 
redundancy in sensors. 
No immediate 
actions needed, run 
to next shutdown 
period if other 
sensors can provide 
adequate information 
to operate the TBM. 
Not an IE, N/S Recalibration activity 
could result in a 
significant personnel 
radiation exposure 
1Eí06/h INEL-
96/0295 
Use sensors that can be remotely 
recalibrated whenever possible to 
reduce personnel exposure 
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    external leak Category IV instrument pipe 
tap crack, 
instrument line 
crack, weld 
crack
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design 
Leaks Pb-17Li  to the 
30 C air atmosphere in 
the equatorial test port.   
No immediate 
actions needed, 
assume that a small 
leak can probably be 
tolerated until the 
end of the campaign, 
then shut down TBM 
to repair the leak. 
Small Pb-17Li 
LOCA, LMP2 
  1Eí09/h, 
assuming <1 
m of tubing 
WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Instrument leaks should be very 
low flow rates, such as through 
cracks, assume <<1% of the 
coolant flow rate, I.e., drops per 
minute.  An important issue is 
potential release of activated gases, 
such as mercury and tritium. 
    external 
rupture 
< Cat IV instrument tap 
material failure, 
instrument line 
material failure, 
weld failure 
Same as external 
leak, given 
above
Leaks moderate to large 
amount of Pb-17Li to 
the equatorial test port 
Shut down ITER 
pulse as fast as 
possible, increase 
helium cooling flow 
and TBM frame 
coolant flow.  Flow 
the Pb-17Li to the 
drain tank to limit 
the release.  
Pb-17Li LOCA, 
LMP1
  3Eí11/h, 
assuming <1 
m of tubing 
WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Temperature 
instrument 
NO fails to 
operate 
Category III fouling, drift, 
calibration error 
Coolant filtering 
and cleaning, 
periodic 
recalibration  
No immediate 
actions needed, run 
to next shutdown 
period if other 
sensors can provide 
adequate information 
to safely operate the 
TBM.
Not an IE Assume that either a 
thermocouple or RTD 
will be used for this 340 
to 470 C (or 650 C) 
temperature operating 
temperature range 
1Eí07/h INEL-
96/0295 
improper 
reading 
Category II calibration error, 
drift 
Periodic
recalibration 
No immediate 
actions needed, run 
to next shutdown 
period if other 
sensors can provide 
adequate information 
to operate the TBM. 
Not an IE 1Eí05/h INEL-
96/0295 
external leak Category II instrument tap 
line crack, 
instrument line 
crack, weld 
crack
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design, NDT 
Leaks Pb-17Li  to the 
30 C air atmosphere in 
the equatorial test port.   
No immediate 
actions needed, 
assume that a small 
leak can probably be 
tolerated until the 
end of the campaign, 
then shut down TBM 
to repair the leak. 
Small Pb-17Li 
LOCA, LMP2 
3Eí05/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Instrument leaks should be very 
low flow rates, such as through 
cracks, assume <<1% of the 
coolant flow rate.  An important 
issue is potential release of 
activated gases, such as mercury 
and tritium. 
external
rupture 
Category III instrument tap 
line material 
failure, weld 
failure
Materials 
selection in 
design, 
prEíservice
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design, NDT 
Leaks moderate to large 
amount of Pb-17Li to 
the equatorial test port 
Shut down ITER 
pulse as fast as 
possible, increase 
helium cooling flow 
and TBM frame 
coolant flow.  Flow 
the Pb-17Li to the 
drain tank to limit 
the release.  
Pb-17Li LOCA, 
LMP1
1Eí06/h analyst
judgment 
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TBM outlet flow 
isolation valve 
(normally closed, 
allows some flow 
to bypass the 
TBM so that a 
lower amount of 
Pb-17Li flow is 
heated to higher 
temperature) 
NO fail to open Category III valve disk 
binding due to 
crud or metal 
buildup, valve 
stem shear, 
valve operator 
fault, power loss 
testing, 
inspection, QA 
This failure mode 
would preclude high 
temperature Pb-17Li in 
normal operations 
No actions to take 
during normal 
operations 
Not an IE   1Eí03/d EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Valve would not be opened unless 
ITER was in shutdown operations, 
4 demands/year. 
    spurious 
operation 
Category III command fault, 
human error, 
electronic noise 
periodic testing, 
procedures, 
software QA 
Pb-17Li coolant is 
bypassing the TBM so 
some Pb-17Li is 
heating up to 670 C. 
Reclose valve to re-
establish operating 
parameters. 
Not an IE   5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
    plugging Category III impurities 
buildup, oxides 
buildup 
periodic 
regeneration of 
cold trap 
This failure mode 
would not be 
discovered during 
normal operations 
No actions to take 
during normal 
operations 
Not an IE   5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
    internal 
leakage
Category III material flaw, 
weld flaw, valve 
seat flaw 
inspection, 
testing, QA 
Lose small amount of 
Pb-17Li across valve 
seat
ITER can continue to 
operate if helium 
cooling system is 
available
Not an IE   5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
If valve is leaking past its seat, the 
leakage Pb-17Li could be very low 
pressure after traversing the valve 
seat.  Actual flow could be very 
small and not a safety concern. 
    internal 
rupture 
Category III Material failure, 
weld failure 
inspection, 
testing, QA 
Pb-17Li coolant is 
bypassing the TBM 
module box 
ITER can continue to 
operate if helium 
cooling system is 
available
Not an IE   5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
    external 
leakage
Category III material flaw, 
weld flaw, stem 
seal flaw 
inspection, 
testing, QA 
Lose small amount of 
Pb-17Li from valve 
stem or through flaw in 
valve body to equatorial 
port 
Isolate line and open 
drain tank to limit 
release.  ITER can 
continue to operate if 
helium cooling 
system is available. 
Pb-17Li Small 
LOCA, LMP2 
  5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
    external 
rupture 
Category III material failure, 
weld failure, 
stem seal failure 
inspection, 
testing, QA 
Pb-17Li coolant is 
draining from the loop 
to the equatorial port 
Isolate line and open 
drain tank to limit 
release.  ITER can 
continue to operate if 
helium cooling 
system is available. 
Pb-17Li LOCA, 
LMP1
  5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Tritium 
extraction tank 
bypass valve 
(normally closed) 
NO fail to open Category III valve disk 
binding due to 
crud or metal 
buildup, valve 
stem shear, 
valve operator 
fault, power loss 
testing, 
inspection, QA 
This failure mode 
would not occur in 
normal operations 
No actions to take 
during normal 
operations 
Not an IE 1Eí03/d EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Valve would not be opened unless 
ITER was in shutdown operations, 
4 demands/year. 
spurious
operation 
Category III command fault, 
human error, 
electronic noise 
periodic testing, 
procedures, 
software QA 
Pb-17Li coolant is 
bypassing the tritium 
extraction tank 
Some tritium will 
come out in the 
plenums with helium 
gas pressure.  ITER 
can continue to 
operate if the helium 
cooling system is 
available
Pb-17Li LOCA, 
LMP1
5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
ITER can continue to operate since 
the tritium production in the TBM 
is small, 1.59Eí06 g/s (DDD 
section 3.1.2).  This can also be 
written as 0.6 mg per pulse or 6.4 
Curies per pulse.   
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plugging Category III impurities 
buildup, oxides 
buildup 
periodic 
regeneration of 
cold trap 
This failure mode 
would not be 
discovered during 
normal operations 
No actions to take 
during normal 
operations 
Not an IE 5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
internal 
leakage
Category III material flaw, 
weld flaw, valve 
seat flaw 
inspection, 
testing, QA 
Lose small amount of 
Pb-17Li across valve 
seat.  Some tritium is 
not being extracted 
from the leak-by Pb-
17Li. 
ITER can continue to 
operate if helium 
cooling system is 
available
Not an IE 5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
ITER can continue to operate since 
the tritium production in the TBM 
is small, 1.59Eí06 g/s (DDD 
section 3.1.2).  This can also be 
written as 0.6 mg per pulse or 6.4 
Curies per pulse.   
internal 
rupture 
Category III Material failure, 
weld failure 
inspection, 
testing, QA 
Pb-17Li coolant is 
bypassing the tritium 
extraction tank.   
ITER can continue to 
operate if helium 
cooling system is 
available
Not an IE 5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
external
leakage
Category III material flaw, 
weld flaw, stem 
seal flaw 
inspection, 
testing, QA 
Lose small amount of 
Pb-17Li from valve 
stem or through flaw in 
valve body 
Isolate line, drain Pb-
17Li to drain tank to 
limit leakage.  ITER 
can continue to 
operate if helium 
cooling system is 
available
Pb-17Li Small 
LOCA, LMP2 
5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
external
rupture 
Category III material failure, 
weld failure, 
stem seal failure 
inspection, 
testing, QA 
Pb-17Li coolant is 
draining from the loop  
Isolate line, drain Pb-
17Li to drain tank to 
limit leakage.  ITER 
can continue to 
operate if helium 
cooling system is 
available
Pb-17Li LOCA, 
LMP1
5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Flow control 
valve to 
extraction tank 
(normally open) 
NO spurious 
operation 
Category III command fault, 
electronic noise, 
human error 
periodic testing, 
software QA, 
procedures 
Loss of control of Pb-
17Li flow direction into 
or bypassing the tritium 
extraction tank 
Re-open valve or 
shut down the Pb-
17Li flow loop. 
Not an IE   5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
TBM can operate with only helium 
cooling flow. 
    plugging Category III impurity 
buildup, 
corrosion
product buildup, 
foreign material 
buildup in gas 
line 
Good gas 
chemistry 
control, keep 
temperature high 
to avoid any 
aerosol plateout 
in the line 
Pb-17Li flow bypasses 
the tritium extraction 
tank or flow stagnates 
entirely
Shut down the Pb-
17Li flow loop 
Pb-17Li
depressurization, 
LOFA, but not an 
IE
  5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
TBM can operate with only helium 
cooling flow. 
    internal 
leakage
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Not an IE normally open valve 5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
    internal 
rupture 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Not an IE normally open valve 5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
    external 
leakage
Category III stem seal leak, 
valve body 
crack
operations 
testing, 
inspection, NDT 
Loss of helium 
followed by loss of Pb-
17Li coolant to port cell 
Close valves to 
isolate the leaking 
valve, drain Pb-17Li 
to the drain tank to 
limit release amount.  
Small Pb-17Li 
LOCA, LMP1 
  5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
    external 
rupture 
Category III stem seal 
failure, valve 
body failure 
operations 
testing, 
inspection, NDT 
Loss of helium 
followed by loss of Pb-
17Li coolant to port cell 
Close valves to 
isolate the leaking 
valve, drain Pb-17Li 
to the drain tank to 
limit release amount.  
Pb-17Li LOCA, 
LMP2
  5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
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Preventive
Action on 
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Corrective or 
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on Consequences 
ITER Postulated 
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Check valve NO fail to open impurity 
buildup, 
corrosion
product buildup, 
hinge fault 
Good coolant 
chemistry 
control with cold 
trap, keep 
temperature up 
to prevent 
precipitation 
Loss of Pb-17Li flow or 
severely limited flow 
Condition should be 
detected in system 
operability testing 
and ITER will not 
start up without 
proper TBM Pb-17Li 
flow. 
Not an IE 1Eí04/d EGG-SSRE-
8875 
plugging Category III impurity 
buildup, 
corrosion
product buildup 
Good coolant 
chemistry 
control with cold 
trap, keep 
temperature up 
to prevent 
precipitation 
Loss of Pb-17Li flow in 
this once-through loop 
Decreasing flow 
accident.  Should 
occur gradually, 
record pumping 
power and track 
changes.  Verify 
helium cooling to 
TBM and ITER can 
continue to operate. 
Pb-17Li LOFA, 
Not an IE 
5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
fail to close impurity 
buildup, 
corrosion
product buildup, 
hinge fault 
Good coolant 
chemistry 
control with cold 
trap, keep 
temperature up 
to prevent 
precipitation, 
material flaw 
Reverse flow allowed 
in the Pb-17Li flow 
loop 
Close nearest motor 
operated valves.  
Shut down ITER as 
quickly as possible, 
increase helium gas 
coolant to remove 
heat from TBM. 
Not an IE 1Eí04/d EGG-SSRE-
8875 
internal 
leakage
Category III valve seat wear, 
impurity or 
corrosion
product buildup 
Good coolant 
chemistry 
control with cold 
trap, keep 
temperature up 
to prevent 
precipitation 
Limited reverse flow 
allowed in the Pb-17Li 
flow loop 
Close motor operated 
valves.  Shut down 
ITER as quickly as 
possible, increase 
helium gas coolant to 
remove heat from 
TBM.
Not an IE 5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
internal 
rupture 
Category III valve disc 
failure, hinge 
failure
inspection, QA Reverse flow allowed 
in the Pb-17Li flow 
loop 
Close motor operated 
valves to isolate leak.  
Verify helium gas 
coolant to remove 
heat from TBM. 
Not an IE 5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
external
leakage
Category III valve body 
crack,
maintenance 
port leak 
inspection, QA Loss of coolant into 
equatorial port  
Close valves to 
isolate the leaking 
valve.  Orderly 
shutdown of ITER 
pulse. 
Small Pb-17Li 
LOCA, LMP2 
5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
external
rupture 
Category III valve body 
failure
inspection, QA Large loss of coolant 
into equatorial port 
Close valves to 
isolate the ruptured 
check valve body.  
Fast shut down of 
ITER, increase 
helium cooling of 
TBM.
Pb-17Li LOCA, 
LMP1
5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
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Initiating Events Comments Frequency 
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PbLi Tritium 
Extraction Tank, 
vacuum 
permeator 
NO external 
leakage
Category III material flaw, 
material crack, 
weld flaw 
Shell-side 
vacuum is 
degraded, unit 
functions poorly.   
Tritium extraction 
permeator could be 
bypassed and the TBM 
could finish the ITER 
operating campaign.  
Some tritium could be 
drawn from the 
pressure control system 
out of the headspace of 
the pump's expansion 
tank.  
Bypass the tritium 
extraction tank so no 
tritium is released to 
the port cell. 
Not an IE  1Eí03/year EGG-FSP-
11037 
Assume vacuum permeator 
concept is used for this tank.  
Experience with this type of 
equipment has shown that tubes 
can crack and poisoning can occur 
(Penzhorn et al., "Long-term 
Permeator Experiment PETRA at 
the TLK: Commissioning Tests 
with Tritium," Fusion Tech., vol. 
28, October 1995, p 723-731.) 
    external 
rupture 
Category IV material failure, 
weld failure 
Vacuum is lost, 
small amount of 
tritium could 
escape to room.   
Tritium extraction 
permeator could be 
bypassed and the TBM 
could finish the ITER 
operating campaign.  
Some tritium could be 
drawn from the 
pressure control in the 
headspace of the 
pump's expansion tank.  
Bypass the tritium 
extraction tank so no 
tritium is released to 
the port cell. 
Not an IE   1Eí05/year EGG-FSP-
11037 
    tube leakage Category III material flaw, 
crack, or tube-
to-tubesheet 
weld flaw 
Small amount of 
Pb-17Li flows 
into vacuum 
shell.  This is a 
small LOCA for 
the flow loop 
and loss of 
function for the 
permeator. 
Pb-17Li has a low 
vapor pressure even 
under vacuum 
conditions.  Any gases 
(Hg, T, etc) are still 
confined in the vacuum 
permeator shell with the 
Pb-17Li.
Isolate Pb-17Li flow 
to the tritium 
extraction permeator 
to limit the quantity 
leaking into the shell.  
Verify that helium 
cooling to the TBM 
is available.  
This is a small Pb-
17Li LOCA, but 
no release to the 
room atmosphere.  
Not an IE 
  1Eí06/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
The vacuum permeator outer tank 
or shell must be able to withstand 
the highest temperature Pb-17Li 
(§ 670 C) in case of tube leakage. 
    tube rupture Category III material failure, 
crack, or tube-
to-tubesheet 
weld failure 
Loss of coolant 
from the flow 
loop to the 
permeator shell.   
Isolate Pb-17Li flow to 
the tritium permeator.   
Isolate Pb-17Li flow 
to the tritium 
extraction permeator 
to limit the quantity 
flowing into the 
shell.  Verify that 
helium cooling to the 
TBM is available. 
This is a small Pb-
17Li LOCA, but 
no release to the 
room atmosphere.  
Not an IE 
  1Eí06/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
    tube 
plugging 
Category III impurity 
buildup, oxide 
buildup 
Loss of flow 
through the 
permeator tubes 
Isolate Pb-17Li flow to 
the tritium permeator.  
Bypass the permeator to 
finish the ITER 
operating campaign. 
The tube plugging 
causes the permeator 
to bypass itself.  
Close the valves to 
positively bypass the 
permeator.  Verify 
that helium cooling 
to the TBM is 
available.
Not an IE   1Eí07/h see note at 
right. 
System design regulates the 
temperature of the inlet fluid to 470 
C, so precipitation of oxides or 
impurities should not be a large 
concern.  EGG-SSRE-8875 for 
sodium reactors had a value of 
1Eí06/h for tube plugging, analyst 
judgment reduced the value by 10x 
to account for the small size of the 
permeator, its few aluminum tubes. 
PbLi-He heat 
exchanger 
NO tube surface 
fouling 
Category III impurity 
buildup, oxide 
buildup 
cold trap 
removes 
impurities and 
oxides 
Loss of heat transfer to 
the secondary helium 
coolant, Pb-17Li 
overheating 
Over temperature 
(similar to LOFA) 
Shell and tube heat 
exchanger.  The Pb-17Li 
is on the shell side, high 
pressure helium is in the 
Aluminum tubes. 
1Eí06/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Helium enters the HX at 200 C, 
exits at 360 C.  Portions of the heat 
exchanger tubes could be cool 
enough to condense out impurities 
and oxides from the Pb-17Li. 
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Action on 
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shell leakage Category III material flaw, 
weld flaw 
inspection, 
testing, QA 
Loss of Pb-17Li Small Pb-17Li 
LOCA, LMM2 
1Eí06/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
shell rupture Category III material failure, 
weld failure 
inspection, 
testing, QA 
Loss of large amount of 
Pb-17Li
Pb-17Li LOCA, 
LMM1 
1Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
tube leakage Category III weld flaw, tube 
flaw
inspection, 
testing, QA 
Helium inleakage to 
Pb-17Li, will pressurize 
the liquid metal, open 
the rupture disk to the 
drain tank 
Increase helium 
cooling to the TBM 
module, can continue 
to run the TBM with 
Pb-17Li drained 
Small secondary 
helium LOCA, 
LMM2 
Failure rate is per tube 
bundle in the heat 
exchanger 
1Eí06/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Helium inleakage at 8 MPa will 
pressurize the 2 MPa liquid metal, 
however the inert helium gas will 
likely separate out in the pump 
housing/expansion tank after the 
heat exchanger.  The helium would 
go to the pressure control system.  
If the helium communicates its 
pressure throughout the liquid 
metal, the rupture disk should 
actuate at 3.5 MPa, draining the 
Pb-17Li to the drain tank during 
ITER operation. 
tube rupture Category III weld failure, 
tube failure, 
tube 
overheating, 
helium 
overpressure 
from TBM 
module breach 
inspection, 
testing, QA 
Helium inleakage to 
Pb-17Li, will pressurize 
the liquid metal, open 
the rupture disk to the 
drain tank 
Increase helium 
cooling to the TBM 
module, can continue 
to run the TBM with 
Pb-17Li drained 
Pb-17Li LOCA, 
LMM1 
Failure rate is per tube 
bundle in the heat 
exchanger 
1Eí06/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
The tubes must be able to 
withstand 8 MPa helium that could 
leak into the Pb-17Li from a TBM 
fault.   
tube 
plugging 
Cat IV foreign material 
intrusion, 
impurities, 
oxide buildup 
keep secondary 
helium clean, 
moisture free 
Loss of heat transfer to 
the secondary helium 
coolant 
Increase helium 
cooling of the TBM 
module, increase 
TBM frame cooling, 
shut down ITER 
after the pulse to 
restore cooling 
Over temperature 
(similar to LOFA).   
Not an IE 
Helium is quite clean, no 
plugging of the helium 
side of the tubes is 
expected. 
1Eí04/year EGG-SSRE-8875 listed 1Eí06/h, 
but with helium (rather than water) 
as the secondary coolant, plugging 
is considered to be an improbable 
event.  Moisture could react with 
the hot tube walls and form oxide 
coatings, but moisture can be kept 
from the helium, use 1Eí04/year as 
a judgment value 
Pressure 
instrument 
NO fails to 
operate 
Category III fouling, 
calibration error, 
power loss 
Coolant filtering 
and cleaning, 
periodic 
recalibration, 
redundant power 
and redundant 
sensors  
Forces operators to rely 
on other pressure 
sensors.  Suggest 
redundancy in sensors. 
No immediate 
actions needed, run 
to next shutdown 
period if other 
sensors can provide 
adequate information 
to operate the TBM. 
Not an IE Fast fission reactors 
have used metal 
diaphragm pressure 
sensors.  Such an 
instrument can operate 
in the 2 MPa range.  It 
must be kept free of 
coolant oxide and crud, 
and not allow liquid 
metal freezing on the 
diaphragm.  Fiber optics 
can be used to sense the 
diaphragm bulging 
1Eí06/h INEL-
96/0295 
Designers should consider sensor 
redundancy in the design, since 
replacing failed sensors will be a 
difficult task.  If penetrations for 
sensors are robust and common 
causes of failure are controlled, 
then redundancy will allow use of 
voting logic to filter out spurious 
noise signals and allow continued 
TBM operation with a sensor 
failure.    
    improper 
reading 
  calibration error, 
drift, diaphragm 
damage  
Periodic
recalibration 
Forces operators to rely 
on other pressure 
sensors.  Suggest 
redundancy in sensors. 
No immediate 
actions needed, run 
to next shutdown 
period if other 
sensors can provide 
adequate information 
to operate the TBM. 
Not an IE Recalibration activity 
could result in a 
significant personnel 
radiation exposure 
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    external leak Category IV instrument pipe 
tap crack, 
instrument line 
crack, weld 
crack
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design 
Leaks Pb-17Li  to the 
30 C air atmosphere in 
the equatorial test port.   
No immediate 
actions needed, 
assume that a small 
leak can probably be 
tolerated until the 
end of the campaign, 
then shut down TBM 
to repair the leak. 
Small LOCA   1Eí09/h, 
assuming <1 
m of tubing 
WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Instrument leaks should be very 
low flow rates, such as through 
cracks, assume <<1% of the 
coolant flow rate.  An important 
issue is release of activated gases, 
such as mercury and tritium. 
    external 
rupture 
< Cat IV instrument tap 
material failure, 
instrument line 
material failure, 
weld failure 
Same as external 
leak, given 
above
Leaks moderate to large 
amount of Pb-17Li to 
the equatorial test port 
Shut down ITER 
pulse as fast as 
possible, increase 
helium cooling flow 
and TBM frame 
coolant flow.  Flow 
the Pb-17Li to the 
drain tank to limit 
the release.  
LOCA   3Eí11/h, 
assuming <1 
m of tubing 
WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Temperature 
instrument 
NO fails to 
operate 
Category III fouling, drift, 
calibration error 
Coolant filtering 
and cleaning, 
periodic 
recalibration  
No Pb-17Li 
temperature indication 
returned to operators 
No immediate 
actions needed, run 
to next shutdown 
period if other 
sensors can provide 
adequate information 
to operate the TBM. 
Not an IE Assume that either a 
platinum thermocouple 
or RTD will be used for 
this 340 to 470 C (or 
650 C) temperature 
operating temperature 
range 
1Eí07/h INEL-
96/0295 
improper 
reading 
Category II calibration error, 
drift 
Periodic
recalibration 
Incorrect Pb-17Li 
temperature indication 
returned to operators 
No immediate 
actions needed, run 
to next shutdown 
period if other 
sensors can provide 
adequate information 
to operate the TBM. 
Not an IE 1Eí05/h INEL-
96/0295 
external leak Category II instrument tap 
line crack, 
instrument line 
crack, weld 
crack
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design, NDT 
Leaks Pb-17Li  to the 
30 C air atmosphere in 
the equatorial test port.   
No immediate 
actions needed, 
assume that a small 
leak can probably be 
tolerated until the 
end of the campaign, 
then shut down TBM 
to repair the leak. 
Small Pb-17Li 
LOCA, LMP2 
3Eí05/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Instrument leaks should be very 
low flow rates, such as through 
cracks, assume <<1% of the 
coolant flow rate.  An important 
issue is release of activated gases, 
such as mercury and tritium. 
external
rupture 
Category III instrument tap 
line material 
failure, weld 
failure
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design, NDT 
Leaks moderate to large 
amount of Pb-17Li to 
the equatorial test port 
Shut down ITER 
pulse as fast as 
possible, increase 
helium cooling flow 
and TBM frame 
coolant flow.  Flow 
the Pb-17Li to the 
drain tank to limit 
the release.  
Pb-17Li LOCA, 
LMP1
1Eí06/h analyst
judgment 
Pump housing 
expansion tank 
NO external leak Category III   testing, 
inspection, QA 
Leaks small amount of 
Pb-17Li to the 
equatorial test port 
  Small Pb-17Li 
LOCA, LMP2 
  1Eí06/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
    external 
rupture 
Category III   testing, 
inspection, QA 
Leaks Pb-17Li to the 
equatorial test port 
  Pb-17Li LOCA, 
LMP1
  1Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
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    overfill Category II valving error, 
level controller 
fault, pressure 
control system 
fault 
software QA, 
procedures, 
testing of 
pressure control 
system 
Pb-17Li level increases 
in the expansion tank 
and pump casing.  
Liquid metal on the 
pump shaft seal will 
lead to reduced seal 
lifetime. 
Correct the fault in 
the valving or 
pressure control 
system.  Level 
controller requires 
TBM shutdown to 
repair. 
Not an IE Using multiple level 
controllers will reduce 
the likelihood of 
requiring a repair 
outage.  Instrument 
redundancy can be 
accomplished with a 
"tree" penetration 
instead of multiple 
instrument tap 
penetrations. 
1Eí05/h analyst 
judgment 
    loss of 
pressure 
control 
Category II Loss of Helium 
Pressure Control 
System by 
sensor fault, 
compressor 
fault, operator 
error, controller 
fault, or line 
breach 
software QA, 
procedures, 
testing of 
pressure control 
system 
Depressurization allows 
Pb-17Li to flow out of 
the tank and into 
Pressure Control 
System lines. 
ITER can continue to 
operate if TBM 
helium cooling is 
available.
Interfacing system 
LOCA, probably 
no breach to the 
room. 
This LOCA may be 
limited by the diameter 
of the helium lines.  
Pressure control system 
is stated to circulate 
helium, but the design is 
not completed at this 
time. 
1Eí05/h analyst 
judgment 
The pressure control system failure 
rate of § 1Eí05/hour to keep 
pressure up is based on analyst 
judgment (using information in 
EGG-FSP-8709, Sept 1989) since 
the pressure control system is not 
fully designed at this time.   
Inert gas inlet 
valve to 
expansion tank 
(normally open) 
NO spurious
operation 
Category III command fault, 
electronic noise, 
human error 
periodic testing, 
software QA, 
procedures 
Loss of helium gas 
pressure control 
Re-open valve or 
shut down the Pb-
17Li flow loop. 
Pb-17Li
depressurization, 
LOFA, but not an 
IE
5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
TBM can operate with only helium 
cooling flow. 
plugging Category III impurity 
buildup, 
corrosion
product buildup, 
foreign material 
buildup in gas 
line 
Good gas 
chemistry 
control, keep 
temperature high 
to avoid any 
aerosol plateout 
in the line 
Loss of helium gas 
pressure control 
Shut down the Pb-
17Li flow loop 
Pb-17Li
depressurization, 
LOFA, but not an 
IE
5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
internal 
leakage
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Not an IE normally open valve 5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
internal 
rupture 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Not an IE normally open valve 5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
external
leakage
Category III stem seal leak, 
valve body 
crack
operations 
testing, 
inspection, NDT 
Loss of helium 
followed by loss of Pb-
17Li coolant to port cell 
Close valves to 
isolate the leaking 
valve, drain Pb-17Li 
to the drain tank to 
limit release amount.  
LMP1 5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
external
rupture 
Category III stem seal 
failure, valve 
body failure 
operations 
testing, 
inspection, NDT 
Loss of helium 
followed by loss of Pb-
17Li coolant to port cell 
Close valves to 
isolate the leaking 
valve, drain Pb-17Li 
to the drain tank to 
limit release amount.  
LMP2 5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Inert gas outlet 
valve from 
expansion tank 
(normally open) 
NO spurious 
operation 
Category III command fault, 
electronic noise, 
human error 
periodic testing, 
software QA, 
procedures 
Loss of helium gas 
pressure control 
Re-open valve or 
shut down the Pb-
17Li flow loop. 
Pb-17Li
depressurization, 
LOFA, but not an 
IE
  5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
TBM can operate with only helium 
cooling flow. 
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    plugging Category III impurity 
buildup, 
corrosion
product buildup, 
foreign material 
buildup 
Good coolant 
chemistry 
control with cold 
trap 
Loss of helium gas 
pressure control 
Shut down the Pb-
17Li flow loop 
Pb-17Li
depressurization, 
LOFA, but not an 
IE
  5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
    internal 
leakage
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Not an IE normally open valve 5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
    internal 
rupture 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Not an IE normally open valve 5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
    external 
leakage
Category III stem seal leak, 
valve body 
crack
operations 
testing, 
inspection, NDT 
Loss of helium 
followed by loss of Pb-
17Li coolant to port cell 
Close valves to 
isolate the leaking 
valve, drain Pb-17Li 
to the drain tank to 
limit release amount.  
LMP1   5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
    external 
rupture 
Category III stem seal 
failure, valve 
body failure 
operations 
testing, 
inspection, NDT 
Loss of helium 
followed by loss of Pb-
17Li coolant to port cell 
Close valves to 
isolate the leaking 
valve, drain Pb-17Li 
to the drain tank to 
limit release amount.  
LMP2   5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Cold trap inlet 
isolation valve 
(normally open) 
NO fail to close Category II valve disk 
binding due to 
crud or metal 
buildup, valve 
stem shear, 
valve operator 
fault, power loss 
testing, 
inspection, QA 
No operational 
consequences 
Not an operational 
concern. 
Not an IE 1Eí03/d EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Valve would not be closed unless 
the cold trap was being cleaned, 
and it would not be cleaned unless 
ITER was in shutdown operations 
spurious
operation 
Category III command fault, 
human error, 
electronic noise 
periodic testing, 
QA on control 
system, operator 
procedures 
isolates cold trap from 
Pb-17Li flow loop, so 
there is no PbLi 
cleanup.  Leads to 
plateout in coolest parts 
of the system, such as 
the heat exchanger, 
instrument lines. 
Slow progression 
event.  No actions to 
take.  Impurities and 
oxides will build up 
in other parts of the  
flow loop. Prudent to 
shut down Pb-17Li 
until the cold trap 
can be repaired. 
Not an IE 5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
plugging Category III impurities 
buildup, oxides 
buildup 
periodic testing, 
QA on control 
system, operator 
procedures 
isolates cold trap from 
Pb-17Li flow loop, so 
there is no PbLi 
cleanup.  Leads to 
plateout in coolest parts 
of the system, such as 
the heat exchanger, 
instrument lines. 
Slow progression 
event.  No actions to 
take.  Impurities and 
oxides will build up 
in other parts of the  
flow loop over time. 
Not an IE 5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
In some cold traps, the impurity 
plateout occurred at the cold trap 
throat instead of on the screens in 
the tank. 
external
leakage
Category III material flaw, 
weld flaw, stem 
seal flaw 
testing, 
inspection, QA 
Leaks high pressure Pb-
17Li into equatorial 
port 
Turn off pump to 
limit release.  Verify 
helium cooling to 
TBM.
Small Pb-17Li 
LOCA, LMP2 
5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
external
rupture 
Category III material failure, 
weld failure, 
stem seal failure 
testing, 
inspection, QA 
Leaks high pressure Pb-
17Li into equatorial 
port 
Turn off pump and 
open drain tank to 
limit release.  Verify 
helium cooling to 
TBM.
Pb-17Li LOCA, 
LMP1
5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
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Cold trap outlet 
isolation valve 
(normally open) 
NO fail to 
transfer 
position 
Category II valve disk 
binding due to 
crud or metal 
buildup, valve 
stem shear, 
valve operator 
fault, power loss 
testing, 
inspection, QA 
Cannot close valve to 
flush cold trap for 
cleaning.
Not an operational 
concern. 
Not an IE   1Eí03/d EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Valve would not be opened unless 
ITER was in shutdown operations 
    spurious 
operation 
Category III command fault, 
human error, 
electronic noise 
periodic testing, 
QA on control 
system, operator 
procedures 
isolates cold trap from 
Pb-17Li flow loop, so 
there is no PbLi 
cleanup.  Leads to 
plateout in coolest parts 
of the system, such as 
the heat exchanger, 
instrument lines. 
Slow progression 
event.  No actions to 
take.  Impurities and 
oxides will build up 
in other parts of the  
flow loop. 
Not an IE   5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
    plugging Category III impurities 
buildup, oxides 
buildup 
periodic testing, 
QA on control 
system, operator 
procedures 
isolates cold trap from 
Pb-17Li flow loop, so 
there is no PbLi 
cleanup.  Leads to 
plateout in coolest parts 
of the system, such as 
the heat exchanger, 
instrument lines. 
Slow progression 
event.  No actions to 
take.  Impurities and 
oxides will build up 
in other parts of the  
flow loop. 
Not an IE   5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
    external 
leakage
Category III material flaw, 
weld flaw, stem 
seal flaw 
testing, 
inspection, QA 
Leaks high pressure Pb-
17Li into equatorial 
port 
Turn off pump to 
limit release.  Verify 
helium cooling to 
TBM.
Small Pb-17Li 
LOCA, LMP2 
  5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
    external 
rupture 
Category III material failure, 
weld failure, 
stem seal failure 
testing, 
inspection, QA 
Leaks high pressure Pb-
17Li into equatorial 
port 
Turn off pump and 
open drain tank to 
limit release.  Verify 
helium cooling and 
frame cooling to 
TBM.
Pb-17Li LOCA, 
LMP1
  5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Cold trap NO failure to trap Category III trap saturated, 
temperature too 
high 
measure oxygen 
% in coolant; 
measure, control 
trap temperature 
periodic regeneration if 
necessary 
Slow progression 
event.  No actions to 
take.  Impurities and 
oxides will build up 
in other parts of the  
flow loop. 
Not an IE  Note that Boisseau 
(1982) data on sodium 
cold traps gave a failure 
rate of 1.5Eí06/h for all 
failure modes. 
5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
In some cold traps, the impurity 
plateout occurred at the cold trap 
throat instead of on the screens in 
the tank.  Loss of the cold trap 
function will present concerns 
about impurities and oxides, but 
this is not a rapid transient event. 
external
leakage
Category III vessel wall 
cracking, weld 
flaw
materials 
selection, 
inspection, QA 
Leaks high pressure Pb-
17Li into equatorial 
port 
Turn off pump to 
limit release.  Verify 
helium cooling to 
TBM.
Small Pb-17Li 
LOCA, LMP2 
5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
external
rupture 
Category III vessel severe 
cracking, weld 
failure
materials 
selection, 
inspection, QA 
Leaks high pressure Pb-
17Li into equatorial 
port 
Turn off pump and 
open drain tank to 
limit release.  Verify 
helium cooling to 
TBM.
Pb-17Li LOCA, 
LMP1
5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
89
Component 
Operational
State
Failure 
Mode 
Frequency 
Category Possible Causes 
Preventive
Action on 
Possible Causes Consequences 
Corrective or 
Preventive Actions 
on Consequences 
ITER Postulated 
Initiating Events Comments Frequency 
Comment on 
frequency 
calculation Design comments 
plugging Category III fouling by 
foreign material, 
impurity or 
oxide plateout in 
throat of cold 
trap chamber 
measure, control 
trap temperature 
Loss of function.  
Isolates cold trap from 
Pb-17Li flow loop, so 
there is no PbLi 
cleanup.  Leads to 
plateout in coolest parts 
of the system, such as 
the heat exchanger, 
instrument lines. 
Slow progression 
event.  No actions to 
take.  Impurities and 
oxides will build up 
in other parts of the  
flow loop over time. 
Not an IE 1Eí05/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Loss of function will present 
concerns about impurities and 
oxides, but this is not a rapid 
transient event.  
Cold trap heat 
exchanger 
NO external 
leakage
  jacket crack, 
construction 
flaw, weld flaw 
inspection, NDT, 
QA
Leak helium to the port Pb-17Li loop can 
continue to operate 
Not an IE It is not clear how 200 C 
helium will affect port 
equipment, notably the 
bellows 
1Eí06/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Assume gaseous helium at 8 MPa, 
200 C, is used for the cold trap 
coolant.  The design may be as 
simple as a jacket on the cold trap 
vessel.  The jacket routes helium 
coolant around the vessel. 
    external 
rupture 
  jacket failure, 
construction  
flaw, weld 
failure
inspection, NDT, 
QA
trap does not remove 
impurities, this means a 
slow degradation of the 
system 
Shut down Pb-17Li 
loop 
Not an IE It is not clear how a 
large amount of 200 C 
helium will affect port 
equipment, notably the 
bellows 
1Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Cold trap drain 
valve (normally 
closed)
NO fail to open Category III valve disk 
binding due to 
crud or metal 
buildup, valve 
stem shear, 
valve operator 
fault, power loss 
testing, 
inspection, QA 
This failure mode 
would not occur in 
normal operations 
No actions to take 
during normal 
operations 
Not an IE 1Eí03/d EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Valve would not be opened unless 
ITER was in shutdown operations, 
4 demands/year. 
spurious
operation 
Category III command fault, 
human error, 
electronic noise 
periodic testing, 
procedures, 
software QA 
Pb-17Li coolant is 
draining from the loop 
through the cold trap 
Isolate cold trap to 
limit leakage.  ITER 
can continue to 
operate if helium 
cooling system is 
available
Pb-17Li LOCA, 
LMP1
5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
plugging Category III impurities 
buildup, oxides 
buildup 
periodic 
regeneration of 
cold trap 
This failure mode 
would not be 
discovered during 
normal operations 
Perform cold trap 
cleaning during an 
ITER outage 
Not an IE 5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
internal 
leakage
Category III material flaw, 
weld flaw, valve 
seat flaw 
inspection, 
testing, QA 
Lose small amount of 
Pb-17Li across valve 
seat
Isolate cold trap to 
limit leakage.  ITER 
can continue to 
operate if helium 
cooling system is 
available
Pb-17Li Small 
LOCA, LMP2 
5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
internal 
rupture 
Category III Material failure, 
weld failure 
inspection, 
testing, QA 
Pb-17Li coolant is 
draining from the loop 
through the cold trap 
Isolate cold trap to 
limit leakage.  ITER 
can continue to 
operate if helium 
cooling system is 
available
Pb-17Li LOCA, 
LMP1
5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
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external
leakage
Category III material flaw, 
weld flaw, stem 
seal flaw 
inspection, 
testing, QA 
Lose small amount of 
Pb-17Li from valve 
stem or through flaw in 
valve body 
Isolate cold trap to 
limit leakage.  ITER 
can continue to 
operate if helium 
cooling system is 
available
Pb-17Li Small 
LOCA, LMP2 
5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
external
rupture 
Category III material failure, 
weld failure, 
stem seal failure 
inspection, 
testing, QA 
Pb-17Li coolant is 
draining from the loop 
through the cold trap 
Isolate cold trap to 
limit leakage.  ITER 
can continue to 
operate if helium 
cooling system is 
available
Pb-17Li LOCA, 
LMP1
5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
PbLi Drain Tank NO external  
leakage
Category III material flaw, 
weld flaw, 
construction 
fault 
inspection, NDT drain tank is normally 
valved off from Pb-
17Li flow loop, no 
immediate concern 
ITER can continue to 
operate 
Not an IE   1Eí06/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
The TRITEX Pb-17Li flow loop 
kept the drain tank above the 
melting temperature of Pb-17Li by 
use of electric heaters.  There was a 
concern for thermal shock if a 
dump quickly placed high 
temperature alloy in a room 
temperature tank. 
    external 
rupture 
Category III material failure, 
weld failure 
inspection, NDT drain tank is normally 
valved off from Pb-
17Li flow loop, no 
immediate concern 
ITER can continue to 
operate 
Not an IE   1Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
PbLi drain tank 
inlet valve from 
HX (normally 
closed)
NO fail to open command fault, 
human error, 
electronic noise 
periodic testing, 
QA on control 
system, operator 
procedures 
No operational 
consequences 
No actions to take 
during operations 
Not an IE 1Eí03/d EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Assume one fill or refill operation 
per campaign, so 4 demands to 
open the valve per year during 
ITER outages 
spurious
operation 
Category III command fault, 
human error, 
electronic noise 
periodic testing, 
QA on control 
system, operator 
procedures 
Drains Pb-17Li to the 
drain tank during ITER 
operation.  Regarding 
the heat transfer loop, 
this is a LOCA. 
ITER can continue to 
operate if the helium 
cooling system is 
operating 
Pb-17Li LOCA, 
LMP1
5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Opening the low point valve on the 
tank while the tank is merely under 
0.1 MPa gas pressure will allow 
liquid metal admission to the tank. 
fail to close command fault, 
human error, 
electronic noise 
periodic testing, 
QA on control 
system, operator 
procedures 
This failure mode 
would not occur during 
ITER operation. 
No actions to take 
for this failure mode 
during ITER 
operation 
Not an IE 1Eí03/d EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Assume one fill or refill operation 
per campaign, so 4 demands to 
close the valve per year.  Failure to 
close would only occur during 
ITER outages. 
plugging impurity 
buildup, oxide 
buildup 
cold trap cleans 
the coolant 
This failure mode 
would not be 
discovered during 
normal ITER operation. 
Clean valve during 
an ITER outage 
Not an IE 5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Assume that operational evolutions 
requiring the drain valve to open 
are during ITER outages, not 
during ITER TBM operating time.  
internal 
leakage
Category III valve seat flaw 
or wear, valve 
disk flaw 
inspection, 
periodic 
testing,QA on 
construction 
Drains Pb-17Li to the 
drain tank during ITER 
operation.   
ITER can continue to 
operate if the helium 
cooling system is 
operating 
Not an IE Not an IE since Pb-17Li 
is not lost from the 
system, no leak into the 
Port Cell  
5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Helium inert gas is in the tank and 
this gas would leak out past the 
valve seat. 
internal 
rupture 
Category III valve disk 
failure
inspection, 
periodic testing, 
QA on 
construction 
Drains Pb-17Li to the 
drain tank during ITER 
operation.   
ITER can continue to 
operate if the helium 
cooling system is 
operating 
Not an IE Not an IE since Pb-17Li 
is not lost from the 
system, no leak into the 
Port Cell  
5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
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external
leakage
Category III valve stem 
packing flaw, 
valve body flaw 
inspection, 
periodic testing, 
QA on 
construction 
Drains Pb-17Li to the 
equatorial port 
ITER can continue to 
operate if the helium 
cooling system is 
operating 
Pb-17Li small 
LOCA, LMP2 
5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
external
rupture 
Category III valve steam 
packing failure, 
valve body 
failure
inspection, 
periodic testing, 
QA on 
construction 
Drains Pb-17Li to the 
equatorial port 
ITER can continue to 
operate if the helium 
cooling system is 
operating 
Pb-17Li LOCA, 
LMP1
5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
PbLi drain tank 
inlet valve from 
pump outlet 
(normally closed) 
NO fail to open Category III command fault, 
human error, 
electronic noise 
periodic testing, 
QA on control 
system, operator 
procedures 
No consequences 
during normal plant 
operation 
No actions to take 
for this failure mode 
during ITER 
operation 
Not an IE   1Eí03/d EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Assume one fill or refill operation 
per year, so one demand to open 
the valve during 4 annual ITER 
shutdown periods 
    spurious 
operation 
Category III command fault, 
human error, 
electronic noise 
periodic testing, 
QA on control 
system, operator 
procedures 
Drains Pb-17Li from 
piping to drain tank 
ITER can continue to 
operate if helium 
cooling is operating 
Pb-17Li LOCA, 
LMP1
  5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
    fail to close Category III command fault, 
human error, 
electronic noise 
periodic testing, 
QA on control 
system, operator 
procedures 
No consequences 
during normal plant 
operation 
No actions to take 
for this failure mode 
during ITER 
operation 
Not an IE   1Eí03/d EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Assume one fill or refill operation 
per year, so one demand to close 
the valve.  Failure to close would 
occur during ITER outage work so 
this is not an initiating event. 
    plugging Category III impurity 
buildup, oxide 
buildup 
periodic testing No consequences 
during normal plant 
operation 
No actions to take 
for this failure mode 
during ITER 
operation 
Not an IE   5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Assume that operational evolutions 
requiring the drain valve to open 
are during ITER outages, not 
during ITER TBM operating time.  
This would be a latent fault, if the 
valve was needed during Pb-17Li 
loop operation, a plugged valve 
would be inoperable so the other 
inlet valve and the rupture disk 
would be relied on. 
    internal 
leakage
Category III valve seat flaw 
or wear, valve 
disk flaw 
inspection, 
periodic testing, 
QA on 
construction 
Slow leak of Pb-17Li to 
the drain tank 
ITER can continue to 
operate if helium 
cooling is operating 
Not an IE Not an IE since Pb-17Li 
is not lost from the 
system, no leak into the 
Port Cell  
5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
    internal 
rupture 
Category III valve disk 
failure
inspection, 
periodic testing, 
QA on 
construction 
Large leak of Pb-17Li 
to the drain tank 
ITER can continue to 
operate if helium 
cooling is operating 
Not an IE Not an IE since Pb-17Li 
is not lost from the 
system, no leak into the 
Port Cell  
5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
    external 
leakage
Category III valve stem 
packing flaw, 
valve body flaw 
inspection, 
periodic testing, 
QA on 
construction 
Slow leak of Pb-17Li to 
the port 
ITER can continue to 
operate if helium 
cooling is operating 
Pb-17Li Small 
LOCA, LMP2 
  5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
    external 
rupture 
Category III valve stem 
packing failure, 
valve body 
failure
inspection, 
periodic testing, 
QA on 
construction 
Large leak of Pb-17Li 
to the port 
ITER can continue to 
operate if helium 
cooling is operating 
Pb-17Li LOCA, 
LMP1
  5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
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Rupture disk NO fail to open Category IV disk made too 
thick, or 
impurity and 
oxide buildup 
coats disk or 
plugs line 
cold trap 
removes oxides 
and impurities 
overpressure in the 
system must be 
relieved, by opening 
valves to the drain tank 
open valves to drain 
tank, shut down Pb-
17Li loop.  ITER can 
continue to operate if 
the helium cooling 
system is operating 
Transient system 
over-pressure until 
relief valve is 
challenged.  Not 
an IE  
Rupture disk should 
open at 3.5 MPa per 
DDD section 3.6.2.1.1.  
Assume system upset 
events that demand 
rupture disk to open are 
somewhat rare, incidents 
< 1/year to 0.01/year 
1Eí04/d INEEL/EXT-
98-00892 
Rupture disks are reputed to be 
reasonably leak tight, low 
maintenance items.  They do have 
plus/minus variance in burst 
pressure, usually on the order of 2 
to 5%.  Disks have burst pressure 
ratings at given temperatures, 
decreasing as temperature 
increases.  The DCLL may need 
two disks that can be isolated, one 
for 470 C and another for 650 C 
operation. 
premature 
opening 
Category II thermal cycling 
weakens metal, 
pressure pulse, 
metal fatigue, 
corrosion,
improper 
installation 
maintain rupture 
disk at constant 
temperature, 
replace disk at 
regular intervals 
Secure the system, turn 
off pump 
ITER can continue to 
operate if helium 
cooling system is 
operating 
LOCA to drain 
tank, but not an IE, 
N/S
1Eí05/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Many rupture disks used in the 
chemical industry have only a 1-
year warranty (see 
www.bsbsystems.com web site).  
Rupture disks are periodically 
changed out every few years, or as 
frequently as the operating system 
requires disk replacement.  
Pressure relief 
valve 
NO external  
leakage
Category III material flaw, 
weld flaw, 
construction 
fault 
inspection, NDT drain tank is normally 
valved off from Pb-
17Li flow loop, no 
immediate concern 
ITER can continue to 
operate 
Not an IE   1Eí06/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
In DDD section 3.6.2.1.1 the drain 
tank has a pressure relief valve that 
opens at 4 MPa.  This valve vents 
to the room. 
    external 
rupture 
Category III material failure, 
weld failure 
inspection, NDT drain tank is normally 
valved off from Pb-
17Li flow loop, no 
immediate concern 
ITER can continue to 
operate 
Not an IE   1Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
    internal 
leakage
Category III valve seat wear, 
crud buildup 
inspection, clean 
coolant 
drain tank is normally 
valved off from Pb-
17Li flow loop, no 
immediate concern 
ITER can continue to 
operate 
Not an IE   5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
    internal 
rupture 
Category IV material failure, 
weld failure 
inspection, NDT drain tank is normally 
valved off from Pb-
17Li flow loop, no 
immediate concern 
ITER can continue to 
operate 
Not an IE   1Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
    premature 
opening 
Category III spring relaxation inspection, 
testing 
drain tank is normally 
valved off from Pb-
17Li flow loop, no 
immediate concern of 
air admission into drain 
tank 
ITER can continue to 
operate 
Not an IE   3Eí06/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
PbLi drain tank 
headspace inert 
gas inlet valve 
(normally closed) 
NO fail to open Category III command fault, 
human error, 
electronic noise 
periodic testing, 
QA on control 
system, operator 
procedures 
No consequences 
during normal plant 
operation 
No actions to take 
for this failure mode 
during ITER 
operation 
Not an IE 1Eí03/d EGG-SSRE-
8875 
One fill / refill operation per 
maintenance outage, so 4 demands 
to open the valve per year.  The 
drain tank helium pressurizes the 
Pb-17Li before each campaign, 
then the helium pressure is taken 
down to 0.1 MPa until the next 
outage. 
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spurious
operation 
Category III command fault, 
human error, 
electronic noise 
periodic testing, 
QA on control 
system, operator 
procedures 
No consequences 
during normal plant 
operation 
No actions to take 
for this failure mode 
during ITER 
operation 
Not an IE 5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Opening the headspace valve on 
the tank while the tank is merely 
under gas pressure will vent the gas 
in the tank.  The rupture disk at 
burst pressure of 3.5 MPa is not 
threatened at the 0.1 MPa 
backpressure loss.   
fail to close Category III command fault, 
human error, 
electronic noise 
periodic testing, 
QA on control 
system, operator 
procedures 
No consequences 
during normal plant 
operation 
No actions to take 
for this failure mode 
during ITER 
operation 
Not an IE 1Eí03/d EGG-SSRE-
8875 
One fill / refill operation per 
maintenance outage, so 4 demands 
to close the valve per year.  Failure 
to close would occur during ITER 
outage work so this is not an 
initiating event. 
plugging Category III impurity 
buildup, oxide 
buildup 
cold trap cleans 
the coolant 
No consequences 
during normal plant 
operation 
No actions to take 
for this failure mode 
during ITER 
operation 
Not an IE 5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Operational evolutions requiring 
the gas valve to open are just 
during ITER outages, not during 
ITER TBM operating time.   
internal 
leakage
Category III valve seat flaw 
or wear, valve 
disk flaw 
inspection, 
periodic testing, 
QA on 
construction 
No consequences 
during normal plant 
operation 
No actions to take 
for this failure mode 
during ITER 
operation 
Not an IE 5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Helium inert gas is within the tank 
and this gas would leak out past the 
valve seat to the pressure control 
system.   
internal 
rupture 
Category III valve disk 
failure
inspection, 
periodic testing, 
QA on 
construction 
No consequences 
during normal plant 
operation 
No actions to take 
for this failure mode 
during ITER 
operation 
Not an IE 5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Helium inert gas is within the tank 
and this gas would leak out through 
the faulted valve to the pressure 
control system.   
external
leakage
Category III valve stem 
packing flaw, 
valve body flaw 
inspection, 
periodic testing, 
QA on 
construction 
Leaks helium cover gas 
to the equatorial port 
Operators can isolate 
helium supply 
Not an IE A large amount of 
elevated temperature gas 
leaking into the port 
could be a personnel 
hazard, but this area 
should be a personnel 
exclusion zone during 
ITER operation. 
5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Helium inert gas is within the tank 
and this gas would leak out past the 
valve seat.  With helium bled out, 
air will slowly enter the tank so the 
tank requires cleaning before next 
use.
external
rupture 
Category III valve steam 
packing failure, 
valve body 
failure
inspection, 
periodic testing, 
QA on 
construction 
Leaks helium cover gas 
to the equatorial port 
Operators can isolate 
helium supply 
Not an IE A large amount of 
elevated temperature gas 
leaking into the port 
could be a personnel 
hazard, but no personnel 
should be in the area 
during ITER operation. 
5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Helium inert gas is within the tank 
and this gas would leak out past the 
valve seat.  With helium bled out, 
air will slowly enter the tank so the 
tank requires cleaning before next 
use.
Level instrument 
on drain tank 
NO fails to 
operate 
Category III fouling, drift, 
calibration error 
Coolant filtering 
and cleaning, 
periodic 
recalibration  
Deprives operators of 
accurate information on 
Pb-17Li depth in the 
drain tank, whether the 
liquid is in storage in 
the tank or where it is 
during an off-normal 
event
Other indications 
may provide enough 
data to allow 
operators to assess 
the TBM flow loop 
conditions.  The 
TBM should shut 
down at the end of 
the campaign to 
allow for repairs. 
Not an IE   1Eí06/h INEL-
96/0295 
Note on fouling: Instrument lines 
tend to act as diffusion cold traps 
for impurities in the liquid metal 
system; keeping the line 
temperature above the saturation 
temperature of impurities will 
reduce impurity buildup in the 
lines.  Dietrich and Zinn, "Solid 
Fuel Reactors", Addison Wesley 
Publishers, Reading, MA, 1958, 
page 84. 
94
Component 
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State
Failure 
Mode 
Frequency 
Category Possible Causes 
Preventive
Action on 
Possible Causes Consequences 
Corrective or 
Preventive Actions 
on Consequences 
ITER Postulated 
Initiating Events Comments Frequency 
Comment on 
frequency 
calculation Design comments 
    improper 
reading 
Category III calibration error, 
drift, impurity 
buildup on 
instrument  
Periodic
recalibration 
Reading high or low 
will affect volume flow 
in the TBM 
Could result in 
temperature transient 
in the Pb-17Li.   
Not an IE   1.4Eí06/h INEL-
96/0295 
Instrument recalibration is an ORE 
concern, remote instruments would  
reduce personnel exposure. 
    external leak Category IV instrument tap 
crack,
instrument line 
crack, weld 
crack
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, 
system 
operability 
testing, reduce 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design 
An instrument line leak 
will either leak inert 
gas, depressurizing the 
drain tank, or leak the 
'heel' liquid from the 
drain tank.  A coolant 
leak of limited amount 
from the drain tank 
does not pose large 
concerns.  
No immediate 
actions needed, 
assume that a small 
leak can probably be 
tolerated until the 
end of the campaign, 
then shut down TBM 
to repair the leak. 
Not an IE Do not expect much Pb-
17Li to be in the drain 
tank during normal 
operation, and kept at 
below 8 MPa pressure.  
Leakage should be 
minor, not an IE. 
1Eí09/h, 
assuming <1 
m of tubing 
WSRC-TR-
93-262 
An important issue is release of 
activated gases, such as mercury 
and tritium. 
    external 
rupture 
< Cat IV instrument tap 
line material 
failure, weld 
failure, over-
pressure on 
instrument 
weld NDT, 
reduce flow-
induced
vibration in 
design 
Instrument line rupture 
leakage from the drain 
tank in normal 
operation is not high 
volume. 
Shut down pump, 
isolate inflow to 
pump, and open 
drain line as quickly 
as possible to limit 
release amount.  
ITER can continue to 
operate if TBM 
helium system is 
operating. 
Not an IE   3Eí11/h, 
assuming <1 
m of tubing 
WSRC-TR-
93-262 
PbLi drain tank 
inlet valve from 
mixing tank 
(normally closed) 
NO fail to open Category III command fault, 
human error, 
electronic noise 
periodic testing, 
QA on control 
system, operator 
procedures 
No operational 
consequences 
No actions to take 
during operations 
Not an IE 1Eí03/d EGG-SSRE-
8875 
One fill / refill operation per year, 
so one demand to open the valve 
spurious
operation 
Category III command fault, 
human error, 
electronic noise 
periodic testing, 
QA on control 
system, operator 
procedures 
Drains Pb-17Li from 
piping to drain tank 
ITER can continue to 
operate if helium 
cooling is operating 
LOCA, LMP1 5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
fail to close Category III command fault, 
human error, 
electronic noise 
periodic testing, 
QA on control 
system, operator 
procedures 
No consequences 
during normal plant 
operation 
No actions to take 
for this failure mode 
during ITER 
operation 
Not an IE 1Eí03/d EGG-SSRE-
8875 
One fill / refill operation per year, 
so one demand to close the valve.  
Failure to close would occur during 
ITER outage work so this is not an 
initiating event. 
plugging Category III impurity 
buildup, oxide 
buildup 
cold trap cleans 
the coolant 
No consequences 
during normal plant 
operation 
No actions to take 
for this failure mode 
during ITER 
operation 
Not an IE 5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Operational evolutions requiring 
the drain valve to open are during 
ITER outages, not during ITER 
TBM operating time.  This would 
be a latent fault, if the valve was 
needed during Pb-17Li loop 
operation, a plugged valve would 
be inoperable so the other inlet 
valve and the rupture disk would 
be relied on. 
internal 
leakage
Category III valve seat flaw 
or wear, valve 
disk flaw 
inspection, 
periodic testing, 
QA on 
construction 
Slow leak of Pb-17Li to 
the drain tank 
ITER can continue to 
operate if helium 
cooling is operating 
Not an IE Not an IE since Pb-17Li 
is not lost from the 
system, no leak into the 
Port Cell 
5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
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Action on 
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Comment on 
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internal 
rupture 
Category III valve disk 
failure
inspection, 
periodic testing, 
QA on 
construction 
Large leak of Pb-17Li 
to the drain tank 
ITER can continue to 
operate if helium 
cooling is operating 
Not an IE Not an IE since Pb-17Li 
is not lost from the 
system, no leak into the 
Port Cell 
5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
external
leakage
Category III valve stem 
packing flaw, 
valve body flaw 
inspection, 
periodic testing, 
QA on 
construction 
Slow leak of Pb-17Li to 
the port 
ITER can continue to 
operate if helium 
cooling is operating 
Small LOCA, 
LMP2
5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
external
rupture 
Category III valve steam 
packing failure, 
valve body 
failure
inspection, 
periodic testing, 
QA on 
construction 
Large leak of Pb-17Li 
to the port 
ITER can continue to 
operate if helium 
cooling is operating 
LOCA, LMP1 5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
PbLi drain tank 
headspace inert 
gas outlet valve 
(normally closed) 
NO fail to open Category III command fault, 
human error, 
electronic noise 
periodic testing, 
QA on control 
system, operator 
procedures 
No consequences 
during normal plant 
operation 
No actions to take 
for this failure mode 
during ITER 
operation 
Not an IE   1Eí03/d EGG-SSRE-
8875 
One fill / refill operation per 
maintenance outage, so 4 demands 
to open the valve per year.  The 
drain tank helium pressurizes the 
Pb-17Li before each campaign, 
then the helium pressure is taken 
down to 0.1 MPa until the next 
outage. 
    spurious 
operation 
Category III command fault, 
human error, 
electronic noise 
periodic testing, 
QA on control 
system, operator 
procedures 
No consequences 
during normal plant 
operation 
No actions to take 
for this failure mode 
during ITER 
operation 
Not an IE   5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Opening the headspace valve on 
the tank while the tank is merely 
under gas pressure will vent the gas 
in the tank.  The rupture disk at 
burst pressure of 3.5 MPa is not 
threatened at the 0.1 MPa 
backpressure loss.   
    fail to close Category III command fault, 
human error, 
electronic noise 
periodic testing, 
QA on control 
system, operator 
procedures 
No consequences 
during normal plant 
operation 
No actions to take 
for this failure mode 
during ITER 
operation 
Not an IE   1Eí03/d EGG-SSRE-
8875 
One fill / refill operation per 
maintenance outage, so 4 demands 
to close the valve per year.  Failure 
to close would occur during ITER 
outage work so this is not an 
initiating event. 
    plugging Category III impurity 
buildup, oxide 
buildup 
cold trap cleans 
the coolant 
No consequences 
during normal plant 
operation 
No actions to take 
for this failure mode 
during ITER 
operation 
Not an IE   5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Operational evolutions requiring 
the gas valve to open are just 
during ITER outages, not during 
ITER TBM operating time.   
    internal 
leakage
Category III valve seat flaw 
or wear, valve 
disk flaw 
inspection, 
periodic testing, 
QA on 
construction 
No consequences 
during normal plant 
operation 
No actions to take 
for this failure mode 
during ITER 
operation 
Not an IE   5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Helium inert gas is within the tank 
and this gas would leak out past the 
valve seat to the pressure control 
system.   
    internal 
rupture 
Category III valve disk 
failure
inspection, 
periodic testing, 
QA on 
construction 
No consequences 
during normal plant 
operation 
No actions to take 
for this failure mode 
during ITER 
operation 
Not an IE   5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Helium inert gas is within the tank 
and this gas would leak out through 
the faulted valve to the pressure 
control system.   
    external 
leakage
Category III valve stem 
packing flaw, 
valve body flaw 
inspection, 
periodic testing, 
QA on 
construction 
Leaks helium cover gas 
to the equatorial port 
Operators can isolate 
helium supply 
Not an IE A large amount of 
elevated temperature gas 
leaking into the port 
could be a personnel 
hazard, but no personnel 
should be in the area 
during ITER operation. 
5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Helium inert gas is within the tank 
and this gas would leak out past the 
valve seat.  With helium bled out, 
air will slowly enter the tank so the 
tank requires cleaning before next 
use.
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Action on 
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    external 
rupture 
Category III valve steam 
packing failure, 
valve body 
failure
inspection, 
periodic testing, 
QA on 
construction 
Leaks helium cover gas 
to the equatorial port 
Operators can isolate 
helium supply 
Not an IE A large amount of 
elevated temperature gas 
leaking into the port 
could be a personnel 
hazard, but no personnel 
should be in the area 
during ITER operation. 
5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Helium inert gas is within the tank 
and this gas would flow out the 
damaged valve.  With helium bled 
out, air will slowly enter the tank 
so the tank requires cleaning before 
next use. 
Low point Pb-
17Li fill/drain 
valve (normally 
closed)
NO fail to open Category III command fault, 
human error, 
electronic noise 
periodic testing, 
QA on control 
system, operator 
procedures 
No consequences 
during normal plant 
operation 
No actions to take 
for this failure mode 
during ITER 
operation 
Not an IE 1Eí03/d EGG-SSRE-
8875 
One fill / refill operation per 
maintenance outage, so 4 demands 
to open the valve per year.  The 
drain tank helium pressurizes the 
Pb-17Li before each campaign, 
then the helium pressure is taken 
down to 0.1 MPa until the next 
outage. 
spurious
operation 
Category III command fault, 
human error, 
electronic noise 
periodic testing, 
QA on control 
system, operator 
procedures 
No consequences 
during normal plant 
operation 
No actions to take 
for this failure mode 
during ITER 
operation 
Not an IE 5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
fail to close Category III command fault, 
human error, 
electronic noise 
periodic testing, 
QA on control 
system, operator 
procedures 
No consequences 
during normal plant 
operation 
No actions to take 
for this failure mode 
during ITER 
operation 
Not an IE 1Eí03/d EGG-SSRE-
8875 
One fill / refill operation per 
maintenance outage, so 4 demands 
to close the valve per year.  Failure 
to close would occur during ITER 
outage work so this is not an 
initiating event. 
plugging Category III impurity 
buildup, oxide 
buildup 
cold trap cleans 
the coolant 
No consequences 
during normal plant 
operation 
No actions to take 
for this failure mode 
during ITER 
operation 
Not an IE 5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Assume that operational evolutions 
requiring the drain valve to open 
are during ITER outages, not 
during ITER TBM operating time.  
internal 
leakage
Category III valve seat flaw 
or wear, valve 
disk flaw 
inspection, 
periodic testing, 
QA on 
construction 
No consequences 
during normal plant 
operation 
No actions to take 
for this failure mode 
during ITER 
operation 
Not an IE 5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Helium gas is within the tank and 
this gas would leak out past the 
valve seat. 
internal 
rupture 
Category III valve disk 
failure
inspection, 
periodic testing, 
QA on 
construction 
No consequences 
during normal plant 
operation 
No actions to take 
for this failure mode 
during ITER 
operation 
Not an IE 5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Helium gas in the tank would flow 
out the damaged valve 
external
leakage
Category III valve stem 
packing flaw, 
valve body flaw 
inspection, 
periodic testing, 
QA on 
construction 
Leaks helium cover gas 
to the equatorial port 
Operators can isolate 
helium supply 
Not an IE 5Eí07/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Helium inert gas is within the tank 
and this gas would leak out past the 
valve seat.  With helium bled out, 
air will slowly enter the tank so the 
tank requires cleaning before next 
use.
external
rupture 
Category III valve stem 
packing failure, 
valve body 
failure
inspection, 
periodic testing, 
QA on 
construction 
Leaks helium cover gas 
to the equatorial port 
Operators can isolate 
helium supply 
Not an IE 5Eí08/h EGG-SSRE-
8875 
Helium inert gas is within the tank 
and this gas would flow out the 
damaged valve.  With helium bled 
out, air will slowly enter the tank 
so the tank requires cleaning before 
next use. 
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Possible Causes Consequences 
Corrective or 
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PbLi drain tank 
heaters
NO fail to 
operate 
Category III electrical fault, 
control fault, 
human error, 
power loss 
periodic testing, 
QA on control 
system, operator 
procedures 
Cannot maintain liquid 
temperature or melt the 
Pb-17Li in the tank 
No actions to take 
for this failure mode 
during ITER 
operation 
Not an IE Surface heaters (versus 
immersion heaters) were 
chosen for easier 
maintenance. 
5.6Eí07/h IAEA 
TECDOC
478, page 139 
Normally, the helium coolant and 
pipework electrical heat tracing can 
be used to warm the Pb-17Li, but 
in the drain tank the Pb-17Li is 
separated from the helium flow 
loop.  Cannot start up the tritium 
breeding portion of the TBM if the 
Pb-17Li cannot be melted and 
driven from the tank by pressurized 
helium.  The TRITEX Pb-17Li 
loop kept its drain tank at elevated 
temperature to avoid thermal shock 
to the tank if the tank was needed 
in an emergency dump situation. 
    spurious 
operation 
Category III control fault, 
human error 
QA on control 
system, operator 
procedures 
Heat tank with or 
without Pb-17Li 
present.  If helium gas 
overheats, it increases 
tank pressure  
Operator intervene to 
depower heaters, 
repair heaters before 
next ITER outage. 
Not an IE The spurious operation 
failure mode has been 
equated to runaway 
operation.  
§ 1Eí06/h analyst 
judgment 
The maximum runaway tank 
temperature (per IEEE Std-515-
1997) from the heater spurious 
operation has not been set by the 
designers at this time.  Assume 
heaters can reach a maximum of 
470 C.  At that temperature, the 
trapped § 56 g of helium in the 0.6 
m3 tank will only reach 1.4 MPa, 
so the rupture disk should not 
actuate with that backpressure.  
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Appendix B 
Preliminary Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
for the Helium Flow Loop 
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Operational
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Failure 
Mode 
Frequency 
Category Possible Causes 
Preventive
Action on 
Possible Causes Consequences 
Corrective or 
Preventive Actions 
on Consequences 
ITER
Postulated 
Initiating
Events Comments Frequency 
Comment on 
frequency 
calculation Design comments 
Pressure 
instrument after 
the TBM module 
box, total of two 
units in the loop 
NO fails to 
operate 
Category 
III 
calibration error, 
power loss, drift 
periodic 
recalibration, 
redundant power 
and redundant 
sensors  
No immediate 
consequences from a 
failed sensor.  
Operator must verify 
proper functioning of 
the helium cooling 
system. 
Verify helium 
pressure is adequate 
with other pressure 
sensors.   
Not an IE, 
N/S
1Eí06/h INEL-96/0295 Designers should consider sensor 
redundancy in the design, since 
replacing failed sensors will be a 
difficult task.  If penetrations for 
sensors are robust (i.e., sensor 'tree') 
and common causes of failure are 
controlled, then redundancy will allow 
use of voting logic to filter out 
spurious noise signals and allow 
continued TBM operation with a 
sensor failure.    
spurious
alarm 
Category 
III 
electronic noise 
from EM or 
ionizing 
radiation, 
pressure pulsation 
from pressure 
control system, 
drift 
periodic 
recalibration, 
selection of 
setpoints, 
redundant sensor 
voting logic, 
sensor shielding 
from noise 
Operator must verify 
proper functioning of 
the helium cooling 
system 
Verify helium 
pressure is adequate 
with other pressure 
sensors.   
Not an IE, 
N/S
5Eí06/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Sensor voting logic or output 
comparisons will reduce the number of 
false alarms  
improper 
reading 
Category 
III 
calibration error, 
drift, instrument 
damage, foreign 
material 
accumulation  
Periodic
recalibration, 
testing, gas 
purification 
No immediate 
consequences from an 
improper reading.  
Operator must verify 
proper functioning of 
the helium cooling 
system. 
No immediate actions 
needed, run to next 
shutdown period if 
other gas sensors can 
provide adequate 
information to 
operate the TBM 
safely.
Not an IE, 
N/S
Recalibration activity could 
result in a significant 
personnel radiation 
exposure 
1Eí06/h INEL-96/0295 Use sensors that can be remotely 
recalibrated whenever possible to 
reduce personnel exposure 
external
leakage
Category 
IV
instrument pipe 
tap crack, 
instrument line 
crack, weld crack 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
acoustic vibration 
in design 
Leaks helium to the 
30 C air atmosphere 
in the equatorial test 
port.   
Isolate leak if 
possible, shut down 
TBM to repair the 
leak.
Small 
Helium 
LOCA,
LBO2
1Eí09/h, 
assuming 
<1 m of 
tubing 
WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Instrument leaks should be very low 
flow rates, such as through cracks, 
assume <<1% of the coolant flow rate, 
i.e., cc's per minute.  An important 
issue is potential release of any tritium 
gas that migrated into the helium 
coolant. 
external
rupture 
< Cat IV instrument tap 
material failure, 
instrument line 
material failure, 
weld failure 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
acoustic vibration 
in design 
Leaks moderate to 
large amount of 
helium to the 
equatorial test port 
Isolate the leak if 
possible, flood with 
helium to keep air out 
of the system.  ITER 
must shut down to 
prevent TBM box 
damage. 
Helium 
LOCA,
LBO1
Increasing the Pb-17Li 
cooling will not be 
adequate to remove all the 
heat from the TBM box. 
3Eí11/h, 
assuming 
<1 m of 
tubing 
WSRC-TR-
93-262 
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Temperature 
instrument after 
the TBM module 
box, a total of 3 
units in the flow 
loop 
NO fails to 
operate 
Category 
III 
drift, calibration 
error
Periodic
recalibration 
No immediate 
consequences from a 
failed sensor.  
Operator must verify 
proper functioning of 
the helium cooling 
system. 
No immediate actions 
needed, run to next 
shutdown period if 
other sensors can 
provide adequate 
information to 
operate the TBM 
safely.
Not an IE, 
N/S
Assume that either a 
platinum thermocouple or 
RTD will be used for this 
380 to 440 C operating 
temperature range.  Sensor 
maintenance is an ORE 
concern. 
2.2Eí06/h INEL-96/0295 Several authors noted that redundant 
instrumentation was very useful for 
flow loop operations. 
    improper 
reading 
Category II calibration error, 
drift, impurity 
plateout 
Periodic
recalibration 
No immediate 
consequences from an 
improper reading.  
Operator must verify 
proper functioning of 
the helium cooling 
system. 
No immediate actions 
needed, run to next 
shutdown period if 
other sensors can 
provide adequate 
information to 
operate the TBM 
safely.
Not an IE, 
N/S
  1.7Eí05/h INEL-96/0295   
    spurious 
alarm 
Category II electronic noise 
from EM or 
ionizing 
radiation, 
pressure pulsation 
from pressure 
control system, 
drift 
periodic 
recalibration, 
selection of 
setpoints, 
redundant sensor 
voting logic, 
sensor shielding 
from noise 
Operator must verify 
proper functioning of 
the helium cooling 
system 
Verify helium 
pressure is adequate 
with other pressure 
sensors.   
Not an IE, 
N/S
  5Eí06/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Sensor voting logic or output 
comparisons will reduce the number of 
false alarms  
    external 
leakage
Category 
IV
instrument tap 
line crack, 
instrument line 
crack, weld crack 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design, NDT 
Leaks helium  to the 
30 C air atmosphere 
in the equatorial test 
port.  
Isolate leak if 
possible.  Inject more 
helium to give time 
for a benign ITER 
shutdown.  Shut 
down ITER and then 
the helium circulator.  
Repair the leak. 
Small 
Helium 
LOCA,
LBO2
Little tritium gas is 
expected to be present in 
the helium.  Hot helium gas 
at 340 C or higher and 8 
MPa would also pose a 
personnel safety concern. 
1Eí09/h, 
assuming 
<1 m of 
tubing 
WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Instrument leaks should be very low 
flow rates, such as through cracks, 
assume §  1% of the coolant flow rate, 
i.e., cc's per minute.  An important 
issue is potential release of any tritium 
gas that migrated into the helium 
coolant. 
    external 
rupture 
< Cat IV instrument tap 
line material 
failure, weld 
failure
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design, NDT 
Leaks moderate to 
large amount of 
helium to the 
equatorial test port 
Shut down ITER 
quickly.  Then 
shutdown the helium 
circulator to reduce 
pressure and reduce 
helium loss. 
Helium 
LOCA,
LBO1
Little tritium gas is 
expected to be present in 
the helium.  Hot helium gas 
at 340 C or higher and 8 
MPa would also pose a 
personnel safety concern. 
3Eí11/h, 
assuming 
<1 m of 
tubing 
WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Safety relief 
valve to pressure 
control system 
storage tanks, a 
total of two units 
in the helium 
loop 
NO internal 
leakage
Category II valve seat seal 
deterioration, 
spring tension 
relaxation 
Routine 
inspection of 
seals and springs 
Leaks small amount 
of helium to the 
pressure control 
system storage tanks 
Verify helium 
pressure is adequate 
with makeup from the 
pressure control 
system 
Not an  IE The helium system has 
reserve tanks to make up 
small loses of helium and 
continue to operate the 
TBM.  Assume that this 
leak, which is captured in 
the pressure control system 
storage tanks, can be made 
up.  This event is not a 
small LOCA. 
1Eí05/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
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internal 
rupture 
Category 
III 
valve disk failure, 
valve shaft failure 
Routine 
inspection of 
valve disk and 
shaft
Leaks large amount of 
helium to the pressure 
control system storage 
tanks, large 
depressurization event 
Helium makeup from 
pressure control 
system to keep TBM 
heat transfer high 
during ITER 
shutdown 
Helium 
LOCA,
LBO1
Helium is not lost from the 
pipework.  Helium pressure 
in the cooling loop will 
fluctuate, but should 
stabilize at a new lower 
level. 
5Eí07/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Prudent operations will call for a TBM 
shutdown and consequently an ITER 
shutdown. 
external
leakage
Category 
III 
valve body crack, 
attachment weld 
leak
Routine 
inspection of 
valve body and 
welds
Leaks small amount 
of helium to the room, 
may release some 
tritium and other 
gases
Depressurize helium 
loop to reduce hot gas 
leakage
Small 
Helium 
LOCA,
LBO2
1Eí07/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
The PCS controls to 8 plus or minus 
0.3 MPa.  Below 7.7 MPa the system 
response is not clear.  Assume below 
that pressure the helium does not 
remove adequate heat from the TBM. 
external
rupture 
Category 
IV
valve body 
failure, 
attachment weld 
failure
Routine 
inspection of 
valve body and 
welds
Leaks large amount of 
helium to the room, 
may release some 
tritium and other 
gases
Quickly depressurize 
helium loop to reduce 
hot gas leakage 
Helium 
LOCA,
LBO1
5Eí09/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
The effects of a large release of > 300 
C helium gas into the port cell have 
not been evaluated. 
spurious or 
premature 
opening 
Category II spring fracture, 
improper spring 
setting 
Routine 
inspection of 
springs 
Leaks large amount of 
helium to the pressure 
control system storage 
tanks 
Assume the helium 
system cannot 
continue to remove 
heat from the TBM 
unless operator 
intervention occurs to 
isolate the PCS tanks.  
Helium 
LOCA,
LBO1
Helium is not lost from the 
pipework.  Helium pressure 
will fluctuate, but should 
stabilize at a new lower 
level.  Helium may not be 
able to adequately remove 
heat from the TBM module 
after a let down to the 
storage tank. 
1Eí05/h GA-A14839 
System piping NO external 
leakage
Category 
III 
weld fault, pipe 
wall flaw, pipe 
vibration induced 
crack,
construction fault 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration, NDT 
Leaks small amount 
of helium to room, 
slowly depletes 
makeup helium, may 
release some tritium 
and other gases to 
room 
Isolate leak if 
possible, depressurize 
system, shut down 
ITER
Small 
Helium 
LOCA,
LBP2
About 10% of piping is in 
the Port Cell (LBP2) and 
90% of the piping is either 
in the pipe chase (that 
empties into the TWCS 
room) or the TWCS room 
(LBO2). 
9.8Eí08/h-
m
WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Assumed 195 m piping in the flow 
loop.  10% is §  20 m  
    external 
leakage
Category II weld fault, pipe 
wall flaw, pipe 
vibration induced 
crack,
construction fault 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration, NDT 
Leaks small amount 
of helium to room, 
slowly depletes 
makeup helium, may 
release some tritium 
and other gases to 
room 
Isolate leak if 
possible, depressurize 
system, shut down 
ITER
Small 
Helium 
LOCA,
LBO2
About 10% of piping is in 
the Port Cell (LBP2) and 
90% of the piping is either 
in the pipe chase (that 
empties into the TWCS 
room) or the TWCS room 
(LBO2). 
9.8Eí08/h-
m
WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Assumed 195 m piping in the flow 
loop.  90% is §  180 m 
    external 
rupture 
Category 
III 
weld fracture, 
piping failure, 
flow induced 
vibration 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration, NDT 
Leaks large amount of 
helium to the room 
Isolate leak if 
possible, depressurize 
system, shut down 
ITER
Helium 
LOCA,
LBP1
About 10% of piping is in 
the Port Cell (LBP1) and 
90% of the piping is either 
in the pipe chase (that 
empties into the TWCS 
room) or the TWCS room 
(LBO1). 
3.3Eí09/h-
m
WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Assumed 195 m piping in the flow 
loop.  10% is §  20 m  
    external 
rupture 
Category 
III 
weld fracture, 
piping failure, 
flow induced 
vibration 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration, NDT 
Leaks large amount of 
helium to the room 
Isolate leak if 
possible, depressurize 
system, shut down 
ITER
Helium 
LOCA,
LBO1
About 10% of piping is in 
the Port Cell (LBP1) and 
90% of the piping is either 
in the pipe chase (that 
empties into the TWCS 
room) or the TWCS room 
(LBO1). 
3.3Eí09/h-
m
WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Assumed 195 m piping in the flow 
loop.  90% is §  180 m 
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Pressure Control 
System 
NO external
leakage
Category 
III 
weld fault, pipe 
wall flaw, pipe 
vibration induced 
crack,
construction fault 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration, NDT 
Leaks small amount 
of helium to room, 
slowly depletes 
makeup helium, may 
release some tritium 
and other gases to 
room 
Isolate and 
depressurize the PCS 
if possible to reduce 
gas leakage.  Shut 
down the TBM, shut 
down ITER pulsing. 
Small 
Helium 
LOCA,
LBO2
This system has several 
tanks and valves but is not 
sufficiently designed to 
model individual 
components at this time. 
9.8Eí08/h-
m
WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Assumed 20 m piping in the PCS in 
the TCWS room as an initial estimate.  
Overestimate to account for valves, 
tanks, etc., that are not designed at 
present. 
external
rupture 
Category 
III 
weld fracture, 
piping failure, 
flow induced 
vibration 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration, NDT 
Leaks large amount of 
helium to the room 
Isolate and 
depressurize the PCS 
if possible to reduce 
gas leakage.  Shut 
down the TBM, shut 
down ITER pulsing. 
Helium 
LOCA,
LBO1
3.3Eí09/h-
m
WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Assumed 20 m piping in the PCS as an 
initial estimate 
plugs Category 
III 
foreign material 
buildup, oil from 
compressors, dust 
in system 
Routine 
inspection and 
testing 
Fails to maintain 
helium pressure at 8 
MPa in the helium 
loop, lose adequate 
cooling of TBM  
  Shut down the 
TBM, shut down 
ITER pulsing. 
Loss of Heat 
Sink, HB1 
3Eí09/h-m WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Assumed 20 m piping in the PCS as an 
initial estimate 
fail to 
operate 
Category II Bad control 
signals, loss of 
helium supply, 
loss of power 
Routine 
inspection and 
testing 
Fails to maintain 
helium pressure at 8 
MPa in the helium 
loop, lose adequate 
cooling of TBM  
Shut down the TBM, 
shut down ITER 
pulsing. 
Loss of Heat 
Sink, HB1 
If PCS fails before ITER 
startup, then suspend ITER 
operations until it can be 
repaired.  If the PCS fails 
during ITER operation, shut 
down ITER. 
1Eí02/yr NUREG/CR-
6928, ch 8 
Inferred failure rate from PWR Total 
Loss of Instrument Air System failure 
rate in NUREG, chapter 8. 
Flowmeter, 2 
units—one is 
ahead of 
electrical heater 
and the other is 
ahead of helium-
to-water heat 
exchanger 
NO fail to 
operate 
Category II fouling, short 
circuit, noise 
Routine 
inspection and 
testing 
Fail to indicate flow 
in helium loop 
No immediate actions 
needed 
Not an IE, 
N/S
Operators can infer flow 
rate from circulator speed 
and helium properties. 
3Eí06/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Consider adding a redundant flow 
sensor in the flow loop.  Fouling 
should be rare in a helium system.  
Foreign materials could be weld beads, 
weld slag, SiC dust, dirt or debris from 
construction  
    spurious 
alarm 
Category II electronic noise 
from EM or 
ionizing 
radiation, drift 
periodic 
recalibration, 
selection of 
setpoints, 
redundant sensor 
voting logic, 
sensor shielding 
from noise 
Operator must verify 
proper functioning of 
the helium cooling 
system 
Verify helium flow is 
adequate with other 
flow sensors or other 
means, e.g., heat 
balance on system.   
Not an IE, 
N/S
Operators can infer flow 
rate from circulator speed 
and helium properties. 
5Eí06/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Sensor voting logic or output 
comparisons will reduce the number of 
false alarms but will increase 
maintenance costs 
    improper 
reading 
Category 
III 
calibration error, 
drift, meter 
damage, partial 
fouling  
Periodic
recalibration, 
routine inspection 
and testing 
Loss of proper 
reading regarding gas 
flow may mean that 
there is insufficient 
cooling of the TBM.   
No immediate actions 
needed, run to next 
shutdown period if 
other gas sensors can 
provide adequate 
information to 
operate the TBM 
safely.
Not an IE, 
N/S
Recalibration activity could 
result in a significant 
personnel radiation 
exposure 
1Eí06/h INEL-96/0295 Use sensors that can be remotely 
recalibrated whenever possible to 
reduce personnel exposure 
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    external 
leakage
Category 
IV
instrument pipe 
tap crack, 
instrument line 
crack, weld crack 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design 
Leaks hot helium to 
the 30 C air 
atmosphere in the 
equatorial test port, 
lose helium pressure 
and TBM cooling is 
inadequate.   
Isolate leak if 
possible, assume that 
TBM cannot be 
adequately cooled, 
shut down TIER and 
shut down TBM to 
repair the leak. 
Small 
Helium 
LOCA,
LBO2
Helium makeup capabilities 
are not known at this time, 
assume leak cannot be 
adequately made up in short 
time frame and it is a small 
LOCA
1Eí09/h, 
assuming 
<1 m of 
tubing 
WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Instrument leaks should be very low 
flow rates, such as through cracks, 
assume 1% of the coolant flow rate, 
i.e., cc's per minute.  An important 
issue is potential release of any tritium 
gas that migrated into the helium 
coolant.  Tritium concentration should 
be small. 
    external 
rupture 
< Cat IV instrument tap 
material failure, 
instrument line 
material failure, 
weld failure 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design 
Leaks moderate to 
large amount of 
helium to the 
equatorial test port, 
TBM cooling is 
inadequate 
Isolate and 
depressurize the 
system if possible to 
reduce gas leakage.  
Shut down the TBM, 
shut down ITER 
pulsing. 
Helium 
LOCA,
LBO1
Helium makeup capabilities 
are not known at this time, 
assume that the large leak 
cannot be made up and it is 
a LOCA 
3Eí11/h, 
assuming 
<1 m of 
tubing 
WSRC-TR-
93-262 
A helium break size to leak rate 
correlation was not available, but it is 
believed to be less sensitive than 
water.   
Control valve to 
the operating heat 
exchanger 
NO fails open Category II control element 
seized, valve disk 
stuck, control 
fault 
Routine testing 
and inspection 
Overheat TBM due to 
low coolant pressure 
Shut down ITER and 
TBM
Loss of Heat 
Sink, HB1 
This is a depressurization 
accident
3Eí06/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
fails closed Category II control fault, 
valve controller 
failure
Routine testing 
and inspection 
Overheat TBM due to 
loss of flow 
Shut down ITER and 
TBM
Helium 
LOFA, FB1 
3Eí06/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Some flow control valves have a stop 
block built in so that some flow can 
occur with the valve fully closed, if the 
helium design could operate in this 
way it would mitigate effects of this 
LOF event 
fails to 
respond 
Category II controller fault, 
loss of power 
Routine testing 
and inspection 
Slow overheat of 
TBM due to 
decreasing coolant 
pressure 
Helium makeup 
system should 
respond to keep 
helium pressure up, 
so no immediate 
actions needed. 
Not an IE Helium makeup system 
should maintain helium 
pressure despite valve fault, 
repair valve during the next 
evening outage 
3Eí06/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
plugs Category 
III 
foreign material 
intrusion 
Coolant 
purification to 
remove 
impurities 
Overheat TBM due to 
loss of flow 
Shut down ITER and 
TBM
Helium 
LOFA, FB1 
5Eí07/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
external
leakage
Category 
III 
weld fault, valve 
wall flaw, 
vibration induced 
crack,
construction fault 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design 
Leaks hot helium to 
the 30 C air 
atmosphere in the 
equatorial test port.   
Assume that a small 
leak cannot be 
tolerated until the end 
of the campaign, shut 
down ITER and TBM 
to repair the leak. 
Small 
Helium 
LOCA,
LBO2
Helium makeup capabilities 
are not known at this time, 
assume leak cannot be 
made up and it is a small 
LOCA
1Eí07/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
external
rupture 
Category 
IV
weld fracture, 
valve wall failure, 
flow induced 
vibration 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design 
Leaks moderate to 
large amount of 
helium to the 
equatorial test port 
Isolate and 
depressurize the 
system if possible to 
reduce gas leakage.  
Shut down the TBM, 
shut down ITER 
pulsing. 
Helium 
LOCA,
LBO1
Helium makeup capabilities 
are not known at this time, 
assume that the large leak 
cannot be made up and it is 
a LOCA 
5Eí09/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
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Helium-to-water 
heat exchanger 
NO fouling heat 
transfer 
surfaces
Category II foreign material 
intrusion, 
chemical 
reactions, poor 
water quality 
control 
Keep water 
cleanliness high, 
do not allow 
water to boil in 
HX
Fouling degrades heat 
transfer from helium 
to water 
Shut down TBM and 
shut down ITER 
Loss of Heat 
Sink, HB1 
  1Eí05/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
    plugging 
tubes 
Category II foreign material 
accumulation in 
helium system 
design for low 
tube bundle 
vibration 
Plugged tubes will 
degrade heat transfer 
from helium to water 
Shut down TBM and 
shut down ITER 
Loss of Heat 
Sink, HB1 
Assume helium in the tubes 
is cleaner than other heat 
transfer applications, so 
reduce failure rate by a 
half-order of magnitude for 
this event (from 3Eí06 to 
1Eí06/h). 
1Eí06/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
    leakage 
from tubes 
Category II Tube degradation 
by vibration, 
thermal cycling, 
fluid jetting on 
tubes 
design for low 
tube bundle 
vibration 
Lose small amount of 
helium into HX shell, 
lose TBM cooling as 
helium pressure 
decreases 
Shut down TBM and 
shut down ITER 
helium HX 
tube rupture, 
LBO3
  1Eí05/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
    tube rupture Category 
III 
material flaw, 
thermal 
overstress, 
burnout 
design for low 
tube bundle 
vibration 
Lose moderate to 
large amount of 
helium into HX shell, 
lose TBM cooling as 
helium pressure 
decreases 
Shut down TBM and 
shut down ITER 
helium HX 
tube rupture, 
LBO3
  5Eí07/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
A single HX tube might be perhaps 12 
mm diameter or greater, but even that 
small double-ended opening can 
depressurize the helium loop.  Assume 
that the helium loop will be 
depressurized by a tube rupture. 
    leakage 
from shell 
Category 
III 
faulty weld, wall 
crack
Routine 
inspection  
Small leak should not 
degrade heat transfer 
from helium to the 
water
Shut down TBM and 
shut down ITER 
Not an IE Small leakage should not 
affect operations if the 
water can be made up 
1Eí06/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
    shell rupture Category 
III 
weld failure, 
severe wall crack 
Routine 
inspection 
Loss of heat sink 
accident
Shut down TBM and 
shut down ITER 
Loss of Heat 
Sink, HB1 
  5Eí08/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Secondary 
cooling water 
system 
NO fails to 
operate 
Category 
III 
many reasons, 
loca, power loss, 
human error 
Routine testing 
and inspection 
Overheat of TBM if 
helium is not cooled 
in the HX, loss of heat 
sink 
Shut down TBM and 
shut down ITER 
Loss of Heat 
Sink, HB1 
Water system fails to 
provide cooling to HX 
1.2Eí03/yr NUREG/CR-
6928, ch 8 
As a first approximation, use partial 
failure of PWR component cooling 
water system as the failure rate for this 
heat exchanger secondary system 
Flow control 
valve to gas 
heater, normally 
closed during 
plasma operation 
NO fails open or 
spurious
open 
Category II control fault, 
valve controller 
failure
Routine testing 
and inspection 
Overheat TBM due to 
partial loss of heat 
sink 
Shut down ITER and 
TBM
Loss of Heat 
Sink, HB1 
There is no quick repair 
intervention for this event. 
3Eí06/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
This flow control valve should remain 
closed during Normal Operation since 
the heater is not needed during normal 
ops.   Opening means helium will 
bypass the heat exchanger in a partial 
loss of heat sink. 
    plugs Category 
III 
foreign material 
intrusion 
Coolant 
purification 
No immediate effects No actions to take 
until shutdown 
Not an IE   5Eí07/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
    internal 
leakage
Category II Valve seat wear, 
valve disk fault 
Routine test and 
inspection 
Small flow of helium 
bypasses the TBM, 
overheat the TBM 
Attempt to reseat 
valve fully closed.  If 
unsuccessful, shut 
down ITER 
Loss of Heat 
Sink, HB1 
  1Eí05/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
    internal 
rupture 
Category 
III 
Valve disk failure Routine test and 
inspection 
Large flow of helium 
bypasses the TBM, 
overheats the TBM 
Shut down ITER Loss of Heat 
Sink, HB1 
  5Eí07/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
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    external 
leakage
Category 
III 
weld fault, valve 
wall flaw, 
vibration induced 
crack,
construction fault 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design 
Leaks hot helium to 
the 30 C air 
atmosphere in the 
equatorial test port.  
Assume that a small 
leak cannot be 
tolerated until the end 
of the campaign, shut 
down ITER and TBM 
to repair the leak. 
Small 
Helium 
LOCA,
LBO2
Helium makeup capabilities 
are not known at this time, 
assume leak cannot be 
made up and it is a small 
LOCA
1Eí07/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
    external 
rupture 
Category 
IV
weld fracture, 
valve wall failure, 
flow induced 
vibration 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design 
Leaks moderate to 
large amount of 
helium to the 
equatorial test port 
Isolate the leak if 
possible, shut down 
ITER and TBM to 
repair the leak.  
Helium 
LOCA,
LBO1
Helium makeup capabilities 
are not known at this time, 
assume that the large leak 
cannot be made up and it is 
a LOCA 
5Eí09/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Gas heater, 
normally inlet 
isolated and de-
energized during 
plasma operation 
NO spurious
actuation 
Category 
III 
command fault, 
human error 
Monitoring 
status, and 
procedures 
Adds heat to helium 
gas downstream of 
HX, same as a loss of 
heat sink event 
Depower heater if 
possible 
Loss of Heat 
Sink, HB1 
For this failure, assume at 
present it is equal to circuit 
breaker spurious closure 
3Eí07/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Heater can add 170 kW to the helium 
gas, which will begin to flow from the 
heater tank exit line.  With the control 
valve remaining in the closed position 
(as it should be), the tank will begin to 
overheat as the heated helium leaves 
the tank.  Good monitoring of the 
system components is needed to bring 
this fault to the attention of operators. 
fails to heat Category 
III 
power loss, 
command fault, 
human error 
Monitoring 
status, and 
procedures 
Not a failure mode 
during NO 
No actions to take. Not an IE 1Eí06/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
This failure mode is only an issue 
during startup operations, not normal 
plasma operations 
overheating Category 
III 
controller fault, 
command fault 
Routine testing 
and inspection 
Not a failure mode 
during NO 
No actions to take. Not an IE 3Eí07/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
This failure mode is only an issue 
during startup operations, not normal 
plasma operations 
external
leakage
Category 
III 
weld fault, wall 
flaw, vibration 
induced crack, 
thermal stress, 
construction fault 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design, NDT 
Leaks hot helium to 
the 30 C air 
atmosphere in the 
equatorial test port.  
Assume that a small 
leak cannot be 
tolerated until the end 
of the campaign, shut 
down ITER and TBM 
to repair the leak. 
Small 
Helium 
LOCA,
LBO2
This tank is stagnant during 
Normal Operation, but a 
breach will decrease tank 
pressure and then helium 
loop pressure. 
1Eí07/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
external
rupture 
Category 
IV
weld fracture, 
wall failure, flow 
induced
vibration, thermal 
stresses
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design, NDT 
Leaks moderate to 
large amount of 
helium to the 
equatorial test port 
Isolate the leak if 
possible, shut down 
ITER and TBM to 
repair the leak.  
Helium 
LOCA,
LBO1
5Eí09/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Gas circulator NO fail to start Category II command fault, 
human error, 
bearing or shaft 
seized, shaft 
shear, power loss 
periodic system 
testing, software 
QA
No helium flow to 
startup TBM, cannot 
start up ITER 
Continue the ITER 
shutdown to repair 
gas circulator 
Not an IE   5Eí03/d WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Circulator must start before ITER can 
operate.  Assume 4 starts per year, at 
the beginning of each campaign. 
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    shaft seizure Category 
III 
Bearing fault, 
loss of lubrication 
Routine testing 
and inspection, 
system testing 
Loss of helium flow 
during ITER 
operation 
Shut down ITER and 
TBM
Loss of 
helium flow, 
FB1
  5.6Eí08/h analyst 
judgment 
Shaft seizure is a rare event, assume 
1% of the circulator failure to operate 
(that is, the failure to run) failure 
mode.  Note that FMD-97 report gives 
bearing failure as 0.2% of a pump "all 
modes" failure rate, so this assumption 
is reasonable. 
    overspeed Category II command fault periodic system 
testing, software 
QA
Overcooling the TBM 
by high flow rate 
helium gas 
Shut down ITER and 
TBM
Not an IE This is not a safety event 
unless the overcooling is 
severe and leads to TBM 
warping.  Circulator should 
have an overspeed trip at 
105 or 110% of nominal 
rpm, which does not allow 
severe overcooling. 
1Eí05/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
    fail to 
operate 
Category I command fault, 
human error, 
shaft seizure, 
shaft shear 
periodic system 
testing, software 
QA
Loss of helium flow 
during ITER 
operation 
Shut down ITER and 
TBM
Loss of 
helium flow, 
FB1
  5.6Eí06/h analyst 
judgment 
Used data from CO2 gas circulator 
experiences 
    fail to stop Category II command fault, 
human error, 
breaker fault 
periodic system 
testing, software 
QA
Cannot shut down 
helium circulation at 
the end of cool down 
period 
No immediate actions 
needed, cut off power 
upstream to shut 
down the circulator 
Not an IE   5Eí03/d WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Consider 4 demands to stop the gas 
circulator each year. 
    external 
leakage
Category 
III 
casing crack, 
weld failure, shaft 
seal fault 
Specify high 
quality parts, 
regular inspection 
Small loss of helium 
coolant 
Shut down ITER and 
TBM
Small 
helium 
LOCA,
LBO2
  3Eí07/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
  NO external 
rupture 
Category 
IV
impeller failure 
pieces tear 
casing, casing 
crack, shaft seal 
blowout 
Specify high 
quality parts, 
regular inspection 
Large loss of helium 
coolant 
Shut down ITER and 
TBM
Large 
helium 
LOCA,
LBO1
  1Eí08/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Control valve, 
outlet from the 
helium 
purification 
system 
NO fails open Category II command fault, 
control fault, 
valve disk stuck 
Routine testing 
and inspection 
Overheat TBM due to 
low coolant pressure 
Shut down ITER and 
TBM
Loss of Heat 
Sink, HB1 
This is a depressurization 
accident
3Eí06/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
fails closed Category II control fault, 
valve controller 
failure
Routine testing 
and inspection 
No helium 
purification 
Can continue to 
operate TBM for a 
while without helium 
cleanup
Not an IE 3Eí06/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Some flow control valves have a stop 
block built in so that some flow can 
occur with the valve fully closed, if the 
helium design could operate in this 
way it would mitigate effects of this 
LOF event 
fails to 
respond 
Category II controller fault, 
loss of power 
Routine testing 
and inspection 
No helium 
purification, and 
pressure fluctuations 
Helium pressure 
system should 
respond to keep 
helium pressure up, 
so no immediate 
actions needed. 
Not an IE Helium makeup system 
should maintain helium 
pressure despite valve fault, 
repair valve during the next 
evening outage 
3Eí06/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
plugs Category 
III 
foreign material 
intrusion 
Coolant 
purification 
No helium 
purification 
Can continue to 
operate TBM for a 
while without helium 
cleanup
Not an IE 5Eí07/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
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Operational
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Failure 
Mode 
Frequency 
Category Possible Causes 
Preventive
Action on 
Possible Causes Consequences 
Corrective or 
Preventive Actions 
on Consequences 
ITER
Postulated 
Initiating
Events Comments Frequency 
Comment on 
frequency 
calculation Design comments 
external
leakage
Category 
III 
weld fault, valve 
wall flaw, 
vibration induced 
crack,
construction fault 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design 
Leaks hot helium to 
the 30 C air 
atmosphere in the 
equatorial test port.   
Assume that a small 
leak cannot be 
tolerated until the end 
of the campaign, shut 
down ITER and TBM 
to repair the leak. 
Small 
Helium 
LOCA,
LBO2
Helium makeup capabilities 
are not known at this time, 
assume leak cannot be 
made up and it is a small 
LOCA
1Eí07/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
external
rupture 
Category 
IV
weld fracture, 
valve wall failure, 
flow induced 
vibration 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design 
Leaks moderate to 
large amount of 
helium to the 
equatorial test port 
Isolate the leak if 
possible, shut down 
ITER and TBM to 
repair the leak.  
Helium 
LOCA,
LBO1
Helium makeup capabilities 
are not known at this time, 
assume that the large leak 
cannot be made up and it is 
a LOCA 
5Eí09/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Control valve, 
inlet to the 
helium 
purification 
system 
NO fails open Category II command fault, 
controller fault 
Routine testing 
and inspection 
Overheat TBM due to 
low coolant pressure 
Shut down ITER and 
TBM
Loss of Heat 
Sink, HB1 
This is a depressurization 
accident
3Eí06/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
    fails closed Category II control fault, 
valve controller 
failure
Routine testing 
and inspection 
No helium 
purification 
Can continue to 
operate TBM for a 
while without helium 
cleanup
Not an IE   3Eí06/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Some flow control valves have a stop 
block built in so that some flow can 
occur with the valve fully closed, if the 
helium design could operate in this 
way it would mitigate effects of this 
LOF event 
    fails to 
respond 
Category II controller fault, 
loss of power 
Routine testing 
and inspection 
No helium 
purification, and 
pressure fluctuations 
Helium pressure 
system should 
respond to keep 
helium pressure up, 
so no immediate 
actions needed. 
Not an IE Helium makeup system 
should maintain helium 
pressure despite valve fault, 
repair valve during the next 
evening outage 
3Eí06/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
    plugs Category 
III 
foreign material 
intrusion 
Coolant 
purification 
No helium 
purification 
Can continue to 
operate TBM for a 
while without helium 
cleanup
Not an IE   5Eí07/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
    external 
leakage
Category 
III 
weld fault, valve 
wall flaw, 
vibration induced 
crack,
construction fault 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design 
Leaks hot helium to 
the 30 C air 
atmosphere in the 
equatorial test port.   
Assume that a small 
leak cannot be 
tolerated until the end 
of the campaign, shut 
down ITER and TBM 
to repair the leak. 
Small 
Helium 
LOCA,
LBO2
Helium makeup capabilities 
are not known at this time, 
assume leak cannot be 
made up and it is a small 
LOCA
1Eí07/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
    external 
rupture 
Category 
IV
weld fracture, 
valve wall failure, 
flow induced 
vibration 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design 
Leaks moderate to 
large amount of 
helium to the 
equatorial test port 
Isolate the leak if 
possible, shut down 
ITER and TBM to 
repair the leak. 
Helium 
LOCA,
LBO1
Helium makeup capabilities 
are not known at this time, 
assume that the large leak 
cannot be made up and it is 
a LOCA 
5Eí09/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
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Mode 
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Preventive
Action on 
Possible Causes Consequences 
Corrective or 
Preventive Actions 
on Consequences 
ITER
Postulated 
Initiating
Events Comments Frequency 
Comment on 
frequency 
calculation Design comments 
Helium 
Purification 
System 
NO external
leakage
Category 
III 
weld fault, pipe 
wall flaw, pipe 
vibration induced 
crack,
construction fault 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration, NDT 
Leaks small amount 
of helium to room, 
slowly depletes 
makeup helium, may 
release some tritium 
and other gases to 
room 
Isolate and 
depressurize the PCS 
if possible to reduce 
gas leakage.  Shut 
down the TBM, shut 
down ITER pulsing. 
Small 
Helium 
LOCA,
LBO2
9.8Eí08/h-
m
WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Assumed 20 m piping in the HPS as an 
initial estimate for all piping in the 
TCWS room.  The system valves, 
tanks, etc., that are not designed at 
present. 
external
rupture 
Category 
III 
weld fracture, 
piping failure, 
flow induced 
vibration 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration, NDT 
Leaks large amount of 
helium to the room 
Isolate and 
depressurize the PCS 
if possible to reduce 
gas leakage.  Shut 
down the TBM, shut 
down ITER pulsing. 
Helium 
LOCA,
LBO1
3.3Eí09/h-
m
WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Assumed 20 m piping in the HPS as an 
initial estimate 
plugs Category 
III 
foreign material 
buildup, oil from 
machinery, dust 
Routine 
inspection and 
testing 
No immediate effect 
upon loss of 
purification system 
No immediate effects, 
no actions to take 
until a scheduled 
shutdown 
Not an IE 3Eí09/h-m WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Assumed 20 m piping in the HPS as an 
initial estimate 
fail to 
operate 
Category II Bad control 
signals, loss of 
helium supply, 
loss of power 
Routine 
inspection and 
testing 
Fails to clean the 
helium to desired 
purity, no immediate 
effect on helium 
cooling loop 
No immediate effects, 
no actions to take 
until a scheduled 
shutdown 
Not an IE 1Eí02/yr NUREG/CR-
6928, ch 8 
Inferred failure rate from PWR Total 
Loss of Instrument Air System  failure 
rate in NUREG, chapter 8. 
THE SECONDARY HELIUM COOLANT SYSTEM to the Pb-17Li HEAT EXCHANGER 
Gas circulator or 
compressor 
NO fail to start Category II command fault, 
human error, 
shaft seizure, 
shaft shear 
periodic system 
testing, software 
QA
No helium flow to 
startup TBM, cannot 
start up ITER 
Continue shutdown to 
repair gas mover 
Not an IE   5Eí03/d WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Circulator must start before ITER can 
operate.  Assume 4 starts per year, at 
the beginning of each campaign. 
    fail to 
operate 
Category II command fault, 
human error, 
shaft seizure, 
shaft shear 
periodic system 
testing, software 
QA
Loss of helium flow 
during ITER 
operation, cannot cool 
the Pb-17Li, loss of 
heat sink accident 
Shut down ITER and 
TBM
Secondary 
system 
LOHS event 
on Pb-17Li, 
HB1
  5Eí05/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Motor-driven compressor/circulator 
    fail to stop Category II command fault, 
human error, 
breaker fault 
periodic system 
testing, software 
QA
Cannot shut down 
helium circulation at 
the end of cool down 
period 
No immediate actions 
needed, cut off power 
upstream to shut 
down the circulator 
Not an IE   5Eí03/d WSRC-TR-
93-262 
    external 
leak
Category 
III 
casing crack, 
weld failure, shaft 
seal fault 
Specify high 
quality parts, 
regular inspection 
Small loss of helium 
coolant, reduced 
cooling capability 
Shut down ITER and 
TBM
Secondary 
system 
LOHS event 
on Pb-17Li, 
HB1
  3Eí07/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
  NO external 
rupture 
Category 
IV
impeller failure 
pieces tear 
casing, casing 
crack, shaft seal 
blowout 
Specify high 
quality parts, 
regular inspection 
Large loss of helium 
coolant, loss of Pb-
17Li cooling 
capability 
Shut down ITER and 
TBM
Secondary 
system 
LOHS event 
on Pb-17Li, 
HB1
  1Eí08/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
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Frequency 
Category Possible Causes 
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Action on 
Possible Causes Consequences 
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on Consequences 
ITER
Postulated 
Initiating
Events Comments Frequency 
Comment on 
frequency 
calculation Design comments 
Pb-17Li-to-
helium heat 
exchanger 
NO fouling heat 
transfer 
surfaces
Category II foreign material 
intrusion, 
chemical 
reactions, poor 
water quality 
control 
Keep water 
cleanliness high, 
do not allow 
water to boil in 
HX
Fouling degrades heat 
transfer from Pb-17Li 
to helium 
Shut down TBM and 
shut down ITER 
Secondary 
system 
LOHS event 
on Pb-17Li, 
HB1
1Eí05/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
plugging 
tubes 
Category II foreign material 
accumulation in 
helium system 
design for low 
tube bundle 
vibration 
Plugged tubes will 
degrade heat transfer 
from Pb-17Li to 
helium 
Shut down TBM and 
shut down ITER 
Secondary 
system 
LOHS event 
on Pb-17Li, 
HB1
3Eí06/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
leakage
from tubes 
Category II Tube degradation 
by vibration, 
thermal cycling, 
fluid jetting on 
tubes 
design for low 
tube bundle 
vibration 
Small leak will allow 
high pressure helium 
at 8 MPa into Pb-17Li 
at 2 MPa  
Shut down TBM and 
shut down ITER 
Pb-17Li HX 
tube rupture, 
LBO3
1Eí05/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
tube rupture Category 
III 
material flaw, 
thermal 
overstress, 
burnout 
design for low 
tube bundle 
vibration 
Lose moderate to 
large amount of Pb-
17Li into HX shell, 
lose TBM breeder 
cooling as helium 
pressure increases the 
Pb-17Li pressure 
Shut down TBM and 
shut down ITER 
Pb-17Li HX 
tube rupture, 
LBO3
5Eí07/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
A single HX tube might be perhaps 12 
mm diameter or greater, but even that 
small double-ended opening can 
depressurize the helium loop.  Assume 
that the helium loop will be 
depressurized by a tube rupture. 
leakage
from shell 
Category 
III 
faulty weld, wall 
crack
Routine 
inspection 
Small leak will not 
degrade heat transfer 
from Pb-17Li to 
helium 
Shut down TBM and 
shut down ITER 
Not an IE 1Eí06/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
shell rupture Category 
III 
weld failure, 
severe wall crack 
Routine 
inspection 
Loss of heat sink 
accident
Shut down TBM and 
shut down ITER 
Secondary 
system 
LOHS event 
on Pb-17Li, 
HB1
5Eí08/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Control valve, to 
throttle helium 
secondary 
coolant flow 
NO fails open Category II control element 
seized, valve disk 
stuck, control 
fault 
Routine testing 
and inspection 
Overheat Pb-17Li due 
to low secondary 
helium coolant 
pressure 
Shut down ITER and 
TBM
Secondary 
system 
LOHS event 
on Pb-17Li, 
HB1
  3Eí06/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
    fails closed Category II control fault, 
valve controller 
failure
Routine testing 
and inspection 
Loss of heat sink 
accident
Shut down TBM and 
shut down ITER 
Secondary 
system 
LOHS event 
on Pb-17Li, 
HB1
  3Eí06/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
    fails to 
respond 
Category II controller fault, 
loss of power 
Routine testing 
and inspection 
Lose control of 
helium coolant flow 
but pressure is 
maintained by 
makeup  
Helium pressure 
system should 
respond to keep 
helium pressure up, 
so no immediate 
actions needed. 
Not an IE   3Eí06/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
    plugs Category 
III 
foreign material 
intrusion 
Coolant 
purification 
Loss of heat sink 
accident
Shut down TBM and 
shut down ITER 
Secondary 
system 
LOHS event 
on Pb-17Li, 
HB1
  5Eí07/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
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    external 
leakage
Category 
III 
weld fault, valve 
wall flaw, 
vibration induced 
crack,
construction fault 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design 
Loss of heat sink 
accident
Shut down TBM and 
shut down ITER 
Secondary 
system 
LOHS event 
on Pb-17Li, 
HB1
  1Eí07/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
    external 
rupture 
Category 
IV
weld fracture, 
valve wall failure, 
flow induced 
vibration 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration in 
design 
Loss of heat sink 
accident
Shut down TBM and 
shut down ITER 
Secondary 
system 
LOHS event 
on Pb-17Li, 
HB1
  5Eí09/h WSRC-TR-
93-262 
System helium 
piping 
NO external
leakage
Category II weld fault, pipe 
wall flaw, pipe 
vibration induced 
crack,
construction fault 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration, NDT 
Leaks small amount 
of helium to room, 
then the Pb-17Li 
begins slowly heating 
up.
TBM can tolerate the 
Pb-17Li heat 
increase.  Some heat 
will be transferred to 
the primary helium 
coolant in the TBM.   
Not an IE 9.8Eí08/h-
m
WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Assumed 140 m piping in the flow 
loop.   
external
rupture 
Category 
III 
weld fracture, 
piping failure, 
flow induced 
vibration 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service
inspection, low 
flow-induced 
vibration, NDT 
Leaks large amount of 
helium to the room, 
lose secondary 
coolant.  This is a loss 
of heat sink accident. 
Isolate leak if 
possible, depressurize 
system, shut down 
ITER
Secondary 
system 
LOHS event 
on Pb-17Li, 
HB1
3.3Eí09/h-
m
WSRC-TR-
93-262 
Assumed 140 m piping in the flow 
loop.   
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Preliminary Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
for the TBM Module Box 
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Component 
Operational
State Failure Mode 
Frequency 
Category Possible Causes 
Preventive
Action on 
Possible Causes Consequences 
Corrective or 
Preventive
Actions on 
Consequences 
ITER Postulated 
Initiating Events Comments Frequency 
Comment on 
frequency 
calculation 
Design 
comments
First wall 
assembly (tubes) 
NO small external 
leakage to VV 
Category IV material flaw or 
defect (thru-wall 
crack), thermal or 
vibration fatigue 
NDT, pre-service 
pressure test 
Small helium leak 
into vacuum 
vessel.  Does not 
cause a plasma 
disruption. 
Can continue to 
operate ITER but 
leak should be 
repaired in the 
next long outage. 
LBV3 Use 105.7 m of 
tubing in the FW.  
Use 4032 
operating hours 
per year.  Use 
25% factor toward 
the VV. 
2Eí10/h-m analyst judgment Assume a small 
leak is 10x the 
frequency of a 
large leak and 
100x the 
frequency of a 
rupture (Buende, 
1991). 
external leakage 
to VV 
Category IV material flaw or 
defect (thru-wall 
crack), thermal or 
vibration fatigue 
NDT, pre-service 
pressure test 
Helium leak into 
vacuum vessel.  
Causes a plasma 
disruption. 
Depressurize, 
isolate TBM 
helium coolant 
line after 
disruption has 
occurred to reduce 
leakage into VV.   
LBV2 Use 105.7 m of 
tubing in the FW.  
Use 4032 
operating hours 
per year.  Use 
25% factor of wall 
face toward the 
VV. 
2Eí11/h-m see text The total helium 
flow is 1.76 kg/s, 
divided in plate-
type headers.  
Large leaks (up 
to 5% of helium 
flow) will cause 
a plasma 
disruption before 
the plasma can 
be shut down. 
external rupture to 
VV
< Cat. IV tube wall 
longitudinal crack, 
wall failure 
NDT, pre-service 
pressure test 
Large helium leak 
into vacuum 
vessel.  Causes 
intense plasma 
disruption. 
Maintain Pb-17Li 
coolant flow to 
TBM to remove 
heat.  Isolate 
helium makeup 
system to reduce 
flow into VV. 
LBV1 Use 105.7 m of 
tubing in the FW.  
Use 4032 
operating hours 
per year.  Use 
25% factor of wall 
face toward the 
VV. 
1Eí12/h-m see text Rupture flow is 
the entire rated 
helium flow or 
greater
(depressurization 
flow from a large 
opening).  
Helium speed of 
sound is high, so 
flow will be high 
into the vacuum.  
Designers might 
consider placing 
limits on 
allowable 
makeup mass, let 
plant operators 
override limits if 
the situation is 
not a large 
LOCA.
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small leakage into 
TBM
Category III material flaw or 
defect (e.g., 
pinhole leak), 
thermal or 
vibration fatigue 
NDT, pre-service 
pressure test 
Very small helium 
leak into Pb-17Li, 
slightly 
pressurizes the 
liquid metal.  
Helium should 
evolve out of 
liquid metal in 
pump or 
expansion tank. 
Continue to 
operate TBM, 
plan to repair leak 
during next long 
outage. 
LBB3 Use 105.7 m of 
tubing in the FW.  
Use 4032 
operating hours 
per year.  Use 
25% factor of wall 
face toward the 
TBM.
2Eí10/h-m analyst judgment Very small 
helium leaks are 
difficult to sense 
with the usual 
sensors (T, P, 
flow).  The Pb-
17Li pressure 
will increase with 
helium inflow.  
The Pb-17Li 
operates at 2 
MPa and the 
rupture disk to 
the drain tank 
opens at 3.5 
MPa.  Assume 
small inleakage 
does not elevate 
Pb-17Li pressure 
to any value 
close to the 
rupture disk 
actuation point. 
leakage into TBM Category III material flaw or 
defect (e.g., 
pinhole leak), 
thermal or 
vibration fatigue 
NDT, pre-service 
pressure test 
Large helium leak 
into Pb-17Li, 
pressurizes the 
liquid metal. 
Must begin an 
orderly shut down 
of ITER when 
helium leak is 
noted by Pb-17Li 
pressure increase. 
LBB2 Use 105.7 m of 
tubing in the FW.  
Use 4032 
operating hours 
per year.  Use 
25% factor of wall 
face toward the 
TBM.
2Eí11/h-m see text 
rupture into TBM < Cat. IV tube wall 
longitudinal crack, 
wall failure 
NDT, pre-service 
pressure test 
Large helium leak 
into Pb-17Li.  The 
rupture disk to the 
drain tank opens 
rapidly.   
Must shut down 
ITER as soon as 
possible, the TBM 
is losing all 
cooling and could 
overheat. 
LBB1 Use 105.7 m of 
tubing in the FW.  
Use 4032 
operating hours 
per year.  Use 
25% factor of wall 
face toward the 
TBM.
1Eí12/h-m see text Large helium 
leak into Pb-17Li 
will
overpressurize it 
and open the 
rupture disk at 
3.5 MPa, 
draining the Pb-
17Li as the 
helium 
depressurizes. 
fouling Category IV foreign material 
intrusion and 
buildup on tube 
walls, moisture in 
helium gas 
Helium purity 
control, gas drying 
Gradual 
degradation of 
heat transfer to the 
helium coolant 
Gradual heatup of 
the TBM.  Begin 
an orderly 
shutdown of ITER 
when coolant 
temperatures 
increase.
FB2 1Eí04/yr analyst judgment Helium systems 
are reputed to be 
very clean.  
HTGRs have 
only had graphite 
dust and moisture 
concerns.  
Assume this is a 
category IV 
event.
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flow blockage Category IV construction or 
maintenance 
debris blocks flow 
Comprehensive 
system 
commissioning, 
flow test before 
each operating 
period. 
Localized loss of 
helium flow in 
TBM.  This may 
not be sensed by 
instrumentation. 
Must begin an 
orderly shut down 
of ITER when 
TBM temperature 
begins to increase.  
FB2 9Eí05/yr Analyst judgment 
based on HFIR 
PRA analyses 
Water cooled 
systems have had 
screws, bolts, 
bearings, gasket 
pieces, weld slag, 
rust particles, 
etc., in the piping 
system.  
Personnel have 
left pencils, rags, 
tools, and other 
debris.  High 
Flux Isotope 
Reactor PRA, 
PLG-0604, 1988. 
external rupture 
from missile 
Category IV Loose ferro-
magnetic objects 
in ITER, I.e., 
bolts, antenna 
pieces, diagnostic 
pieces
Routine camera 
inspection of VV 
interior, and good 
house-keeping 
Impact tears open 
TBM first wall 
tube, large helium 
leak into vacuum 
vessel.  If object 
does not cause 
plasma disruption, 
helium will. 
Maintain Pb-17Li 
coolant flow to 
TBM to remove 
heat.  Isolate 
helium makeup 
system to reduce 
flow into VV. 
LBV1 Any in-vessel 
ferromagnetic 
object propelled 
by tokamak 
magnetic fields 
would likely 
travel toward the 
inboard wall, not 
the outboard wall 
where the TBM is 
located
< 0.0001 per year analyst judgment Ferromagnetic 
objects are 
always
accelerated
toward higher 
magnetic fields, 
and moving 
inboard on a 
tokamak is 
certainly the 
higher field.  The 
toroidal field is 
stronger than the 
poloidal field and 
is proportional to 
1/r in the interior 
of the vacuum 
vessel.  Analyst 
judgment is 
highly unlikely 
event, Category 
IV
external rupture 
from plasma 
effects
Category II Plasma disruption 
impinges on TBM 
face, localized 
overheating by 
runaway 
electrons, arc from 
halo current, 
MARFE, type I 
ELM, etc. 
Good planning of 
plasma operations, 
good control of 
plasma, disruption 
avoidance 
Overheat leads to 
overstress and 
surface melting 
opens TBM first 
wall tube, large 
helium leak into 
vacuum vessel.   
Maintain Pb-17Li 
coolant flow to 
TBM to remove 
heat.  Isolate 
helium makeup 
system to reduce 
flow into VV. 
LBV1 1.2Eí02/yr analyst judgment, 
see text for 
description 
This is a highly 
tentative 
assumption of the 
plasma 
disruption effects 
from a very 
intense 
disruption event.  
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Operational
State Failure Mode 
Frequency 
Category Possible Causes 
Preventive
Action on 
Possible Causes Consequences 
Corrective or 
Preventive
Actions on 
Consequences 
ITER Postulated 
Initiating Events Comments Frequency 
Comment on 
frequency 
calculation 
Design 
comments
Beryllium coating 
on first wall 
assembly (tube 
faces)
NO debonding Category I Bond failure, 
overheating from 
plasma causes 
melting 
Good bonding 
practices, cautious 
approach to 
plasma operations 
Assume that Be 
poison in plasma 
results in a plasma 
disruption.  
Disruption 
severity is not 
known.  Over 30 g 
into plasma can 
result in a strong 
disruption. 
Maintain flows to 
TBM.  Beryllium 
may need to be 
replaced or 
repaired if tubes 
are exposed. 
Not an IE While the TBM 
design assumes 
loss of Be results 
in a disruption, 
evidence from 
JET—droplets of 
Be entering the 
plasma has not 
resulted in 
disruptions 
(Loarte 2005). 
5.8Eí05 /ITER 
pulse 
Value based on e-
beam testing 
Castro’s work on 
plasma sprayed 
Be has shown 
good bond 
reliability until 
the heat flux 
increases 
substantially (3x 
to 5x greater than 
planned).  Castro 
work has given a 
failure rate of 
5.8Eí05 
debondings per 
pulse at 
conditions 
greater than the 
planned TBM 
conditions.  
Using this value 
with 3000 pulses 
per year is 0.17, a 
Category I event. 
Top plate 
assembly, same 
entries for bottom 
plate assembly 
NO deformation Category IV thermal 
overstress, 
warping 
Good design 
practices, verify 
proper flow at 
temperature 
Top plate 
deformation is 
assumed to greatly 
constrict helium 
flow within top 
plate.  Dual 
deformation (rare 
event) into flow 
area results in 
decreased Pb-17Li 
flow by 
constriction and 
potential cracking 
of SiC FCI's that 
leads to flow 
stagnation by 
MHD forces.   
Maintain helium 
coolant flow to 
TBM as well as 
possible to 
remove heat.  Shut 
down ITER to 
replace the 
module box.   
FB2 Deformation 
could include 
irradiation-
induced swelling, 
creep, or bowing.  
Typically, ferritic 
steels have low 
swelling and low 
creep.  TBMs 
have a 10,000 
operating hour 
lifetime (Wong 
2005), so these 
long term 
processes should 
not be a 
significant factor. 
1Eí09/hour analyst judgment Based on Carter, 
"Mechanical
Reliability", 
second edition, 
John Wiley, New 
York 1986, page 
177, mechanical 
components can 
achieve an 
overall failure 
rate of 
1Eí08/hour, and 
a plate is a 
simple 
component.  Use 
0.1*1Eí08/h for 
dual plate failure.  
Assume 50% of 
failure rate is for 
mechanical stress 
failures, 50% is 
for cracks or 
other 
metallurgical 
failures. 
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Initiating Events Comments Frequency 
Comment on 
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external leakage Category III material flaw, 
crack, bond fault, 
erosive wear 
NDT, good design 
and construction 
practices
Leak helium at 8 
MPa into VV. 
Can continue to 
operate ITER and 
TBM if helium 
spill is small and 
not contaminating 
the plasma.  
Larger leaks (such 
as 1% of helium 
flow rate) will 
cause a disruption 
or otherwise 
require ITER 
shutdown. 
LBV2 8.7Eí04/yr analyst judgment Top plate bond 
and plate cracks 
will result in 
leakage failures.  
Plate cracks are 
50% of 1Eí08/h 
or 2Eí05/yr.  
Bond failure is 
along the edge of 
the plate, 2(0.645 
m + 0.413 m)= 
2.12 m bond 
distance, 4032 
h/yr, at 
1Eí07/m-h gives 
8.5Eí04/yr  
external rupture Category IV material failure, 
large crack, bond 
failure
NDT, good design 
and construction 
practices
Large leak helium 
at 8 MPa into VV. 
Helium ingress 
will cause plasma 
disruption.  Shut 
down ITER to 
remove heat from 
TBM FW. 
LBV1 Following Buende 
(1991) 
recommendation, 
a bond rupture is 
0.1x of a leak.  
Assume that plate 
large crack or 
catastrophic
failure is 0.1xplate 
failure rate. 
8.7Eí05/yr analyst judgment 
flow blockage Category IV construction or 
maintenance 
debris blocks flow 
Comprehensive 
system 
commissioning, 
flow test before 
each operating 
period. 
Localized loss of 
helium flow in 
TBM.  This may 
not be sensed by 
instrumentation. 
Must begin an 
orderly shut down 
of ITER when 
TBM temperature 
begins to increase.  
FB2 Helium flow in 
the plate may 
redistribute 
around a flow 
blockage. 
9Eí05/yr Analyst judgment 
based on HFIR 
PRA analyses 
Water cooled 
systems have had 
screws, bolts, 
bearings, gasket 
pieces, weld slag, 
rust particles, 
etc., in the piping 
system.  
Personnel have 
left pencils, rags, 
tools, and other 
debris.  High 
Flux Isotope 
Reactor PRA, 
PLG-0604, 1988. 
fouling Category IV foreign material 
intrusion and 
buildup on tube 
walls, moisture in 
helium gas 
Helium purity 
control, gas drying 
Gradual 
degradation of 
heat transfer to the 
helium coolant 
Gradual heatup of 
the TBM.  Begin 
an orderly 
shutdown of ITER 
when coolant 
temperatures 
increase.
FB2 1Eí04/yr analyst judgment Helium systems 
are reputed to be 
very clean.  
HTGRs have 
only had graphite 
dust and moisture 
concerns.  
Assume this is a 
category IV 
event.
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internal leakage 
into TBM box 
Category III material flaw or 
defect (e.g., 
pinhole leak), 
plate thermal or 
vibration fatigue 
NDT, pre-service 
pressure test 
Helium leak into 
Pb-17Li,
pressurizes the 
liquid metal. 
Must begin an 
orderly shut down 
of ITER when 
helium leak is 
noted by Pb-17Li 
pressure increase. 
LBB2 9Eí04/yr analyst judgment Top plate bond 
and plate cracks 
will result in 
leakage failures.  
Plate cracks are 
5Eí09/h.  Bond 
failure is along 
the edge of the 
plate, 2(0.645 m 
+ 0.413 m)= 2.12 
m bond distance, 
4032 h/yr, at 
1Eí07/m-h gives 
8.5Eí04/yr  
internal rupture 
into TBM box 
Category IV metal flaw, 
cracking, 
overstress failure 
NDT, pre-service 
pressure test 
Large helium leak 
into Pb-17Li.  The 
rupture disk to the 
drain tank opens 
rapidly.   
Must shut down 
ITER as soon as 
possible, the TBM 
is losing all 
cooling and could 
overheat. 
LBB1 Following Buende 
recommendation, 
a bond rupture 
rate is 10% of a 
leak rate.  Also 
assume that a 
plate catastrophic 
mechanical failure 
is 10% of the plate 
failure rate. 
9Eí05/yr analyst judgment Top plate bond 
and plate cracks 
will result in 
leakage failures.  
Plate ruptures are 
taken to be 
5Eí10/h.  Bond 
failure is along 
the edge of the 
plate, 2(0.645 m 
+ 0.413 m)= 2.12 
m bond distance, 
4032 h/yr, at 
1Eí08/m-h gives 
8.5Eí05/yr  
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Initiating Events Comments Frequency 
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internal leakage 
within plate 
assembly 
Category III material flaw or 
defect (e.g., 
pinhole leak), 
plate fin thermal 
or vibration 
fatigue 
NDT, pre-service 
pressure test 
Helium lateral 
leakage within 
plate must still 
enter one of the 
two grid plates to 
leave the top 
plate.  Some 
cooling might be 
reduced in some 
parts of the plate. 
Effects are judged 
to be minor, not a 
problem to 
operate the TBM 
Not an IE Helium will 
continue to flow 
through the plate 
assembly, and 
judgment is 
mostly adequate 
cooling to avoid 
plate deformation. 
1Eí07/h analyst judgment Twenty one fins, 
each § 0.4 m 
long.  A steam 
turbine has stator 
blades to direct 
steam.  For a 
high pressure 
superheated
steam turbine, 
there could be 48 
blades per row 
and 15 rows.  
EPRI-AP-2071 
gave a steam 
turbine failure 
rate of 
1.83Eí04/h, and 
1.81% of faults 
involve blades, 
or a failure rate 
of 3.3Eí06/h for 
blades.  
Representative 
high pressure 
turbine is 48  
blades/row x 15 
rows is 720 
blades, or 
4.6Eí09/blade-
hour.  For 21 
fins, that would 
be 1Eí07/fin-
hour. 
internal rupture 
within plate 
assembly 
Category III metal flaw, 
cracking, 
overstress failure 
NDT, pre-service 
pressure test 
Helium lateral 
flow in the plate 
must still enter 
one of the two 
grid plates to 
leave the top or 
bottom plate.   
Effects could 
result in thermal 
overstress, 
warping and 
deformation of the 
plate.
FB2 1Eí08/h analyst judgment Assume rupture 
is 0.1x of leakage 
119
Component 
Operational
State Failure Mode 
Frequency 
Category Possible Causes 
Preventive
Action on 
Possible Causes Consequences 
Corrective or 
Preventive
Actions on 
Consequences 
ITER Postulated 
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Center divider 
"cross" and "end" 
grid plate 
assemblies that 
support FCIs 
NO deformation Category IV thermal 
overstress, 
warping 
Good design 
practices, verify 
proper flow at 
temperature 
Constrict or block 
Pb-17Li flow 
channel in TBM, 
stress from 
deformed plate is 
assumed to fail the 
flow channel 
insert so Pb-17Li 
flow is retarded by 
MHD forces. 
Drain Pb-17Li to 
drain tank.  Can 
continue to 
operate TBM if 
helium coolant is 
available.
Not an IE Since the grid 
plates are helium 
cooled, use the 
helium operating 
hours for this 
component, 4,032 
h/yr 
1Eí09/h analyst judgment Rather than 
assuming 
independent 
walls of the grid 
plate must both 
fail (i.e., plate 1 
failure
probability x 
plate 2 failure 
probability), it is 
assumed here 
that similar 
failure
mechanisms or 
stresses would 
attack or act 
upon both plates, 
so a common 
mode failure rate 
multiplier of 
0.1(plate 1 
failure rate of 
1Eí08/h) is used 
for deformation 
of both walls of 
the grid plate.    
    internal leakage 
past fins 
Category III material flaw, 
crack, bond failure 
NDT, good design 
and construction 
practices
Helium could leak 
within the grid 
plate and not 
remove heat 
uniformly.  
Differential 
thermal expansion 
of the grid plate. 
Prudent to drain 
Pb-17Li to the 
drain tank.  Can 
operate TBM with 
helium coolant 
available.
Not an IE Internal leak is 
still routed 
through the grid 
plate, toward 
lower pressure, so 
the reduction in 
cooling is 
believed to be 
minor. 
1Eí07/h analyst judgment Judgment based 
on top plate 
information 
above.
    internal rupture of 
fins
Category III material failure, 
large crack, bond 
failure
NDT, good design 
and construction 
practices
Helium flows 
throughout the 
grid plate without 
channeling.
Assume this leads 
to hot spot 
formation on grid 
plate walls, 
overstressing the 
grid plate.   
Prudent to drain 
Pb-17Li to drain 
tank.  Can operate 
TBM with helium 
coolant available. 
Not an IE   1Eí08/h analyst judgment Assume rupture 
is 10% of the 
leakage failure 
rate.
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    external leakage Category IV material flaw, 
crack, bond failure 
NDT, good design 
and construction 
practices
Helium leak into 
module box.  FCIs 
could be hotter 
(650 C) than 
helium (460 C), 
and slow helium 
leak could warm 
and build pressure 
to fail the FCIs.  
Slowly pressurize 
the TBM module 
box. 
LBB2 Losing small 
amounts of helium 
is not a cooling 
concern, but 
helium gas 
buildup in the 
TBM module box 
could lead to 
deformation of 
plates in the box, 
FCI failure, etc. 
1Eí08/h analyst judgment   
    external rupture Category IV material failure, 
large crack, bond 
failure
NDT, good design 
and construction 
practices
Helium large leak 
into module box.  
Helium pressure 
release and grid 
plate failure 
energy are 
expected to fail 
FCIs, retarding 
Pb-17Li flow. 
Losing both 
helium and Pb-
17Li cooling.  
Must immediately 
shut down TBM 
and ITER. 
LBB1 Losing a large 
amount of helium 
at 8 MPa into the 
module box 
reduces helium 
cooling and 
overstresses plates 
in the box. 
1Eí09/h analyst judgment Assume a 
catastrophic plate 
failure rate is 
0.1x of a plate 
crack failure rate. 
    fouling Category IV foreign material 
intrusion and 
buildup on tube 
walls, moisture in 
helium gas 
Helium purity 
control, gas drying 
Gradual 
degradation of 
heat transfer to the 
helium coolant 
Gradual heatup of 
the TBM.  Begin 
an orderly 
shutdown of ITER 
when coolant 
temperatures 
increase.
FB2   1Eí04/yr analyst judgment Helium systems 
are reputed to be 
very clean.  
HTGRs have 
only had graphite 
dust and moisture 
concerns.  
Assume this is a 
category IV 
event.
    flow blockage Category IV construction or 
maintenance 
debris blocks flow 
Comprehensive 
system 
commissioning, 
flow test before 
each operating 
period. 
Localized loss of 
helium flow in 
TBM.  This may 
not be sensed by 
instrumentation. 
Must begin an 
orderly shut down 
of ITER when 
TBM temperature 
begins to increase.  
FB2   9Eí05/yr Analyst judgment 
based on HFIR 
PRA analyses 
Water cooled 
systems have had 
screws, bolts, 
bearings, gasket 
pieces, weld slag, 
rust particles, 
etc., in the piping 
system.  
Personnel have 
left pencils, rags, 
tools, and other 
debris.  High 
Flux Isotope 
Reactor PRA, 
PLG-0604, 1988. 
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Silicon carbide 
flow channel 
inserts (FCIs), 
three U-duct units 
NO loss of integrity Category IV vibration induced 
cracking, inherent 
flaw induced 
cracking, surface 
wear flaw induced 
cracking, fretting 
cracking 
good material 
selection, good 
fabrication and 
construction 
practices
Pb-17Li exposed 
to MHD forces 
that retard coolant 
flow, SiC pieces 
intruding into Pb-
17Li cooling 
system. 
Maintain helium 
coolant flow to 
TBM to remove 
heat.  Can 
continue to 
operate TBM with 
helium cooling. 
Not an IE If pieces of SiC 
spall or break off 
of the FCI, they 
will travel around 
the Pb-17Li flow 
loop, traversing 
the tritium 
permeator, heat 
exchanger, and 
pump.  This 
foreign material 
could lead to 
damage in these 
components, 
including wear 
and scoring. 
1Eí08/h analyst judgment, 
see text 
Assume no 
bending of brittle 
ceramic material, 
so no 
deformation 
failure mode is 
attributable to the 
SiC FCIs (other 
parts can 
overstress the 
FCIs).  Assume 
no FCI 
detachment from 
walls unless the 
material cracks.  
After cracking, if 
Pb-17Li flow is 
retarded, the 
liquid metal can 
withstand high 
heat until the 
next plasma 
downtime when 
the Pb-17Li can 
be drained to the 
drain tank.  Then 
ITER operators 
can continue to 
run the TBM 
without liquid 
metal coolant.    
Support key, two 
units 
NO deformation   thermal 
overstress, 
mechanical stress, 
weld fault 
good design 
practices
TBM can slip, 
possibly sag 
against water 
cooling frame.  
Increased 
vibration wear, 
vibration on 
structure reduces 
lifetime. 
Can continue to 
operate TBM until 
repairs can be 
made. 
Not an IE TBM slightly 
receding toward 
VV wall will 
present a frame 
leading edge to 
the plasma, but it 
is not clear if this 
small movement 
is significant 
enough to cause  
damage. 
1.5Eí08/h analyst judgment, 
based on metal 
part fail rates 
Use an assumed 
3Eí08/h failure 
rate with 50% 
contribution of 
deformation and 
50% crack 
failure.
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    fracture   material failure 
(e.g., inclusions), 
large crack 
NDT, good design 
and construction 
practices
TBM moves out 
of position, sags 
onto water cooled 
frame, stresses 
pipe connections, 
vibration wear.   
TBM should be 
shut down to 
preclude further 
damage. 
Not an IE High vibration can 
reduce life of 
TBM box and 
pipe connections 
to the box.  
Assume that a 
disruption after 
key failure will 
vibrate the module 
box, but no 
significant 
damage.  Assume 
that a disruption 
after support key 
failure with 
concomitant 
support pin failure 
will cause the 
TBM to tear a 
helium cooling 
plate (top or 
bottom).  Piping is 
judged to have 
enough flexibility 
that 20 mm 
movement will 
not fail it.    
1.5Eí08/h analyst judgment Assume that with 
a failed support 
key and a failed 
support pin that 
disruption EM 
forces on the 
TBM module 
box will 
overstress the 
box and the pipe 
connections to 
the box.  10% of 
ITER pulses end 
in disruptions of 
some kind (§ 1 or 
2 per pulse day).  
Therefore, it is 
assumed that if a 
support pin and 
key fails, the 
TBM would fail 
by disruption 
forces the same 
operating day.  
Even though a 
failure might be 
difficult to 
detect, a dual 
failure of these 
low failure rate 
parts is a < 
Category IV 
event.
    detachment Category IV weld failure NDT, good weld 
practices
TBM moves out 
of position, sags 
onto water cooled 
frame, stresses 
pipe connections, 
vibration wear.   
TBM should be 
shut down to 
preclude further 
damage. 
Not an IE High vibration can 
reduce life of 
TBM box and 
pipe connections 
to the box.  
Assume that the 
first plasma 
disruption after 
support key 
failure with 
concomitant 
support pin failure 
will cause the 
TBM to tear a 
helium cooling 
plate.  See above 
description.    
6Eí09/h analyst judgment Use a butt weld 
value from 
Buende (1991).   
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Support pin, four 
units 
NO deformation Category IV thermal 
overstress, 
mechanical stress 
good design 
practices
TBM can slip, 
possibly sag 
against water 
cooling frame.  
Increased 
vibration wear, 
vibration on 
structure reduces 
lifetime. 
Can continue to 
operate TBM until 
repairs can be 
made. 
Not an IE Assume that one 
pin and one key 
must be failed and 
a daily plasma 
disruption occurs 
to cause the TBM 
box to strike the 
water cooled 
frame.  The frame 
is expected to 
remain intact, but 
assume that the 
upper or lower top 
plate will breach, 
sending helium 
into the VV. 
6.6Eí10/h analyst judgment FMD-97 gives 
78% of the 
failure rate as 
cracks (fracture) 
and 22% of the 
failure rate as 
bending 
(deformation).  
These failure 
mode 
distributions are 
used on the basic 
failure rate of 
3Eí09/h. 
fracture Category IV material failure 
(e.g., inclusions), 
large crack 
NDT, good design 
and construction 
practices
TBM moves out 
of position, sags 
onto water cooled 
frame, stresses 
pipe connections, 
vibration wear.   
TBM should be 
shut down to 
preclude further 
damage. 
Not an IE High vibration can 
reduce life of 
TBM box and 
pipe connections 
to the box.  
Assume that the 
first plasma 
disruption after 
support key 
failure with 
concomitant 
support pin failure 
will cause the 
TBM to tear a 
helium cooling 
plate.  See above 
description.    
2.3Eí09/h analyst judgment Assume that with 
a failed support 
key and a failed 
support pin that 
disruption EM 
forces on the 
TBM module 
box will 
overstress the 
box and the pipe 
connections to 
the box.  10% of 
ITER pulses end 
in disruptions of 
some kind (§ 1 or 
2 per pulse day).  
Therefore, it is 
assumed that if a 
support pin and 
key fails, the 
TBM would fail 
by disruption 
forces the same 
operating day.  
Even though a 
failure might be 
difficult to 
detect, a dual 
failure of these 
low failure rate 
parts is a < 
Category IV 
event.
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detachment Category IV bond failure NDT, good weld 
practices
TBM moves out 
of position, sags 
onto water cooled 
frame, stresses 
pipe connections, 
vibration wear.   
TBM should be 
shut down to 
preclude further 
damage. 
Not an IE High vibration can 
reduce life of 
TBM box and 
pipe connections 
to the box.  
Assume that the 
first plasma 
disruption after 
support key 
failure with 
concomitant 
support pin failure 
will cause the 
TBM to tear a 
helium cooling 
plate.  See above 
description.    
6Eí09/h analyst judgment Use a butt weld 
value from 
Buende (1991).   
See above 
description of 
failure
consequences. 
Inner back 
plate/helium 
manifold 
NO deformation Category IV thermal 
overstress, 
warping 
Good design 
practices, verify 
proper flow in 
operation 
Inner back plate 
deformation 
causes FCI cracks, 
retards Pb-17Li 
flow to the point 
of stagnation.  
Restricts helium 
flow, increases 
helium friction 
pressure drop in 
TBM.
Maintain helium 
coolant flow to 
TBM to remove 
heat.  Can 
continue to 
operate TBM with 
helium cooling 
unless back plate 
stresses tear 
module box open. 
Not an IE   1Eí09/h analyst judgment Plate failure rate 
assumptions 
were described 
above.
    external leakage Category IV material flaw, 
crack, bond fault 
NDT, good design 
and construction 
practices
Leak helium at 8 
MPa into TBM 
module box. 
Can continue to 
operate ITER and 
TBM if helium 
leak is small and 
not 
overpressurizing 
the Pb-17Li.  
Larger leaks (such 
as 1% of helium 
flow rate) will 
cause or will 
require ITER 
shutdown. 
LBB2 Despite FCI being 
present, assume 
that helium leak 
into that part of 
the TBM module 
will reach the Pb-
17Li and 
pressurize it. 
1Eí08/h analyst judgment   
    external rupture Category IV material failure, 
large crack, bond 
failure
NDT, good design 
and construction 
practices
Large leak of 
helium at 8 MPa 
into TBM module 
box. 
Drain Pb-17Li to 
drain tank to limit 
spill into VV.  
Spill may cause 
plasma disruption, 
heavy metal at 
plasma edge.  
Shut down ITER 
to clean up spill. 
LBB1   1Eí09/h analyst judgment   
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    flow blockage Category IV construction or 
maintenance 
debris blocks flow 
Comprehensive 
system 
commissioning, 
flow test before 
each operating 
period. 
Localized loss of 
helium flow in 
TBM.  This may 
not be sensed by 
instrumentation. 
Must begin an 
orderly shut down 
of ITER when 
TBM temperature 
begins to increase.  
FB2   9Eí05/yr Analyst judgment 
based on HFIR 
PRA analyses 
Water cooled 
systems have had 
screws, bolts, 
bearings, gasket 
pieces, weld slag, 
rust particles, 
etc., in the piping 
system.  
Personnel have 
left pencils, rags, 
tools, and other 
debris.  High 
Flux Isotope 
Reactor PRA, 
PLG-0604, 1988. 
    fouling Category IV foreign material 
intrusion and 
buildup on 
channel walls, 
moisture in 
helium gas 
Helium purity 
control, gas drying 
Gradual 
degradation of 
heat transfer to the 
helium coolant, 
gradual flow 
friction increase.   
Gradual heatup of 
the TBM.  Begin 
an orderly 
shutdown of ITER 
when coolant 
temperatures 
increase to 
technical
specification
limits. 
FB2   1Eí04/yr analyst judgment Helium systems 
are reputed to be 
very clean.  
HTGRs have 
only had graphite 
dust and moisture 
concerns.  
Assume this is a 
category IV 
event.
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    internal leakage Category III material flaw 
(e.g., pinhole), 
crack, bond fault 
NDT, good design 
and construction 
practices
Leak helium at 8 
MPa across the 
back plate, "short 
circuits" the TBM 
module.   
TBM receives 
reduced helium 
cooling in the first 
wall cooling 
tubes, TBM FW 
temperature 
increases. 
FB2 First wall tubes 
will not receive 
proper cooling in 
half of the square 
duct tubes.  
Thermal stresses 
on tube-to-tube 
bonds. 
1Eí07/h analyst judgment Twenty one fins, 
each § 1.8 m 
long.  A steam 
turbine has stator 
blades to direct 
steam.  For a 
high pressure 
superheated
steam turbine, 
there could be 48 
blades per row 
and 15 rows.  
EPRI-AP-2071 
gave a high 
pressure steam 
turbine failure 
rate of 
1.83Eí04/h, and 
1.81% of faults 
involve blades, 
or a failure rate 
of 3.3Eí06/h for 
blades.  48  
blades x 15 rows 
is 720 blades in a 
typical high 
pressure turbine, 
or 
4.6Eí09/blade-
hour.  For 21 
fins, that would 
be 1Eí07/fin-
hour. 
    internal rupture Category IV material failure, 
large crack, bond 
failure
NDT, good design 
and construction 
practices
Leak helium at 8 
MPa across the 
back plate, "short 
circuits" the TBM 
module.   
TBM receives 
inadequate helium 
cooling in the first 
wall cooling 
tubes. 
FB1 First wall tubes 
will not receive 
adequate cooling 
in half the square 
duct tubes.  
Thermal stresses 
on tube-to-tube 
bonds. 
1Eí08/h analyst judgment Assume rupture 
is 10% of the 
leakage failure 
rate.
Outer back 
plate/helium 
manifold  
NO deformation Category IV thermal 
overstress, 
warping 
Good design 
practices, verify 
proper flow in 
operation 
Inner back plate 
deformation 
causes FCI cracks, 
retards Pb-17Li 
flow to the point 
of stagnation.  
Restricts helium 
flow, increases 
helium friction 
pressure drop in 
TBM.
Maintain helium 
coolant flow to 
TBM to remove 
heat.  Can 
continue to 
operate TBM with 
helium cooling 
unless back plate 
stresses tear 
module box open. 
Not an IE 1Eí09/h analyst judgment Plate failure rate 
assumptions 
were described 
above.
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external leakage 
into TBM 
Category IV material flaw, 
crack, bond fault 
NDT, good design 
and construction 
practices
Leak helium at 8 
MPa into TBM 
module box. 
Can continue to 
operate ITER and 
TBM if helium 
leak is small and 
not 
overpressurizing 
the Pb-17Li.  
Larger leaks (such 
as 1% of helium 
flow rate) will 
cause or will 
require ITER 
shutdown. 
LBB2 Despite FCI being 
present, assume 
that helium leak 
into that part of 
the TBM module 
will reach the Pb-
17Li and 
pressurize it. 
1Eí08/h analyst judgment 
external rupture 
into TBM 
Category IV material failure, 
large crack, bond 
failure
NDT, good design 
and construction 
practices
Large leak of 
helium at 8 MPa 
into TBM module 
box. 
Drain Pb-17Li to 
drain tank to limit 
spill into VV.  
Spill may cause 
plasma disruption, 
heavy metal at 
plasma edge.  
Shut down ITER 
to clean up spill. 
LBB1 Helium could 
fracture SiC FCIs 
and will reach Pb-
17Li. 
1Eí09/h analyst judgment 
external leakage 
to VV 
Category IV material flaw, 
crack, bond fault 
NDT, good design 
and construction 
practices
Leak helium at 8 
MPa into vacuum 
vessel.
Can continue to 
operate ITER and 
TBM if helium 
leak is small and 
not 
overpressurizing 
the Pb-17Li.  
Larger leaks (such 
as 1% of helium 
flow rate) will 
cause or will 
require ITER 
shutdown. 
LBV2 1Eí08/h analyst judgment Plate failure rate 
assumptions 
were described 
above.
external rupture to 
VV
Category IV material failure, 
large crack, bond 
failure
NDT, good design 
and construction 
practices
Large leak of 
helium at 8 MPa 
into vacuum 
vessel.  Assume 
plasma disruption 
occurs.
Drain Pb-17Li to 
drain tank to limit 
spill into VV.  
Spill may cause 
plasma disruption, 
heavy metal at 
plasma edge.  
Shut down ITER 
to clean up spill. 
LBV1 1Eí09/h analyst judgment 
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flow blockage Category IV construction or 
maintenance 
debris blocks flow 
Comprehensive 
system 
commissioning, 
flow test before 
each operating 
period. 
Localized loss of 
helium flow in 
TBM.  This may 
not be sensed by 
instrumentation. 
Must begin an 
orderly shut down 
of ITER when 
TBM temperature 
begins to increase.  
FB2 9Eí05/yr Analyst judgment 
based on HFIR 
PRA analyses 
Water cooled 
systems have had 
screws, bolts, 
bearings, gasket 
pieces, weld slag, 
rust particles, 
etc., in the piping 
system.  
Personnel have 
left pencils, rags, 
tools, and other 
debris.  High 
Flux Isotope 
Reactor PRA, 
PLG-0604, 1988. 
fouling Category IV foreign material 
intrusion and 
buildup on 
channel walls, 
moisture in 
helium gas 
Helium purity 
control, gas drying 
Gradual 
degradation of 
heat transfer to the 
helium coolant, 
gradual flow 
friction increase.   
Gradual heatup of 
the TBM.  Begin 
an orderly 
shutdown of ITER 
when coolant 
temperatures 
increase to 
technical
specification
limits. 
FB2 1Eí04/yr analyst judgment Helium systems 
are reputed to be 
very clean.  
HTGRs have 
only had graphite 
dust and moisture 
concerns.  
Assume this is a 
category IV 
event.
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Comment on 
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calculation 
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internal leakage Category III material flaw 
(e.g., pinhole), 
crack, bond fault 
NDT, good design 
and construction 
practices
Leak helium at 8 
MPa across the 
back plate, "short 
circuits" the TBM 
module.   
TBM receives 
reduced helium 
cooling in the first 
wall cooling 
tubes, TBM FW 
temperature 
increases. 
FB2 First wall tubes 
will not receive 
proper cooling in 
half of the square 
duct tubes.  
Thermal stresses 
on tube-to-tube 
bonds. 
1Eí07/h analyst judgment Twenty one fins, 
each § 1.8 m 
long.  A steam 
turbine has stator 
blades to direct 
steam.  For a 
high pressure 
superheated
steam turbine, 
there could be 48 
blades per row 
and 15 rows.  
EPRI-AP-2071 
gave a high 
pressure steam 
turbine failure 
rate of 
1.83Eí04/h, and 
1.81% of faults 
involve blades, 
or a failure rate 
of 3.3Eí06/h for 
blades.  48  
blades x 15 rows 
is 720 blades in a 
typical high 
pressure turbine, 
or 
4.6Eí09/blade-
hour.  For 21 
fins, that would 
be 1Eí07/fin-
hour. 
internal rupture Category IV material failure, 
large crack, bond 
failure
NDT, good design 
and construction 
practices
Leak helium at 8 
MPa across the 
back plate, "short 
circuits" the TBM 
module.   
TBM receives 
inadequate helium 
cooling in the first 
wall cooling 
tubes. 
FB1 First wall tubes 
will not receive 
adequate cooling 
in half the square 
duct tubes.  
Thermal stresses 
on tube-to-tube 
bonds. 
1Eí08/h analyst judgment Assume rupture 
is 10% of the 
leakage failure 
rate.
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Comment on 
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Helium 
distribution 
manifold, two sets 
to supply the 
upper and lower 
end plates 
NO external leak Category III weld fault, pipe 
wall flaw, pipe 
vibration induced 
crack,
construction fault 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service inspection, 
low flow-induced 
vibration, NDT 
Leaks small 
amount of helium 
to the vacuum 
vessel, slowly 
depletes makeup 
helium, slowly 
pressurizes VV 
Depressurize 
helium system, 
orderly ITER shut 
down 
Small Helium 
LOCA, LBV2 
Assume that leak 
rate of 1 g/minute 
is too high and 
leaks could easily 
yield that much 
leakage.  A 
helium leak could 
result in a plasma 
disruption over 
the course of one 
plasma shot.  The 
helium system 
operates for 4,032 
h per year. 
9.8Eí08/h-m WSRC-TR-93-
262 
Assume 18 welds 
for each manifold 
and estimate 1 m 
tubing length.  
Assuming tiny 
leaks, LBV3, 
would not create 
an issue behind 
the TBM module 
box. 
    external rupture Category IV weld fracture, 
piping failure, 
flow induced 
vibration 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service inspection, 
low flow-induced 
vibration, NDT 
Leaks large 
amount of helium 
to the room 
Depressurize 
helium system, 
shut down ITER 
for post-disruption 
inspection.  ITER 
cannot run until 
TBM is repaired. 
Helium LOCA, 
LBV1
Assume a rupture 
flow rate gives an 
immediate plasma 
disruption due to 
helium intrusion 
at the plasma 
edge. 
3.3Eí09/h-m WSRC-TR-93-
262 
 Estimate 1 m 
tube length 
    fouling Category IV foreign material 
intrusion and 
buildup on tube 
walls, moisture in 
helium gas 
Helium purity 
control, gas drying 
Gradual 
degradation of 
heat transfer to the 
helium coolant 
Gradual heatup of 
the TBM.  Begin 
an orderly 
shutdown of ITER 
when coolant 
temperatures 
increase.
FB2   1Eí04/yr analyst judgment Helium systems 
are reputed to be 
very clean.  
HTGRs have 
only had graphite 
dust and moisture 
concerns.  
Assume this is a 
category IV 
event.
    flow blockage Category IV construction or 
maintenance 
debris blocks flow 
Comprehensive 
system 
commissioning, 
flow test before 
each operating 
period. 
Localized loss of 
helium flow in 
TBM.  This may 
not be sensed by 
instrumentation. 
Must begin an 
orderly shut down 
of ITER when 
TBM temperature 
begins to increase. 
FB2   9Eí05/yr Analyst judgment 
based on HFIR 
PRA analyses 
Water cooled 
systems have had 
screws, bolts, 
bearings, gasket 
pieces, weld slag, 
rust particles, 
etc., in the piping 
system.  
Personnel have 
left pencils, rags, 
tools, and other 
debris.  High 
Flux Isotope 
Reactor PRA, 
PLG-0604, 1988. 
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Initiating Events Comments Frequency 
Comment on 
frequency 
calculation 
Design 
comments
Helium supply 
line, two sets for 
the TBM 
NO external leak Category III weld fault, pipe 
wall flaw, pipe 
vibration induced 
crack,
construction fault 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service inspection, 
low flow-induced 
vibration, NDT 
Leaks small 
amount of helium 
to the vacuum 
vessel, slowly 
depletes makeup 
helium, slowly 
pressurizes VV 
Depressurize 
helium system, 
orderly ITER shut 
down 
Small Helium 
LOCA, LBV2 
Assume that leak 
rate of 1 g/minute 
is too high and 
leaks could easily 
yield that much 
leakage.  A 
helium leak could 
result in a plasma 
disruption over 
the course of one 
plasma shot.  The 
helium system 
operates for 4,032 
h per year. 
9.8Eí08/h-m WSRC-TR-93-
262 
Assume 8 welds 
for each supply 
line and 2 m pipe 
length. 
external rupture Category IV weld fracture, 
piping failure, 
flow induced 
vibration 
Materials 
selection in 
design, pre-
service inspection, 
low flow-induced 
vibration, NDT 
Leaks large 
amount of helium 
to the room 
Depressurize 
helium system, 
shut down ITER 
for post-disruption 
inspection.  ITER 
cannot run until 
TBM is repaired. 
Helium LOCA, 
LBV1
Assume a rupture 
flow rate gives an 
immediate plasma 
disruption due to 
helium intrusion 
at the plasma 
edge. 
3.3Eí09/h-m WSRC-TR-93-
262 
fouling Category IV foreign material 
intrusion and 
buildup on tube 
walls, moisture in 
helium gas 
Helium purity 
control, gas drying 
Gradual 
degradation of 
heat transfer to the 
helium coolant 
Gradual heatup of 
the TBM.  Begin 
an orderly 
shutdown of ITER 
when coolant 
temperatures 
increase.
FB2 1Eí04/yr analyst judgment Helium systems 
are reputed to be 
very clean.  
HTGRs have 
only had graphite 
dust and moisture 
concerns.  
Assume this is a 
category IV 
event.
flow blockage Category IV construction or 
maintenance 
debris blocks flow 
Comprehensive 
system 
commissioning, 
flow test before 
each operating 
period. 
Localized loss of 
helium flow in 
TBM.  This may 
not be sensed by 
instrumentation. 
Must begin an 
orderly shut down 
of ITER when 
TBM temperature 
begins to increase. 
FB2 9Eí05/yr Analyst judgment 
based on HFIR 
PRA analyses 
Water cooled 
systems have had 
screws, bolts, 
bearings, gasket 
pieces, weld slag, 
rust particles, 
etc., in the piping 
system.  
Personnel have 
left pencils, rags, 
tools, and other 
debris.  High 
Flux Isotope 
Reactor PRA, 
PLG-0604, 1988. 
Vacuum 
penetrations for 
helium lines, 2 
penetrations 
NO leakage Category III fretting wear, 
vibration, material 
failure
Materials 
selection in 
design, periodic 
inspection, NDT 
Small air 
inleakage from 
port cell room to 
VV
Must begin an 
orderly shutdown 
of ITER, receiving 
Be-air reactions 
VVA2 Assume under 
vacuum all year, 
8760 h. 
1Eí07/h analyst judgment Used 
NUREG/CR-
1730 piping 
penetration 
failure to seal as 
basis.
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    rupture Category III fretting wear, 
vibration, material 
failure
Materials 
selection in 
design, periodic 
inspection, NDT 
Large air 
inleakage from 
port cell room to 
VV
Must shut down 
ITER if air has not 
already disrupted 
the plasma.  
Receiving
widespread Be-air 
reactions. 
VVA2 Assume under 
vacuum all year, 
8760 h. 
1Eí08/h analyst judgment Assume a rupture 
is 0.1x the 
leakage failure 
rate.
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Appendix D: Active Repair Times for TBM Pb-17Li Components 
D-1. INTRODUCTION 
To perform a radiological dose assessment of workers occupying radiation zones, the expected residence times are needed.  The active 
repair time is the time that workers are at or near the component in question, performing the necessary tasks.  Total repair time is 
generally referred to as the entire component outage time, and it includes the system shut down and cooldown, time spent “safing” the 
system for personnel access, time to bring spare parts to the work location, time spent outside the radiation zone preparing for the 
labor activity, and the post-repair system operability testing to demonstrate that the repair is good and the system can be returned to 
service.  The active repair time is the time sought here to give radiation dose estimates.  The helium flow loop is not considered here 
since it is known that helium does not activate and any radiation around the helium loop will be very small, plus most of the helium 
loop components are located in a vault room far from the tokamak, where radiation fields are very low.  The blanket module box is not 
treated here since it is recognized that there is no hands-on, in situ repair to the irradiated TBM module box, and replacement of the 
TBM box will be performed as an all-remote handling activity.  An initial estimate for TBM box replacement is 400 hours. 
As with the component failure rate data needs in the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the Pb-17Li flow loop in the main body
of this report, representative data from liquid sodium fission reactors was sought first.  Literature searches revealed that there has been 
little published information on maintenance of US sodium reactors.  Two papers gave some overall radiation exposures for two 
sodium reactors, the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) near Hanford, Washington (Bunch, 1990), and the Experimental Breeder Reactor-
II near Idaho Falls, Idaho (Olson, 1986).  The overall exposure information that has been found is summarized below in Table D-1.
The TBM exposures are expected to be much less than these exposures since the TBM is much smaller and much less irradiated (short
durations of low flux, no fission products) and is a smaller system than found at sodium-cooled reactors. 
Other sodium–cooled and liquid metal reactor experiences were searched as well.  Notably, the Dounreay Fast Reactor, a NaK cooled,
50 MW-thermal plant, discovered a small leak of ~100 liters NaK per day in May 1967 (Matthews, 1968).  The plant shut down to 
find and repair the leak on July 29, 1967.  Locating the leak was hampered by high radiation fields and confined spaces in the reactor’s 
containment sphere.  Leak checking commenced in August 1967 but the leak could not be found.  Ten grams of mildly irradiated Gold
was mixed into the NaK coolant to act as a tracer.  Eventually traces of Gold were found in the containment building outside the
reactor, indicating that the leak was still flowing.  In November 1967, core internals were removed to reduce radiation fields to 1-2 
rem/hour in containment.  A manned entry for leak checking was carried out on November 12, but was inconclusive.  The 24 heat 
exchangers were tested for leaks; finally on December 19 the leak was found in a 4-inch line.
Table D-1.  Annual Worker Exposures at the EBR-II and FFTF sodium cooled reactors 
Calendar Year Average dose per 
person (mrem) 
Highest individual 
dose (mrem) 
Collective dose 
(person-rem) 
Experimental Breeder Reactor-II 
1970 720 -- -- 
1971 1,170 -- -- 
1972 1,000 -- -- 
1973 530 -- -- 
1974 630 -- 40 
1975 1,350 -- 117 
1976 1,040 -- 103 
1977 1,200 -- 87 
1978 800 -- 56 
1979 830 -- 59 
1980 310 -- 41 
1981 370 -- 150 
1982 450 -- 41 
1983 320 -- 61 
1984 270 -- 58 
Fast Flux Test Facility 
1982 36 200 10 
1983 22 200 5 
1984 37 250 13 
1985 4 110 1 
1986 20 290 2 
1987 5 110 1.1 
1988 7 200 1.5 
1989 6 50 1.2 
Note: person-rem data for EBR-II came from the web site 
http://hss.energy.gov/CSA/Analysis/rems/annual/pri_ann.htm 
In each reactor, the maintenance workers accounted for 75-80% of the dose, with the remainder 
being divided about evenly between plant operators and instrumentation & controls (I&C) 
technicians.
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The line was drained, cut with hacksaws, and removed.  In the January-February time frame, scaffolds were erected, pipe lagging was 
removed, new pipework was designed and fabricated, equipment was tested, and an internal pipe welding machine was developed.  
Detailed work plans were made to reduce exposure time.  Repairs proceeded in March 1968.  The work went slowly due to each 
person’s exposure limit of 1 rem/month; this dose limit could be realized in as little as 2 hours of labor.  Several staff volunteered to 
receive an allowable overexposure of 10 rem/month.  In welding, NaK would melt and contaminate the weld, so sodium metal plugs 
were fashioned and pushed ~18 cm into the pipe ends to confine the NaK away from the weld heat affected zones.  Eventually the pipe
was welded into place and radiographed, then pressure tested (leaving the plugs inside the pipe ends).  The Dounreay plant restarted
on June 22, 1968.  This was roughly eleven months of outage time for a 100 liter/day leak.
The Phenix sodium-cooled plant had cracks forming in some of the superheater and reheater tubes (Cavagna, 2006).  In 2001 a 
building was constructed to handle the tubes for weld repair.  Over nine months in 2002, forty-seven steam generator 
superheater/reheater modules (7 tubes per module) measuring 16.9 m long were removed, given > 160 hours of cleaning, and then 
were welded and radiographed.  1,500 welds were made and inspected using 8,500 gamma radiographs.  Personnel exposure totalled 
6.1 mSv for the task.  In two additional months in 2002, all of the modules were reassembled in the Phenix steam generator.
Assuming that just one of these modules is comparable to a TBM heat exchanger, then 11 months or 334 days/47 modules gives 
roughly 7 days per module.  This is a poor average, since the time to uninstall and reinstall the tube module is distributed over all of 
the modules, but it does give the order of magnitude of a tube repair activity. 
This document treats three types of repair times, the active repair for corrective maintenance (e.g., replacing a seal on an existing
component), the active maintenance time to perform routine actions (e.g., calibration, inspection, surveillance testing), and the active 
repair time to replace a component (e.g., replace a pump, tank or valve).  Some component repair times for water system components
in nuclear and in typical industrial environments have been assembled to apply to the Pb-17Li flow loop.  Unfortunately, statistical
tabulations of repair time data are sparse in the literature. The best known sources of averaged labor times are for construction labor 
estimating (Means, 2007) and for automobile mechanical repair (Chilton, 2007).  Without fusion or fission liquid metal maintenance
time data readily available, water cooling system data are used here.  The water system data mainly come from power generation, both 
fossil and nuclear, and other commercial industries.  The TBM is much smaller than the components maintained in the power 
generation industry, so effort was made to find repair times applicable to small size components.  For example, Milivojevic (1989)
gave repair times for PWR primary cooling pumps that ranged from 142.9 hours to 500 hours in the first 10,000 hours of operation.
The repair time peaked at 2,000 hours and was as low as 100 hours over pump lifetime.  The overall Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) 
was ~1,000 hours.  However, a PWR primary coolant pump is large (7.5 MW, versus 20 kW for the TBM, and water flows of ~350 
Mg/minute versus Pb-17Li flow at 72 kg/minute) and requires different maintenance demands (scaffolds, cranes, etc.) to service the
unit.  Comparing Milivojevic data on a set of about 500 PWR pumps to collected data on smaller water pump units shows that for 
smaller centrifugal pumps, the mean time to repair (MTTR) is much smaller:  6.8 hours (pumps flowing less than 3.6 Mg/minute), 7.8
hours (pumps with flow rates between 3.6 and 7.3 Mg/minute), and 26.7 hours (pumps with flow rates between 7.3 and 364 
Mg/minute) (Shultz, 982; Cullinane, 1989).  Another important source of repair times has been given by Butler (2000) for repairs to 
shipboard components – these components are much closer to the TBM in size than the large power plant components.  When repair 
times for small size components were not available, the repair times for large-scale components were ratioed down to apply to the
TBM.  The US TBM is helium and lithium-lead cooled rather than water-cooled, but the power industry data for water system 
components are the most representative repair times available to apply to the low pressure lithium-lead components of interest, and are 
presently the most reasonable data to use for the scoping ORE assessment.  It is noted from the literature that past fusion ORE
estimates have also used fission reactor experiences to give repair times (Sandri, 2000; Sandri, 2002; Sandri, 2004).  Efforts are also 
being made to collect actual operating experiences from existing tokamaks to support ITER ORE estimates (Natalizio, 2005; 
Natalizio, 2005a); however, these data are of limited use on the TBM since the TBM is a unique piece of equipment that is not 
presently used in tokamaks.   
D-2.  ACTIVE REPAIR TIMES 
The main Pb-17Li flow loop components, their failure rates and failure probabilities per year (taken from the TBM preliminary FMEA
tables in Appendix A), and the average active repair times; that is, mean time to repair (MTTR) values, are listed in Table D-2.
It is noted in Table 2 that most of the annual probabilities of needing repairs to any given component in a particular component type 
are small.  Therefore, in a given year there may not be any repair activities.  However, there will be annual preventive maintenance,
surveillance testing, and inspections of the flow loop components.  Lofaro (1991) discussed frequencies of testing light water reactor 
Component Cooling Water System components.  MOV stroke time and valve seat leakage, and check valve leakage and flow, were 
measured each 3 months.  Pressure relief valve setpoints were checked each 5 years.  Pump vibration and pump head were tested each
3 months, as well as suction pressure, flow rate, bearing temperature, lubricant temperature and level, motor voltage, and performance 
testing. Pump inspection and maintenance for water system pumps has been discussed by Karassik (1976).  Karassik suggested daily
inspections (just a few minutes duration) to listen for suspect noises and look for leakage of either process fluid or bearing lube oil.
Semi-annual inspections for seal performance and bearing lubricant change were recommended, and annual bearing and shaft packing
inspection should be performed.  Therefore, it seems that many tests and inspections are carried out several times per year and the 
entries into radiation areas for these purposes will give higher annual exposure times for personnel than the repair activities.
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Table D-2.  Component Failure Rates and Repair Times 
Component type Component
count
Overall “all 
modes” failure 
rate
Probability of a 
component in 
this type failing 
in a calendar 
year
Mean Time  
to Repair, MTTR 
(hours)
Person-hours 
active
repair time
(hours) Reference 
Motor controller 1 7.6E-05/h 0.26 c 2.4 assume 4.8 Cullinane, 1989 
Circuit breaker 1 3E-07/h 0.001 6.0 assume 12 IEEE, 1997 
Pump motor 1 5.5E-03/d 
(hourly motor faults 
were included with 
the pump) 
0.04 c 50.2 assume 100.4 IEEE, 1997 
Pump  1 8.23E-05/h 0.28 c 6.8 assume 13.6 Cullinane, 1989 
Level sensor 2 2.4E-06/h 0.016 6 assume 12 Hannaman, 1978 
Pressure sensor 3 2E-06/h 0.021 6 assume 12 Hannaman, 1978 
Temperature 
sensor
3 1.92E-05/h 0.18 c 6 assume 12 Hannaman, 1978 
Piping 200 m 1.29E-08/h-m 0.006 30 per leak assume 60 
12.5 per m 
Hannaman, 1978 
Butler, 2000 
Check valve 3 2E-04/d  + 
2.5E-06/h 
0.024  24 assume 48 Hannaman, 1978 
Motor operated 
valve
12 1E-03/d  + 
1.65E-05/h 
0.11 c 7.5 15 Butler, 2000 
Flow control valve 2 1E-03/d  + 
2.4E-06/h 
0.022  7.5 15 Butler, 2000 
Transition to 
concentric pipe 
1 5.05E-08/h 0.00017 30 per leak assume 60 Hannaman, 1978 
Concentric pipe 2 m 6.69E-08/h 0.00022 30 per leak assume 60 Hannaman, 1978 
Concentric pipe 
inlet to TBM 
1 3.3E-05/h 0.11 c Remote handling --  
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Table D-2.  Component Failure Rates and Repair Times, continued. 
Component type Component
count
Overall “all 
modes” failure 
rate
Probability of a 
component in 
this type failing 
in a calendar 
year
Mean Time  
to Repair
(hours)
Person-hours 
active
repair time
(hours) Reference 
Concentric pipe 
outlet from TBM 
1 1E-04/y 0.0001 Remote handling --  
Mixing tank 1 1.05E-07/h 0.00035 40 assume 80 Hannaman, 1978 
T extraction tank 1 2.4E-06/h 0.008 30 assume 60 Hannaman, 1978 
Pb-Li to He heat 
exchanger
1 4.11E-06/h 0.014 30 assume 60 Hannaman, 1978 
Pump expansion 
tank
1 2.11E-05/h 0.07 c 40 assume 80 Hannaman, 1978 
Cold trap 1 1.15E-05/h 0.039 c 20 assume 40  analyst judgment 
Cold trap heat 
exchanger
1 1.1E-06/h 0.004 20 assume 40  analyst judgment 
Drain tank 1 1.1E-06/h 0.004 40 assume 80 Hannaman, 1978 
Rupture disk 1 1E-04/d  + 
1E-05/h
0.034 c 1 assume 2 analyst judgment 
Pressure relief 
valve
1 4.16E-06/h 0.014 7.5 15 assumed from 
Butler, 2000 
Drain tank electric 
heater
1 1.56E-06/h 0.005 4 assume 8 analyst judgment 
Notes: Used 3,360 Pb-17Li loop operating hours/year to obtain annual failure probabilities.  Used guidance from Derdiger (1981) to estimate man-
hours needed given the MTTR value. 
Probability of complete overhaul or replacement over the 15-year lifetime of the TBM project (~50,000 hours operating time) is considered to 
occur if the (probability/year)(15 years) is greater than 0.5.  If a “c” appears in the probability column then the component is expected to require a 
changeout; that is, one major overhaul or replacement during the 15-year project life.  The motor controller is probably not in the radiation area, it 
can be close to the motor control center electrical panel. 
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D-3.  COMPONENT TESTING, PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE AND CALIBRATION 
TIMES
The largest yearly reason to enter the TBM port cell is for component inspection, 
surveillance testing, preventive maintenance, and calibration.  Typical times for these 
activities in the fission industry are given in Table D-3.  At present, it is not clear if 
fission-type inspections will be necessary on a yearly basis if the Pb-17Li piping is 
removed to replace the TBM module box every other year.  The box removal will allow 
detailed inspection of the flow loop components on a biannual basis.  Some explanations 
of the fission-based inspection times are given below. 
An issue of importance is weld and piping tests. It is assumed that TBM welds in piping 
would be radiographed during construction, then the inspections would switch to 
ultrasonic (volumetric) inspection and dye penetration testing performed annually.  At the 
Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), a fission reactor for materials irradiation at the INL, weld 
inspection is performed in two parts.  The first part is dye penetrant.  The technician 
wipes the pipe surface clean with dry rags, or a cleanser if necessary, then paints red dye 
on the weld with a brush or spray can, lets the dye penetrate for about 10 minutes, the 
wipes down excess dye with another rag.  Then a cleaner solution or plain water is used 
to remove residual surface dye and the weld is wiped down with rags again.  After the 
solution or water is dried, a developer solution is sprayed on the pipe.  The technician 
waits for 7-8 minutes and visually inspects for indications of dye in any cracks.  If none 
are found, the white residue from the developer is wiped off to prepare the pipe weld for 
ultrasonic inspection.  The dye process typically takes about 30 minutes for a 10 cm-
diameter pipe.  The technician, who usually works alone but has a buddy standing by 
outside the radiological area, can retreat from the radiation area during drying times, so 
exposure is only about 10 minutes out of the 30-minute process.   
The second part of weld inspection is ultrasonic testing (UT).  UT is performed by hand 
and requires less than 10 minutes per weld to access the weld in a 5 cm-diameter pipe, 
start the UT equipment, apply the petroleum jelly on the weld for good contact with the 
probe, track the probe around the weld circumference, verify that the inspection data was 
good, wipe the jelly off the pipe, and leave the weld location.  For a 10 cm-diameter pipe, 
the ultrasonic test time would be 10-15 minutes/weld.  Small piping under 5 cm-diameter 
would take perhaps only 5-10 minutes per weld.  For small diameter welds, the total 
technician exposure time is estimated to be 20 minutes per weld during a combined dye 
and UT inspection.
Assuming a total of 200 m of piping in the TBM Pb-17Li flow loop, and assuming that a 
pipe section is typically 3 m, and has on average 1 weld, gives 67 welds to inspect in the 
loop.  Assuming the 20% inspection per year to give complete flow loop inspection in 5 
years of loop lifetime gives 13 welds to inspect per year.  At 20 minutes inspection time 
within the radiation field per weld, this is 4.3 hours per year for the piping welds. 
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Table D-3.  Testing, Calibration, and Preventive Maintenance Times 
Type of 
Component
Number of 
components
in Pb-17Li 
flow loop 
Average
test act 
duration
per
component
(h)
{multiply by 2 for 
person-hours} 
Range of 
Test act 
duration
(h)
Typical test or 
calibration activities 
and frequency 
Reference 
Centrifugal
pump+motor 
1 1.4 
0.005 
0.25 - 4 Leak inspection, 
output check, four 
times per year 
Annual PM 
WASH,
1975
Shultz,
1982
Motor
operated
valve
17 0.86 
0.01
0.25 - 2 Open/close torque, 
leak inspection, four 
times per year 
Annual PM 
WASH,
1975
Shultz,
1982
Check valve 3 0.86 0.25 - 2 Leak inspection, valve 
disk proper operation, 
four times per year 
WASH,
1975
Relief valve 1 0.86 0.25 - 2 Leak inspection, 
spring tension, suggest 
annual inspection 
WASH,
1975
Piping ~200 m 
(0.16 m 
diameter and 
less)
2.15
(based on 
20% test per 
year) 
 Leak inspection, wall 
thinning inspection, 
ASME ISI, annual 
See text for 
NDT
discussion
Expansion
tank
1 0.125  Leak inspection, wall 
thinning inspection, 
ASME ISI.  Once in 
TBM lifetime  
Butler,
2000
Mixing tank 1 0.125  Leak inspection, wall 
thinning inspection, 
ASME ISI.  Once in 
TBM lifetime  
Butler,
2000
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Table D-3.  Testing, Calibration, and Preventive Maintenance Times, continued. 
Type of 
Component
Number of 
components
in Pb-17Li 
flow loop 
Average
test act 
duration
per
component
(h)
{multiply by 2 for 
person-hours} 
Range of 
Test act 
duration
(h)
Typical test or 
calibration activities 
and frequency 
Reference 
Drain tank 1 0.125  Leak inspection, wall 
thinning inspection, 
ASME ISI.  Once in 
TBM lifetime  
Butler,
2000
Drain tank 
heater
1 0.86 0.25 - 2 Operability test, output 
measurement, annual 
Assumed 
from 
WASH-
1400 
values
Cold trap 1 0.125  Leak inspection, wall 
thinning inspection, 
ASME ISI.  Once in 
TBM lifetime 
Assumed 
from Butler 
values for 
tank test 
Cold trap heat 
exchanger
1 0.125  Leak inspection, wall 
thinning inspection, 
ASME ISI.  Once in 
TBM lifetime 
Assumed 
to be a 
jacket
around the 
cold trap, 
so applied 
a tank 
value.
Vacuum 
permeator 
(like a heat 
exchanger)
1 8.6 
6.0
 Eddy current test. 
Hydraulic test. 
Each once in lifetime 
Taken from 
heat
exchanger
below
Pb-17Li to 
Helium Heat 
exchanger
1 8.6 
6.0
 Eddy current test. 
Hydraulic test. 
Each once in lifetime 
See text 
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Table D-3.  Testing, Calibration, and Preventive Maintenance Times, continued. 
Type of 
Component
Number of 
components
in Pb-17Li 
flow loop 
Average
test act 
duration
per
component
(h)
{multiply by 2 for 
person-hours} 
Range of 
Test act 
duration
(h)
Typical test or 
calibration activities 
and frequency 
Reference 
Temperature 
instrument
3 1.4 0.25 - 4 Adjust, calibrate, 
biannual
WASH,
1975
Pressure
instrument
3 1.4 0.25 – 4 Adjust, calibrate, 
biannual
WASH,
1975
Level
instrument
2 1.4 0.25 – 4 Adjust, calibrate, 
biannual
WASH,
1975
Notes:  A buddy system of two workers in radiation areas should be assumed, hence the 
multiplication by 2 for person-hours.  Typical surveillance includes component testing, calibration or 
inspection to assure proper component operation within safety limits and that limiting conditions for 
operation will be met.  Some of this testing would be carried out during, or near the end of, ITER 
outages when personnel ORE would be minimized. 
The piping In Service Inspection is a 120-month interval test of welds as specified in the ASME 
Section XI.  Power plants typically perform 10% of their piping NDT inspections during outages 
each year to determine that they are meeting the 120-month schedule.  A suggestion is that the TBM 
inspect 20% of its piping annually, or at least annually inspect the piping regions of greatest 
reliability concern.   
Eddy current inspection of the heat exchanger tubes must be performed periodically.  At 
the ATR, eddy current inspection is performed every 10 years.  A full inspection of all 
tubes in a heat exchanger (containing about 1,300 tubes that are bent into U-tubes for 
about 92,000 square feet per heat exchanger) requires about 1.5 weeks, or roughly 60 
calendar hours, with a crew of two inspectors, so 120 person-hours per heat exchanger.
This figure would be scaled down for a smaller unit by number of tubes or perhaps by 
square footage.  The TBM Pb-17Li-to-helium heat exchanger has 56 tubes and 4.22 m2
tube surface area (Wong, 2005 Table 2.2.2-3), so using a ratio from the ATR experience 
(~10.8 tubes/person-hour) gives 5.2 person-hours for eddy current testing.  Cleaning the 
heat exchanger to allow eddy current testing is estimated from Butler (2000), where a 
5 m2 heat exchanger cleaned by air or water lance required 12 man-hours.  Thus, heat 
exchanger eddy current testing could require 17.2 person-hours or 8.6 hours.  For smaller 
heat exchangers, a hydraulic test can require ~12 man-hours (6 hours) for preparation, 
testing, and restoration to operational configuration (Butler, 2000).
According to ASME BPVC Section III, Division I, Part NB-6000, pressure tests of 
equipment, the equipment must undergo the hydrostatic test pressure for a minimum of 
10 minutes before the inspector begins a visual inspection for leaks, deformation, out-of-
round components, etc.  The inspector does not have to remain in a radiation zone while 
the 10 minutes of ‘pressure hold time’ are passing, but the inspector does have to enter to 
examine the tank.  Any leaks must be assessed as being within specifications or 
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originating from temporary seals installed to perform the test.  Considering the test setup 
time, gradual pressure increase time, hold time, inspection time, and pressure bleed-off 
time, a rough estimate of 1 hour is needed for pressure tests, but the  Inspector and one 
system engineer do not stay in the radiation zone the entire time.  A pressure test is 
performed before initial operation and after each major refurbishment of the system.  
Some instruments can be calibrated remotely, and this capability is worth investigation 
for the TBMs (Hashemian, 1993).  These so-called smart sensors are digital units that can 
accept remote commands; self-interrogate, self-adjust and even self-calibrate.  If these 
sensors work well in the ITER fringe magnetic field, they would be useful to reduce 
personnel radiation exposure and also reduce personnel exposure to industrial hazards in 
the port cell. 
D-4 COMPONENT REPLACEMENT TIMES 
The third aspect of repairs is replacement of components.  Replacement would only occur 
as a result of a complete failure that is too extensive to repair locally (e.g., pump impeller 
binds on pump volute) or too time consuming in a radiation field to repair (e.g., motor 
winding replacement), or externally-induced damage to a component.  Some equipment 
replacement times from the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), a fission reactor for materials 
irradiation at the INL, have been gathered to give some insights on component 
replacement times. 
Major overhauls of equipment, or equipment replacements, tend to be lengthy but rare 
events, perhaps occurring every 5 to 10 years.  Some data on typical repairs and major 
equipment overhaul times have been taken from INL internal records on the Advanced 
Test Reactor (ATR; operated 1968-present).  ATR is a 250 MW-thermal fission reactor 
for materials irradiation.  Several events are discussed below.
On October 10, 1992, a small heat exchanger at ATR suffered a tube failure that resulted 
in tube-side liquid flowing into shell-side liquid.  The heat exchanger had only been in 
service for 8 years.  Operators noted what appeared to be a 17 gallon/minute leak from 
the process fluid to the lower pressure cooling fluid.  For this heat exchanger unit neither 
the process fluid (tube side at 200 psi) nor the cooling fluid (shell side) were radioactive, 
but the fluid was important to proper operation of the plant.  The reactor was shut down 
and the affected heat exchanger (one of two side-by-side units) was identified.  The heat 
exchanger was shut down and cooled down, then the stuffing box was accessed.  The 
leaking stainless steel tube was located, plugged, and the three adjacent tubes were also 
plugged in case the damaged tube had inflicted damage on the neighboring tubes.  The 
tube bundle was not pulled to inspect the failure, that action was deferred to a later time 
in favor of plant restart.  The heat exchanger was scheduled to be inspected during a 
future scheduled outage.  The heat exchanger was pressure tested on both tube and shell 
sides and upon satisfactory results it was returned to service.  Vibration and acoustical 
monitoring were also installed to allow for increased surveillance in case another tube 
failed.  From plant scram to power ascension, 166 hours of operating time were lost.  
Accounting for overall plant cooldown, then heatup & power ascension time, that leaves 
approximately 150 calendar hours for the tube repair activity.  The number of workers is 
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not known.  It is assumed that there was one mechanic, one testing technician for tube 
eddy current testing, a radiological controls technician, and one foreman/supervisor.  
Some other typical repairs have included a 3-inch pipe weld repair on October 24, 1992 – 
the small pipe leak was sensed, the pipe was depressurized and cooled for personnel 
safety.  Repair time took 80 calendar hours to cut out the old pipe section, check the pipe 
ends, weld in a new pipe piece, and radiograph the work.  On February 12, 1995, a very 
small water pump began to leak at its volute seal, the gasket was “washing out”.
Replacement of the seal required 92 calendar hours of reactor forced outage for repair 
and pressure test of the pump to return it to service, so 76 hours of actual repair time.  On 
December 8, 1998, a one-inch pipe tee began to leak about 1 gallon/hour.  From plant 
scram to power ascension, 120 hours of operating time were lost.  Repair of the leaking 
weld required ~104 calendar hours for access, re-welding, radiography, and pressure test. 
The number of personnel is not known, but the area is a contamination zone, so as a 
guess, two welders, a radiation worker for decon, preparation, and area cleanup work, and 
a health physics technician.  The supervisor and fire watch could observe from outside 
the zone.
Large equipment overhauls at ATR have included the four, 36-inch diameter check 
valves in the primary coolant system.  During a plant outage, these valves were 
disassembled, decontaminated, inspected, the valve disk pins were surface re-hardened, 
the dash pot assemblies were cleaned and inspected for corrosion, the valve case was 
non-destructive test (NDT) inspected, then the valves were reassembled and the casing 
bolts torqued.  The valves were leak checked and functionally tested, then declared 
operable again.  The four valves were isolated at 0243 hours on September 25, 1995, then 
drained.  Once dry, they were disassembled and parts laid down on the floor near the 
valves.  Decontamination was performed, then interior inspection.  Clevis units and hinge 
pins were hard surfaced.  The valve case seals were changed and the valves reassembled.  
The valve bolts were retorqued and the valves were re-flooded for leak testing.  This was 
accomplished for all four valves by 2352 hours on October 3, 1995, for a total of about 
213 calendar hours.  Thus, the overhaul of one large check valve would have required 
about 53.5 calendar hours with a crew of four workers (mechanics, fitters, and health 
physics technicians for survey and decon tasks).
A small, 40 hp electric-motor driven centrifugal pump, 4,700 gpm water flow, at the ATR 
required shaft seal changeout.  The pump shaft is horizontal.  During a planned reactor 
outage on February 9, 1997, the pump was shut down and isolated at 2010 hours.  At 
1800 hours on February 10 the work began.  The mechanic removed the pump top case 
and wrapped it in plastic to contain contamination left behind from evaporated coolant 
water.  Radiological smear samples in the dry pump casing read 50 mr/h, so work was 
suspended until a new Radiation Work Permit and ALARA review could be completed.  
Work stopped at 2249 hours while awaiting new paperwork.  Work resumed at 1400 
hours on February 13, the new seals were placed and the pump case top rebolting began 
by 1730 hours.  Rebolting the pump casing top was completed and a pressure test took 
place at 2225 hours.  The test failed; another set of new seals were needed.  On February 
17, from 1455 to 2310 hours, seal replacement tasks were under way.  On February 18, 
work continued between 1120 and 1630 hours, ending with a leak check that showed a 1 
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pint/minute leak (too high of a leak rate).  Another two hours of labor were needed to 
correct the new seal leak problem.  The total time was 4.75+8.5+8+5+2 for two seal 
installations, or ~14 hours per seal for two mechanics.  The companion pump unit seal 
replacement began at 0800 on February 19 and was completed with testing by 1500 
hours, for a total time of 9 calendar hours with a crew of two mechanics.  Thus, three 
pump shaft seal replacements required on average ~12 hours each, for two workers in 
each case.     
In 1998, several pumps were replaced or given major overhauls at the reactor.  A 100 hp, 
300 gpm pump was overhauled.  The impeller rings had bound up, seizing the shaft and 
halting the impeller.  The pump was completely disassembled, new parts installed, and it 
was returned to service in 3.5 months after labor by an untracked number of workers.  
This was not a high urgency replacement since the ATR was in a scheduled outage for 
other reasons and there was a redundant pump available to meet any needs during the 
outage.  Another pump was also replaced.  The 30 kW (40 hp) pump and its motor were 
replaced over 14 days (336 hours) in October 1998 using an untracked number of 
workers.  This was a major task but was not pursued 24-hours per day, there were some 
lulls in the task as workers were drawn away to perform other tasks during the plant 
outage.  The task was not urgent since the facility was in a long outage for other reasons.
Nonetheless, a time less than 14 days to replace a medium-sized pump and its motor is an 
initial estimate for a replacement time at a reactor facility. 
In 2000, a heat exchanger sprung a shell leak at a weld.  The leak was discovered at 1000 
hours on March 27.  Steps were taken to reduce the water leakage from the shell side.  At 
1000 hours on March 28, carpenters began erecting scaffolds to access the leak in the 10 
to 100 mr/hour radiation field.  Any known or surveyed hot spots (e.g., > 1 rem/hour) 
require sheets of temporary lead shielding to be placed for personnel protection.  The 
ATR approach is to administratively limit that shield placement task exposure to below a 
safe value, such as < 100 mrem.  Scaffolding was in place by 2330 hours, about 13 hours 
of work for two carpenters.   By March 30 at 0000 hours, the heat exchanger had been 
completely drained in preparation for weld repair.  Repairs began at 1230 hours on March 
31, and the weld was completed, cooled, inspected, and radiographed by 1800 hours that 
day.  This was 7.5 calendar hours for two welders with 0.5 hour for one radiographer to 
position equipment, shoot the weld, and check the results.  The heat exchanger leak repair 
required 52 person-hours for scaffold setup and takedown, 15 person-hours for welders, 
and 0.5 person-hours for radiography.  Health physics technicians surveyed the area 
before the work began, 0.5 person-hour, and a fire watch was needed during and after the 
hot work, 16 person-hours.  It is noted that the TBM is horizontal mounted at floor level, 
so scaffolds are not needed for maintenance work.  However, there may be temporary 
shielding curtain placement for extra protection above that offered by the permanent 
TBM shielding, and plastic sheets deployed at the parts lay-down area for contamination 
control.  By INL procedure, parts weighing 22 kg or more require a chain hoist or other 
mechanical lifting apparatus.  If similar rules are in force foe ITER, then lifting 
equipment must also be staged to support the maintenance replacement activity.    
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The Engineering Test Reactor (ETR; operated 1957-1981), a predecessor to the ATR, 
discovered a primary coolant leak in a 36-inch SS304L pipe on August 28, 1965 (Smith, 
1966).  The pipe crack was ‘weeping’ liquid.  A pipe crack had formed in a Y pattern 
around a 1.5-inch tap for a gas probe.  The cause of the crack was fatigue due to 
vibrational flutter of the ~12 inch long gas probe wand in the primary coolant flow.  A 
9.5-inch by 6.25 inch pipe section containing the crack was cut out of the pipe and the 
edges of the pipe hole were beveled, then ultrasonically and dye penetrant tested.  A 
backing strip was arc welded on the inner edge of the opening.  A patch was cut to 
dimension, beveled and rolled to pipe wall curvature, then arc welded into the pipe wall.  
The initial weld pass on the patch and the completed weld were radiographed and dye 
penetrant tested.   The actual repair work began at 0800 hours on August 29 with cutting 
out the “window” in the pipe wall to remove the cracked section.  A patch was fabricated 
and welded into place.  The patch was completed and ready for pressure testing by 0800 
on September 2.  After pressure testing was completed, a reinforcing band was placed 
around the patch.  The initial pipe repair task required 96 calendar hours in an 80-100 
mrem/hour radiation field.  The documentation did not provide information on the 
number of workers involved.  It is assumed that there were two welders, two NDT testers, 
and several health physics technicians standing by during work on the patch, but only one 
person of each craft was in the radiation field at a time, so an estimate of 288 person-
hours for this repair.  Other personnel, such as the fire watch for hot work, machinists 
who fabricated the patch in the workshop, etc., could perform their work beyond the 
radiation field.   Table D-4 gives the INL repair time experiences.  Noting these times 
compared to a complete, remote changeout of the TBM (~400 hours), perhaps an early 
TBM changeout would be less exposure than an in situ repair activity for a failed 
component. 
Butler (2000) gave some values for motor operated gate valves of 150 mm bore and 20 
atmospheres – major overhaul would be 21 man-hours per valve.  A rupture disk is stated 
to be quickly and easily changed out in product literature.  An analyst judgment value to 
open and remake the flange containing the rupture disk is 4 man-hours.  Replacing a 
temperature sensor should take one instrument technician approximately 2.5 hours, one to 
replace the sensor head and 1.5 hour to calibrate the new sensor head.  Small tank 
replacements require some time to “safe” the system, drain the tank, etc.  An analyst 
judgment value of 48 man-hours is given to small tank replacement tasks. 
Hummler (1988) described recirculation pipe replacements at the Muhleberg Boiling 
Water Reactor.  The pipe replaced was: 177 feet of 18-inch diameter (29 welds), 140 feet 
of 10-inch diameter (18 welds), 23 feet of 8-inch diameter (6 welds), 6 feet of 6-inch 
diameter (4 welds), 60 feet of 3-inch diameter (13 welds), and 354 feet of 2-inch diameter 
(156 welds).  The pipe weighed a total of 30 metric tonnes.  Project planning was 73,000 
man-hours before the on-site work began.  Training was given to 58 persons for 
mechanical cutting, 48 persons for welding, 15 persons for shielding installation and 
removal, 7 persons for decontamination, 8 persons for radiological survey operations.
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Table D-4.  Summary of repair and replacement times from INL operating experiences 
Plant and date Type of activity Calendar hours Man-hours Comments 
ATR 1992 HX tube plug 150 600 Non-urgent 
repair
ATR 1992 3-inch pipe weld 
repair
80 160 Typical repair 
ATR 1995 Volute seal 
replaced on small 
pump 
76 152 Semi-urgent 
repair
ATR 1997 40 hp pump shaft 
seal replaced 
12 24 Typical repair 
ATR 1998 1-inch pipe weld 
repair
104 416 Typical repair 
ATR 1998 40 hp motor and 
pump 
replacement
336 ~336 Non-urgent 
repair
ATR 2000 HX shell leak 
repair
144 84 Non-urgent 
repair
ETR 1965 Pipe crack repair 96 ~288 Urgent repair 
Note: urgency of repair concept was taken from IEEE, 1974. 
Total radiation exposure was 810 man-rems for the 760 feet of pipe replaced.  The work 
began on November 11, 1986 and required about 12 weeks and 310,000 man-hours.  A 
temporary piping workshop was built adjacent to the reactor containment before plant 
shutdown.  Only one weld of the 29+18 welds (in the 18- and 10-inch pipes) had to be 
remade.  Welds were performed by machines for the large diameter pipes.  Full 
volumetric ultrasonic testing and weld radiography were performed by machine on all of 
the piping before the recirculation system was pressure tested.   
These maintenance times are point estimates from individual activities at a single nuclear 
facility.  They are not good statistical average times for such activities, and the urgency 
of repair was not well defined in all cases; it was inferred from the documentation in the 
INL cases.  Nonetheless, these values are indicative of the order of magnitude of time 
needed to perform major equipment repairs and replacements, e.g., hours to days to 
weeks.
Methods to work with alkali metal piping can be adapted to the Pb-17Li TBM piping.
Figure D-1 shows how welding was performed on piping at the JOYO sodium-cooled 
reactor during heat exchanger replacement. The heat exchanger replacement activity at 
JOYO required 10 calendar months.  The estimated dose to replace 6 heat exchangers 
(two intermediate Na-Na heat exchangers and four Na-air ultimate heat sink heat 
exchangers) was 5,235 person-mSv (523.5 person-rems).  When the task was completed, 
the actual dose was 2,156 person-mSv (215.6 person-rems).   
Some discussion of design for maintainability is given for military equipment (MIL, 
1988) and has been adopted by industrial designers as well.  The concepts are design 
simplification, standardized parts and interchangeable parts, personnel accessibility and 
147
component accessibility for replacement, modular components, component identification 
and labeling, and testability and diagnostic capability of the system. 
The time estimates presented here should help to support the occupational radiation 
exposure estimation task for the DCLL TBM. 
Figure D-1.  Depiction of the inert atmosphere seal bag for welding piping.  (Isozaki, 2005) 
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